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The purpose of this dissertation is to present what I think is a particularly 
compelling normative version of sentimentalism.  The moral principle which is 
the foundation of this ethic is: An act, or a failure to act, is morally wrong if and 
only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent, and 
both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and any consequence 
is disliked by the impartial spectator. 
I begin this dissertation by explaining and defending the moral principle 
noted above.  I then show how this normative sentimentalist ethic handles the 
issues raised by factory farming and using animals for research.  Next, I present 
the two most well-known arguments regarding the treatment of animals, Peter 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s rights theory, as well as key 
objections to these theories.  I follow this by showing how the version of 
sentimentalism presented in this dissertation overcomes the objections to the 
animal ethics of Singer and Regan.  To conclude, I address and respond to 
possible criticisms of the normative sentimentalist theory itself.   
 iv 
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Although metaethical sentimentalism has received quite a bit of attention 
in the recent past, very little attention has been given to normative sentimentalist 
moral theories.  The reason for this might be the prevalent notion that the 
sentiments (i.e., emotions) are untrustworthy and so cannot be the basis of sound 
moral judgments.  Although I cannot disagree with the idea that emotions can be 
unpredictable and thus ought not be the sole basis for moral judgments, I also 
think any moral theory that entirely excludes the emotions is inadequate.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to present what I think is a particularly 
compelling normative version of sentimentalism inspired primarily by the moral 
philosophy of one of the original sentimentalists, Adam Smith.  The reason for 
relying on Smith’s sentimentalism is because his version is arguably the most 
complete and least problematic of all the sentimentalist theories currently 
available.1 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters.  The first and second 
chapters focus on introducing, developing and defending the sentimentalist ethic I 
am proposing.  Chapter 3 shows how this sentimentalist ethic handles the issues 
raised by factory farming and using animals for research.  In chapter 4, I present 
the two most well-known arguments regarding the treatment of animals, Peter 
                                                 
1
 I set aside Michael Slote’s recent work because although he relies on the sentimentalist 
theories of Hume and Hutcheson, Slote’s focus is on virtue and care. 
 2 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s rights theory, as well as key 
objections to these theories.  In the final chapter, I first show how the version of 
sentimentalism presented in this dissertation overcomes the objections to the 
animal ethics of Singer and Regan presented in chapter 4.  To conclude, I address 
and respond to possible criticisms of the normative sentimentalist theory itself.   
As noted, the purpose of chapter 1 is to introduce and explain normative 
sentimentalism.  I do this by stating and then explaining each of the components 
of the moral principle which is the basis for this ethic: An act, or a failure to act, is 
morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a 
moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and 
any consequence is disliked by the impartial spectator.  I argue that selfishness is 
the motive with which the impartial spectator disapproves and that a moral agent 
acts from selfishness when she fails to give due consideration to the relevant 
interests of those affected by her action(s).  The consequences that are disliked by 
the impartial spectator are those that harm a moral agent or moral patient.   
The difference between moral agents and moral patients is that moral 
agents are those who can be harmed and who can understand which motives are 
disapproved of (and which are approved of), which consequences are disliked 
(and which liked), and can choose whether to act (or not act) accordingly.  On the 
other hand, moral patients are those who can be harmed but who cannot 
understand which motives are disapproved of (and which are approved of), which 
 3 
consequences are disliked (and which are liked), or cannot choose to act (or not 
act) accordingly.  The distinction between moral agents and moral patients is 
made because moral patients cannot be held morally accountable for their actions 
due to the fact that they cannot understand which motives are disapproved of and 
which consequences are disliked.   
The impartial spectator, I maintain, is crucial to this theory because, 
although fictional, she is the final judge of motives, consequences and thus 
actions.  She represents the viewpoint of the ordinary person when she is in the 
position of a non-involved spectator.  So, although the impartial spectator does 
not possess those traits specific to the person (or people) principally involved, she 
does possess all the normal feelings characteristic of human nature - she possesses 
enough human characteristics to make her a good heuristic device, yet she is also 
an impartial bystander and so is able to properly evaluate actions. 
The second chapter is a defense of the ethic presented in the first chapter.  
I defend the ethic in two ways.  First, I focus on some of its theoretical merits: (1) 
that the emotions are a vital, but not solitary, factor in determining the morality of 
an action, (2) that both motives and consequences are taken into account when 
making moral judgments, and (3) that the impartial spectator is relied upon as a 
moral judge to properly evaluate motives and consequences.  With respect to this 
last point, I clarify how the impartial spectator handles issues such as partiality 
(viz., moral agents who are partial to their friends and loved ones) and customs 
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(viz., how the impartial spectator who is situated in a society is able to get critical 
distance from that culture’s customs, traditions and institutions).  The second way 
I defend normative sentimentalism in chapter 2 is to explain how it renders 
satisfactory moral judgments in two different cases, an uncontroversial case, a 
random drive-by shooting, as well as a controversial case, infanticide, while 
showing how other major moral theories only render a satisfactory moral 
judgment in the uncontroversial case.  In particular, I show how, according to 
normative sentimentalism, random drive-by shootings are morally wrong, and 
how it is often, but not always, the case that infanticide is morally wrong. 
The primary objective of chapter 3 is to show that factory farming and 
using animals for research is in most cases morally wrong.  To do this, I first 
explain both factory farm and research practices involving animals.  I do this to 
establish the fact that animals are very clearly harmed as a result of these 
practices, thus showing that one of the criteria for moral wrongness is satisfied.  I 
also establish that most of those involved with factory farming and research 
practices are moral agents, thereby showing that another of the three criteria for 
moral wrongness is satisfied.   Finally, I provide evidence for the fact that the 
motives of most of these moral agents are disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator, thereby showing that in such cases the third criterion is met and that 
these actions are therefore morally wrong.  Normative sentimentalism does 
recognize, however, that in some cases either the moral agent is not acting from 
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selfishness or that the person principally concerned is not a moral agent, but a 
moral patient (e.g., an infant).  In these cases, the actions of these individuals are 
not morally wrong, even though harm is coming to the animals, because not all 
three criteria have been met.   
Chapter 4 consists of a discussion of Peter Singer’s preference 
utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s rights theory as well as their positions regarding 
the practices of factory farming and using animals for research.  The purpose of 
this discussion is to compare normative sentimentalism to these prominent 
theories in order to show how it is both the superior moral theory and the superior 
animal ethic.  After describing each theory, I illustrate how each responds 
satisfactorily to some key objections and also how each fails to respond 
satisfactorily to some key objections.  
According to Singer’s preference utilitarianism factory farming animals 
and using them for research is usually morally wrong because doing so does not 
maximize preference satisfaction. The objections to which Singer’s theory is 
shown to respond satisfactorily are: the “speciesism objection” according to 
which animals do not deserve equal consideration because they are not humans 
and so humans have a right to treat them as we please; the “natural predator 
objection” according to which there is nothing morally wrong with humans eating 
animals because animals eat each other (and humans when given the opportunity) 
and because animals are different species than humans; the “animal interests 
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objection” according to which the interests of animals are not as important as the 
interests of humans and so do not deserve the type of consideration demanded by 
Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests; and the “preference 
satisfaction objection” according to which preference satisfaction is maximized 
by using factory farmed animals as food and using animals for research and 
therefore these practices are not morally wrong.  However, it is also established 
that Singer’s theory does not have a satisfactory response to one significant 
objection, the “moral standing objection”, according to which preference 
utilitarianism has a number of problems concerning the moral standing of sentient 
beings.  In particular, even though Singer claims sentient beings have moral 
standing superior to that of non-sentient beings, his preference utilitarianism does 
not go far enough in protecting them against certain types of actions, viz., it does 
not offer them enough protection against their being killed. 
According to Regan’s rights theory, factory farming animals and using 
them for research is always morally wrong because in such situations the animals 
are not treated with the respect they are due given their moral standing as beings 
with inherent value.  Regan’s theory has satisfactory responses to two important 
objections:  the “supererogatory acts objection” according to which one of 
Regan’s primary principles seems to imply that we have strict duties to do things 
that most think are supererogatory and the “lifeboat objection” according to which 
Regan’s theory is not only speciesist, but his claim that when faced with a 
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situation in which one must choose whether to save a human or a dog, one ought 
to save the human, is in direct conflict with his own theory as killing the dog 
violates the rights of the dog.  I then establish that there are two objections to 
which Regan’s theory does not have satisfactory responses: the “unknown 
inherent value objection” according to which the failure of Regan’s theory to 
thoroughly classify those animals with inherent value and those without results in 
untoward consequences and the “prohibition against aggregating harms objection” 
according to which it is a major problem with Regan’s theory that unless the 
harms individuals are subjected to are equal we ought not take into account the 
number of individuals harmed. 
In the fifth chapter I show how normative sentimentalism has satisfactory 
responses both to the objections to which Singer’s and Regan’s theories have 
satisfactory responses and to those to which they do not have satisfactory 
responses.  In addition, I present several possible objections critics might have to 
normative sentimentalism itself.  I first consider the fact that some might think 
that taking the life of another in order to preserve one’s own life is actually 
selfish, contrary to what I maintain throughout the dissertation.  I defend this by 
comparing a couple of different situations, one in which most would not argue 
that it is morally wrong to take a life and one in which many would be inclined to 
think it is wrong to take the life.  I show how the circumstances are not morally 
different and thus how the differing judgments are not defensible.  I then address 
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worries that might arise regarding the fact that normative sentimentalism does not 
require individuals to aggregate the consequences of actions in order to determine 
which action is the morally correct one.  What I argue is that it is actually an 
advantage of normative sentimentalism that it does not require, but nor does it 
prohibit, us from aggregating consequences in many situations.  Finally, I further 
defend the idea that there are times when it is not morally wrong to use animals 
for food and research. 
This dissertation demonstrates not only that normative sentimentalism is a 
viable moral theory, but that it is superior to other normative theories and that it is 
superior to the most prominent animal ethics. 
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Chapter 1: What Normative Sentimentalism Is 
 
1.1 Why Sentimentalism? 
Before presenting the normative sentimentalist theory being argued for 
here, I will begin by briefly reviewing some of the literature that supports 
sentimentalism and an ethic that has as its foundation the emotions.  I do this in 
order to show why we ought to be considering normative sentimentalism as a 
viable and important moral theory. 
Although Robert Solomon does not directly advocate ethical 
sentimentalism, he is perhaps the sentiments’ biggest contemporary advocate 
claiming: 
Philosophy has as much to do with feelings as it does with 
thoughts and thinking … To be a philosopher is to be steadfastly 
attentive to what it means to be human, to the passions as well as 
to much celebrated “rationality” … Philosophy … in its concern 
for feelings, requires not only emotional sensitivity but also an 
understanding of the emotions, not as curious but marginal 
psychological phenomena but as the very substance of life … I do 
not think there is anything wrong with reason and rationality … 
But when being “reasonable” means repressing, ignoring, or 
denigrating feeling, then philosophy has gone too far and, so far as 
most people are concerned, rendered itself irrelevant. (Solomon 
2004, vii) 
 
According to Simon Blackburn, who argues for metaethical 
sentimentalism in Ruling Passions, feelings of disgust, contempt, anger, or 
feelings of shame and guilt, along with feelings such as that of disgust at others 
who are not disgusted when one is disgusted or feelings of anger at those who are 
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calm when one is angry are “the heartland of everyday ethics” (Blackburn 2000, 
12-13).  He states, “To moralize … is to insist on emotional responses” 
(Blackburn 2000, 13).  In particular, he claims that getting rid of guilt or shame 
will diminish the motivation to act well and that a “central buttress of good 
behavior [will be] lost” (Blackburn 2000, 20).   
Mary Midgley says this about the sentiments’ role in morality: 
Feeling and action are essential elements in morality, which 
concentration on thought has often made philosophers overlook.  
Hume was right to stress them.  And today there is yet strong 
ground for doing so. (Midgley 1981, 12)2 
 
Although she argues that morality must consist of more than just feeling, she also 
argues that feelings are the raw material from which our moral principles are 
developed.   
In Morals from Motives, Michael Slote argues not only for a metaethical 
sentimentalism, but also for an agent-based virtue ethics which is a normative 
sentimentalist virtue ethic.  He claims that instead of reviving virtue ethics by 
looking to Stoicism for contemporary relevance as many virtue ethicists have 
recently done, one should look to the eighteenth-century British philosophers.3  
He states: 
[T]he idea of an agent-based virtue ethics that grounds its 
evaluations of actions in (evaluations of) sentiments that reflect a 
general concern for humanity has recently seemed to me to be a 
                                                 
2
 She is also the first philosopher that I am aware of to consider the role of feeling in our 
treatment of animals. 
3
 He refers specifically to Hume and Hutcheson. 
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very promising way of reviving virtue-ethics into 
contemporaneous relevancy.  Moral sentimentalism offers virtue 
ethics some splendid opportunities it has previously, to a large 
extent, neglected. (Slote 2003, viii-ix) 
 
Stephen Darwall, while concerned primarily with political philosophy and 
liberalism in particular, not only argues for the consideration of a sentimentalist 
ethic, but in fact claims: 
We can now see … a fascinating line of thought that leads [Adam] 
Smith from his distinctive form of sentimentalism, probably the 
most interesting version ever developed, to a kind of liberalism – 
“sympathetic liberalism,” as we might call it. (Darwall 1999, 140) 
 
He continues on: 
Contemporary writers on ethics who are attracted to ethics of 
virtue or impressed by the role of sympathy, emotion, and feeling 
in the moral life have generally looked to Hume for inspiration.  
The remarkable resources of Hume’s ethics not withstanding, 
however, there are at least three reasons for taking a serious 
interest in Smith.  First, Smith’s theory of sympathy and its role in 
our emotional lives is richer, more sophisticated, and, arguably, 
more suggestive for a wider range of issues in experimental 
psychology, philosophy of mind and moral psychology than is 
Hume’s … Second, Smith’s theory of moral sentiments deploys 
this more sophisticated theory of sympathy in a way that is 
interesting in itself and provides an important sentimentalist 
alternative to Hume … Finally … Smith’s ethics are a model of 
how a sentimentalist virtue ethics can nonetheless ground a 
substantially liberal theory of justice. (Darwall 1999, 140-141)4 
                                                 
4
 There is also a lot of work being done right now in moral psychology and the emotions, 
e.g., Prinz 2006, not to mention the interest in empathy in the philosophy of mind, e.g., Gordon 
1995 and 2000. 
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1.2 Sentimentalist Moral Judgments 
 
The following principle is the foundation of normative sentimentalism: An 
act, or a failure to act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, 
contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator and the act results in any consequences 
that are disliked by the impartial spectator.  There are three conditions then that an 
action must satisfy in order to be morally wrong: (1) it must be committed by, 
contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent; (2) the motive of the agent must 
be disapproved of by the impartial spectator; and (3) any consequence of the act 
must be disliked by the impartial spectator.  If and only if all three conditions are 
satisfied is the act morally wrong.  The purpose of this section is to describe these 
conditions.  To this end, I will begin by explaining what motives are disapproved 
of by the impartial spectator.  I will follow this with an explanation of the 
consequences that are disliked by the impartial spectator.  Next, I will describe the 
impartial spectator and her role in this theory.  I will then not only explain the 
difference between moral agents and moral patients, but will also show why only 
moral agents can be held morally accountable for their actions. 
Before getting started, I want to make clear that I am focusing on what 
actions are morally wrong and setting aside an in depth discussion regarding those 
that are morally right.  Of course, those actions that are morally right are those 
that are not morally wrong.  I am not, however, going to distinguish between 
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those actions that are not only morally right but that we also have positive reasons 
to perform and those actions that are morally right but that we do not also have 
positive reasons to perform.5 
 
1.2.1 Motives 
In this section I explain which motives are approved of by the impartial 
spectator and which are disapproved of by the impartial spectator and why they 
are approved of or disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  Given that what I 
am presenting is a sentimentalist moral theory, when I speak of motives I am 
referring to the passions that move us to act.  Accordingly, for the purposes of the 
argument presented here, the terms “motive”, “passion”, “emotion” and 
“sentiment” are interchangeable.  I want to point out, however, that not everyone 
uses these terms interchangeably.  For example, Jesse Prinz distinguishes between 
emotions and sentiments claiming that sentiments are dispositions to have 
emotions (Prinz, 2006).6  I am going to set aside such discussions and use the 
                                                 
5
 It is my intuition, however, that those actions that are morally acceptable and that we 
have positive reasons to perform are those that are committed by moral agents whose motives are 
approved of by an impartial spectator and the consequences of which are liked by an impartial 
spectator.  Those actions that are morally permissible but we do not have positive reasons to 
perform are those committed by a moral agent and either her motives are approved of by an 
impartial spectator or the consequences of the action are liked by an impartial spectator.  I think it 
is likely to be the case that those actions that are morally acceptable and that we have positive 
reasons to perform are those that are morally required and those that are morally acceptable but 
that we do not have positive reasons to perform are merely permissible or are supererogatory, 
depending on the circumstances. 
6
 There are also those who distinguish between “affection” and “passion” where 
affections are calm emotions and passions are violent emotions.  See, for example, Hutcheson’s 
Essay, 28.  Hume also seems to distinguish between “emotions” and “passions” by claiming that 
“’Tis a remarkable property of human nature, that any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily 
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terms interchangeably in part because Smith often does so and in part because any 
such distinctions will not have a significant impact on the argument being 
presented here.7 
Those motives of which the impartial spectator will approve are those of 
an agent with whom she sympathizes.  Those motives of which the impartial 
spectator will disapprove are those of an agent with whom she does not 
sympathize (TMS I.i.3.1, TMS I.i.3.2, TMS I.i.3.9 and TMS I.i.4.4).8  Sympathy, 
according to Smith, is our “fellow-feeling with any passion whatever” (TMS 
I.i.1.5).  To sympathize with another, we must imagine ourselves in her situation 
and “become in some measure the same person with [her], and thence form some 
idea of [her] sensations” (TMS I.i.1.2).9  Sympathy occurs, then, when there is an 
affect match between the spectator and the person principally concerned (i.e., the 
agent, the recipient of the agent’s action, or a by-stander).  If an affect match does 
                                                                                                                                     
converted into it, tho’ in their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to each 
other” (T419).  See also Hume’s Dissertation II.vi.1. 
Please note that references to the works of Hume will follow standard conventions.  For 
example, reference to Hume’s Treatise will be noted as ‘T’ followed by the page number.   
7
 That is, if Prinz is right and sentiments are different from emotions, for example, then I 
would merely have to stop using the terms interchangeably.  It would have no substantive impact 
on the theory itself. 
8
 All references to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments will follow standard 
conventions and be noted as ‘TMS’ followed by the part number, section number, chapter number 
(where applicable), and paragraph number.  Likewise, references to Smith’s Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations will be noted as ‘WN’ followed by the book number, 
chapter number, and paragraph number and references to Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence will 
be noted as ‘LJ’ followed by the section number and paragraph number.  Appropriate references 
will be made to Smith’s theory where it has had a significant impact on the theory presented here.  
I will also indicate the ways in which the theory presented in the dissertation differs from Smith’s 
theory where it is of particular interest.   
9
 See also TMS I.i.2.4 and TMS I.i.4.6.   
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not occur when the spectator imagines herself in the situation of another, then the 
impartial spectator does not sympathize with the person principally concerned. 
To be clear, sympathy does not occur if by mere coincidence there is an 
affect match between two people.10  The fact that two people just happen to be 
experiencing anger at a given time, e.g., they have suffered a similar fate, is not 
enough to say that one is sympathizing with the other.  Sympathy occurs only 
when one person, e.g., a bystander, imagines herself in the situation of another, 
e.g., an agent, and experiences the passion(s) the agent is experiencing.11  
[T]hat there may be some correspondence of sentiments between 
the spectator and the person principally concerned, the spectator 
must … endeavour, as much as he can to put himself in the 
situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little 
circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. 
(TMS I.i.4.6)   
 
For example, if you are experiencing anger and I imagine myself in your situation 
and experience anger as well, then I can be said to be sympathizing with you.  If I 
                                                 
10
 I am using the term “same” here rather loosely.  Two people can never feel identical 
passions (that is the passions are neither numerically identical nor are they qualitatively identical), 
but it is possible for two people to feel passions similar enough that we can call them the same 
(TMS I.i.1.2 and TMS I.i.4.7). 
11
 Currently, there is much discussion occurring as to the connection between feelings 
and emotions, i.e., whether feelings are or are not emotions (for example, Prinz 2005).  Although I 
do not think any possible distinctions between feelings and emotions would have a significant 
impact on the argument being presented here, I will speak of “experiencing” emotions rather than 
“feeling” emotions in order to avoid any confusion or controversy.  Some of the sources I cite, 
however, do speak of “feeling” emotion and I will remain true to them and their own terminology.  
But, again, in doing so, I am not promoting any particular position.  
I will use the term “agent” to refer to individuals who commit some actions or another 
but whose moral accountability is unknown and inconsequential to the point at hand.  I will use 
the term “moral agent” to refer to individuals who are morally accountable for their actions.  The 
distinction between moral agents and moral patients is explained in detail in section 1.2.4. 
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imagine myself in your situation and do not experience anger, then I am not 
sympathizing with you.   
Today we consider this act of the imagination to be empathy, a “feeling-
with” others, whereas sympathy is thought to be a “feeling-for” others.  Michael 
Slote says, “feeling someone else’s pain or suffering is feeling ‘empathy’ for the 
person in question, whereas feeling for someone else’s pain or suffering is a an 
example of a feeling of ‘sympathy’ for that person” (Slote 2004a, 299; original 
emphasis) and that “[e]mpathy involves seeing or feeling things from the 
standpoint of others; in some sense … empathy involves identifying to some 
extent with another person” (Slote 2004a, 300).12  According to Alvin Goldman, 
“[c]entral cases of empathy … may arise from simulation … from imaginatively 
adopting the perspective of another” (Goldman 1992, 29) and “[p]aradigm cases 
of empathy … consist first of taking the perspective of another person, that is, 
imaginatively assuming one or more of the other person’s mental states” 
(Goldman 1993, 351) .  Martin Hoffman, a prominent psychologist who 
specializes in empathy, claims “empathy [is] defined as an affective response 
more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own” (Hoffman 2000, 4).13  
The difference in terminology is likely due to the fact that the term “empathy” did 
                                                 
12
 See also Slote 2004b, 5-6. 
13
 Psychological experiments not only support the belief that we are capable of empathy 
(and that it is a deliberate act of the imagination), but also that such acts produce a greater 
response in the observer than just watching does, e.g., Hoffman 2000 and Goldman 1992 and 
1993.  
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not appear until the early 20th century (Slote 2004a, 297; Slote 2004b, 5; and 
Richmond, 245).  Although I think a good argument can be made for using the 
term “empathy” instead of the term “sympathy” in this theory, given that this 
ethic is inspired by Smith’s moral theory and given that he uses the term 
“sympathy”, I will continue to use the term “sympathy” to denote empathic acts 
of the imagination. 
One motive the impartial spectator will never approve of is selfishness.  
An individual is motivated by selfishness when it causes her to fail to give due 
consideration to the relevant interests of the moral agents or moral patients who 
might be affected by the consequences that are a result of the motive.  Selfishness 
can occur either when the individual is so consumed with her own interests, i.e., 
her own trivial interests (see below), that she fails to give due consideration to the 
relevant interests of those affected or when she is merely being thoughtless and so 
fails to give due consideration to the relevant interests of those affected.  The 
necessary condition for selfishness is the agent’s failure, for whatever reason, to 
give due consideration to the relevant interests of those affected.    
Excessive self-love often causes an individual to act from selfishness, but 
it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it.14  The impartial spectator 
will never experience this passion when she imagines herself in the situation of 
                                                 
14
 Smith refers to selfishness as a “misrepresentation of self-love” (TMS III.3.4) and he 
thinks that keeping it in check “constitutes the perfection of human nature” (TMS I.i.5.5).  See 
also TMS II.ii.2.1.   
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the agent, and thus she will never sympathize with an agent who is overcome with 
and moved by it.  The impartial spectator will never sympathize with excessive 
self-love because she cannot sympathize with passions that are either “too high” 
(or “too low”) (TMS I.ii.intro.1) and so the agent must “humble the arrogance of 
his self-love and bring it down to something which other men can go along with” 
(TMS II.ii.2.1).15  So, self-love itself is not objectionable.  It is a passion with 
which the impartial spectator can sympathize, as long as it is not excessive.   
Excessive self-love is not a necessary condition for selfishness because an 
individual can act from selfishness without acting from excessive self-love.  For 
example, an individual who kills a dog to feed her children merely because they 
enjoy the taste of dog is not acting from excessive self-love, although she is not 
giving due consideration to the relevant interests of those affected by her action.16  
Excessive self-love is not a sufficient condition for selfishness either because an 
individual can be experiencing excessive self-love and yet not act from it.  For 
example, I could currently be experiencing excessive self-love and yet not be 
engaging in any activity in which I am not giving due consideration to the 
                                                 
15
 See also TMS I.i.3.8, TMS I.i.4.7 and TMS I.i.5.1.  Although it is not entirely clear 
what Smith means by when he says that some passions are “too high” or “too low”, I think it is 
safe to say that he means something that is at the very least similar to what Hume and others have 
in mind when they speak of violent and calm passions.  I discuss this in further detail below. 
16
 That this is the case will be further defended in chapters 3 and 5. 
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relevant interests of others, e.g., I could be sitting here alone in my house writing 
my dissertation.17 
  When speaking of selfishness, the terms “due consideration” and 
“relevant interests” are left intentionally vague.  This is because circumstances 
will dictate not only which interests are relevant, but also the extent to which the 
interests ought to be given consideration.  Examples here and later in the 
dissertation will help clarify what is meant by these terms. What can be said at 
this point is that relevant interests are the interests one has in maintaining one’s 
physical, psychological and material well-being.  Less significant interests, or 
trivial interests, include the interest in indulging the bodily pleasures.18  For 
example, choosing not to save a drowning child because you will miss your 
favorite television show is not giving due consideration to the relevant interests of 
others, i.e., in doing so one is not giving due consideration to the child’s and her 
family’s interest in her continuing to live as compared to the consideration you 
are giving to your trivial interest in not missing American Idol.  An agent’s 
                                                 
17
 As will be explained below, although by sitting here writing my dissertation I might be 
allowing harm to come to others, I am not necessarily failing to give due consideration to their 
relevant interests.  I also want to make explicit a quality of selfishness which I think has been 
implied by what has been said.  Excessive self-love is not always violent.  Borrowing from the 
taxonomy of Hume and others, it is a strong passion (as compared to a weak one) that can be 
either calm or violent (Hume T276 and T344-T345 and Hutcheson Essay, Section II: to be clear, I 
am not remaining entirely true to the distinctions each makes).  Excessive self-love is strong in 
that it overpowers all other passions or is at the core of all other passions.  It is calm when it 
overpowers the other passions but does not significantly affect the agent’s overall demeanor, e.g., 
when I serenely take my sister’s iPod without asking her all the while knowing she is planning to 
use it.  It is violent when it does significantly affect the agent’s overall demeanor, e.g., I smash my 
sister’s iPod against the wall because she will not let me borrow it.    
18
 One might think of trivial interests in the same way that Mill thinks of the lower 
pleasures, see Mill 2003, 100.   
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stealing another’s iPod just so she can listen to music on the bus on the way to 
class is also an act motivated by selfishness (and by excessive self-love).  The 
agent’s motive causes her to not give due consideration to the relevant interests of 
the owner of the iPod.  The agent is not giving due consideration to the owner’s 
interest in maintaining possession of her well-earned property and her interest in 
not being violated while giving substantial consideration to her own trivial 
interest in owning something that she did not work for the likes of which merely 
satisfies a bodily pleasure.  Therefore, it is a motive of which the impartial 
spectator will disapprove (as she will not be able to sympathize with the agent 
who is experiencing it).19   
It is important to be clear that I am not claiming that there are two distinct 
classes or levels of interests, significant and trivial.  Rather, all that I am saying is 
that there is a continuum of interests with some interests being more significant 
than others and that some of our less significant interests are often trivial in 
nature.   
There will of course be situations in which the interests of all those 
impacted by a particular action are relevant.  In such cases, it will need to be 
determined which relevant interest ought to be given the greatest consideration.  
                                                 
19
 So, by “material well-being” I do not mean that the interest in acquiring a large 
quantity of possessions is a relevant interest; I would actually classify that as a bodily pleasure.  
Rather, what I mean by “material well-being” is having adequate food, clothing and shelter.  
However, if one does have a lot of belongings, one certainly has an interest in maintaining 
possession of them. 
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So, for example, if I am in a situation in which I am forced to either torture you 
(or allow another to torture you) or forfeit my life, the impartial spectator will not 
disapprove of my torturing you in order to save my life.  Or, if I am forced to 
either steal from you or be physically tortured, the impartial spectator will not 
disapprove of my stealing from you in order to prevent myself from being 
tortured.  Although such actions result in unpleasant consequences, the impartial 
spectator will sympathize with the agent’s motive as she was giving due 
consideration to the relevant interests of those affected by the situation.   
There will also be situations in which the interests at hand are equally 
relevant.  For example, imagine a state of affairs in which you are forced to kill 
one of two normal adult humans who have very similar lives.  In a situation like 
this, both humans have an equally relevant interest in living.  Given that one or 
the other must be killed, is it not wrong to choose based on some other, perhaps 
secondary, reason, e.g., one of them is a charitable person and the other is not, one 
is a family member and the other is not, etc.   
Additionally, to speak of “equally relevant interests” or “equivalent 
interests” is not to say that they must be identical or exactly alike.  What is meant 
by “equally relevant interests” or “equivalent interests” is that they are similar 
enough that they deserve comparable consideration.  For example, the interest a 
normal adult human has in not being so severely tortured that she is left in a near 
vegetative state is for all intents and purposes equivalent to the interest a normal 
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adult human has in not being killed.  Likewise, the interest someone has in not 
having her home vandalized is equivalent to another’s interest in not having her 
car stolen.20 
Injuring or killing someone who is threatening your life is also not an act 
motivated by selfishness.  An act of self-preservation is never an act of selfishness 
in part because “[t]he preservation and healthful state of the body seem to be the 
objects which Nature first recommends to the care of every individual” (TMS 
VI.i.1), but also because in doing so one is not putting her less significant or 
trivial interests before the more significant interests of another.21  In such 
situations, an agent may be giving greater consideration to her own interests than 
to those of another, but as was noted above the impartial spectator will not 
disapprove of her doing so.22  However, as was also noted above, there are times 
when an agent thinks only of herself (or perhaps a loved one) in situations which 
are not a matter of life or death.  In these situations, the agent’s motive will be 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  As Smith says, “to disturb [another’s] 
happiness merely because it stands in the way of our own … is what no impartial 
spectator can go along with” (TMS II.ii.2.1).   
                                                 
20
 The terms “equally relevant interests”, “equivalent interests” and “equally significant 
interests” are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation. 
21
 See also TMS II.i.5.10.    
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 This is not to say that someone who does choose to save another’s life rather than her 
own has done something morally wrong.   
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In order to give due consideration to the relevant interests of others one 
must have a good understanding of those interests.  Moral agents have a 
responsibility to have as much knowledge as can be expected about those who 
will be affected by their actions, especially when getting this information is very 
little work.  For example, moral agents will generally be aware of the interests of 
many moral patients, e.g., infants and their interest in living, being healthy, being 
warm, etc.  Moral agents will also generally be aware of the interests of other 
moral agents, e.g., their interest in living, being healthy, being warm, etc.  Of 
course, the interests of any particular moral agent or moral patient will vary from 
situation to situation and so those interests and the extent to which a moral agent 
should be aware of those interests will be determined by the impartial spectator 
(see below).  Failing to have as much knowledge as can be expected, being 
neglectfully ignorant, is selfish because by failing to do so the moral agent is only 
thinking of herself and her own interests and she is not giving due consideration 
to the relevant interests of those who will be affected by her action(s).     
To help further elucidate when an agent is and is not giving due 
consideration to the relevant interests of others (including when she is 
neglectfully ignorant and when she is not), I will briefly consider some 
challenging examples, viz., that of a dutiful Nazi, that of a religious zealot, and 
that of an irresponsible or ignorant but well-meaning scientist.  It will be shown 
that in each case, an individual is harmed by a moral agent’s actions; thus two of 
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the criteria for moral wrongness are met.  What needs to be determined in each 
case, then, is whether or not the agent has acted from selfishness. 
The motive of the dutiful Nazi will not be approved of if in following her 
duty she failed to give due consideration to the relevant interests of others. 23  If it 
is the case that she was not in fear for her life or the lives of her loved ones, but 
acted as she did merely because she was told to do so (whether in acting she 
actually harmed or killed members of any of the targeted populations, or whether 
she contributed to the harming or killing of the members of the targeted 
population, or whether she allowed members of the targeted population to be 
harmed or killed), then the impartial spectator would disapprove of her motive.  It 
is not enough, according to this theory, for the dutiful Nazi to act based on duty 
alone and have her actions be morally acceptable.24  Assuming the dutiful Nazi is 
a moral agent, and not merely a moral patient, she must, as every moral agent 
must, give due consideration to the relevant interests of others.  Failing to do so 
entails that she has acted from selfishness and the impartial spectator will not 
sympathize with her and will therefore disapprove of her motive.  However, if the 
dutiful Nazi acted as she did because she was in fear for her life or the lives of her 
loved ones, then the impartial spectator will not disapprove of her motive because 
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 Throughout the dissertation I use phrases such as “the motive is disapproved of” and 
“the consequences are disliked”.  These are merely shorthand for “the motive is disapproved of by 
the impartial spectator” and “the consequences are disliked by the impartial spectator”, 
respectively. 
24
 By “duty” I mean following the orders of one’s superiors, not something like Kantian 
duty. 
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in such a situation she was giving due consideration to the relevant interests of 
those affected by her action.   
Of course, the problem with the case of the dutiful Nazi is that she could 
very well have been genuinely convinced that she was not failing to give due 
consideration to the relevant interests of the those she was harming, or those 
whom she contributed to the harming of, or those she allowed to be harmed.  In 
fact, she could very well have believed that the members of targeted population 
had no interests or that their interests were not worthy of any kind of 
consideration.  If it is the case that the dutiful Nazi genuinely believed that all the 
interests of the members of the targeted population were trivial, or that they had 
no interests at all, then her motive would not have been disapproved of by the 
impartial spectator.  With this being said, however, I also want to make clear that 
the impartial spectator will be making this determination from the standpoint of a 
well-informed spectator (see below).  Given this, the impartial spectator will 
demand that the agent, in this case the dutiful Nazi, be well-informed as well (at 
least to the extent that she can avail herself of available information).  So, the 
motive of an agent will be disapproved of if she is neglectfully ignorant, but not if 
she is, say, brainwashed.   
The case of the religious zealot is very similar to that of the dutiful Nazi.  
If such a person has been brainwashed, or something of the like, then the impartial 
spectator will not disapprove of her motive.  If such a person is acting from 
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neglectful ignorance, then the impartial spectator will disapprove of her motive as 
she will be acting from selfishness.  Take, for example, a young woman who has 
been brainwashed since birth to believe that god has commanded her to kill 
another and that failing to do so would result in devastating consequences for 
herself, e.g., she would be condemned to spend eternity in hell.  Assume that 
throughout her whole life her only interactions with others have been with those 
who have taught her to believe this.  If she acts on this belief and in fact kills 
another, the impartial spectator will not disapprove of her motive.  This is because 
the young woman did not act from selfishness.  She acted according to her own 
relevant interests; it is just an unfortunate fact that in choosing her own relevant 
interests over the equally relevant interests of another she had to kill the other.25 
On the other hand, religious zealots who concoct stories that they know 
are untrue and use these stories to brainwash individuals and get them to follow 
their ideals, e.g., cult leaders, are acting from selfishness when they convince their 
flock to murder others in the name of a (fictional) deity.  Those religious zealots 
who kill others because they believe with all sincerity that god has spoken directly 
to them and has ordered them to do so will not have acted from selfish motives.  
However, in most, if not all, such situations, this type of zealot is actually a moral 
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 I admit that I am taking for granted that spending eternity in hell and death are 
equivalent.  This might not be the case, of course, but for the purposes of the example, I do not 
think it matters one way or the other.  We can just assume that they are equivalent. 
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patient and not a moral agent (as they have some sort of psychological problem) 
and as we will see below their action will not be judged as morally wrong.26   
As was the case with the dutiful Nazi and the religious zealot, the motives 
of an irresponsible or ignorant scientist will be disapproved of if she does not give 
due consideration to the relevant interests of those who might be affected by her 
action (in other words, if she acts from selfishness).  If a scientist performs 
research on subjects about whom she has little information because she has not 
availed herself of the available information and thus cannot properly evaluate 
their interests, then she has acted from selfishness.  If a scientist performs 
research on subjects about whom she is well-informed, but she is ill-informed 
about the possible results, then she has acted from selfishness.  For example, let 
us consider the case of a scientist who is committed to finding a cure for cancer.  
Let us assume that she does at least some research and finds that no one has tried 
subjecting cancer patients to extremely high or low temperatures for extended 
periods of time in order to kill the cancer cells.  Let us also assume that she has no 
good reason to think that subjecting cancer patients to extremely high or low 
temperatures for extended periods of time will actually kill the cancer cells.  She 
has found nothing in her research that has given her good cause to believe it might 
work.  She just tries this experiment because no one has done it.  In a situation 
like this, the impartial spectator will not approve of her motive as the scientist has 
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 This is not to say there is not a god.  It is merely to say that most who believe in god do 
not believe god speaks to people in these ways or gives such commands. 
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not given due consideration to the relevant interests of the others involved (for, as 
is well known, being subjected to extremely high or low temperatures can be 
terribly harmful if not lead to death).  If, however, our scientist has determined 
that there is a common thread in all the medications that are at the very least 
somewhat successful at helping to kill cancer cells and she tries this on cancer 
patients and they all become terribly ill or die, she has not acted from selfishness.  
In this case, she had good reason to believe that this pharmaceutical would work.  
Furthermore, in trying to find a cure for cancer, she was taking into consideration 
the relevant (and significant) interests, e.g., the interest in living, of those 
involved, e.g., the research subjects as well as the potential beneficiaries of the 
research.  The impartial spectator will not disapprove of the agent’s motive just 
because she failed to get the results she anticipated.  Again, what is at issue here is 
the agent’s motive.  If the scientist sincerely believes that by subjecting one or 
more research subjects to pain and suffering she will be able to reduce the pain 




In this section, I explain which consequences are disliked by the impartial 
spectator and why they are disliked by her.  In doing so, I will also address 
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 I think the case of the scientist is very complicated and there is much more to say about 
it than what I have said here.  I will say more about this particular case in chapter 3 when I address 
the morality of the use of animals for research. 
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consequences which are liked by the impartial spectator, but we should keep in 
mind that our primary concern is with those consequences which are disliked by 
the impartial spectator. 
Unlike the sympathy, what I will call “sympathy proper”, required for the 
impartial spectator to approve of the motive of the agent (if sympathy does not 
occur then the motive is disapproved of), only illusive sympathy is needed for the 
impartial spectator to like or dislike the consequences of an action (TMS 
II.1.5.11).  Illusive sympathy occurs when the impartial spectator imagines herself 
in the situation of another and experiences a passion the other is not experiencing, 
but which she would be experiencing were she appropriately situated, e.g., if she 
were in the right frame of mind, if she were considering the relevant facts, etc.28  
That is, if the recipient of a good deed does not like the consequences, the 
impartial spectator can still like them (upon imagining herself in the recipient’s 
situation) and thus judge the consequences as liked consequences.  Similarly, if 
the recipient of a bad deed does not herself dislike the consequences, the impartial 
spectator can still dislike them and judge them as disliked consequences.  Of 
course, sympathy proper can occur between the recipient and the impartial 
spectator, i.e., both may like or dislike the consequences, but the point is that 
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 Although the term “illusive sympathy” does not appear until TMS II.i.5.11, Smith 
seems to have it in mind when he speaks of, among other things, a mother being able to 
sympathize with her infant even though the infant cannot have the fear of disease that its mother 
has and when he speaks of our being able to sympathize with the dead (TMS I.i.1.10-13).   
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sympathy proper is not required for the consequences to be judged by the 
impartial spectator; all that is required is illusive sympathy. 
To be clear, sympathy proper is required in order for the impartial 
spectator to approve of the motive of the agent.  There must be an affect match 
between the impartial spectator and the agent when the impartial spectator 
imagines herself in the situation of the agent in order for the impartial spectator to 
approve of the agent’s motive.  If there is not an affect match, then the motive is 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  It can be said that illusive sympathy 
occurs when the impartial spectator disapproves of the motive as she is 
experiencing what the agent ought to be (or have been) experiencing.  However, it 
is important to keep in mind that it is because the agent is experiencing one thing 
and the impartial spectator another that the impartial spectator disapproves of the 
motive.  In contrast, it is not necessarily the case that because the impartial 
spectator is experiencing one thing and the recipient another that the impartial 
spectator dislikes the consequences.  That is, it is not necessary for there to be an 
affect match between the impartial spectator and the recipient for the impartial 
spectator to like the consequences, although there very well might be.  For 
example, if a recipient of an act has been treated well and so likes the 
consequences and the impartial spectator imagines herself in the situation of the 
recipient and likes the consequences as well, then not only is there an affect match 
between the impartial spectator and the recipient (the impartial spectator 
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sympathizes properly with the recipient), but then we can also say that the 
consequences are liked (because the impartial spectator likes them).  Similarly, if 
the recipient has been treated poorly, say she is harmed in some way, and does not 
like the consequences and the impartial spectator imagines herself in the situation 
of the recipient and does not like the consequences, then not only is there an affect 
match between the impartial spectator and the recipient (the impartial spectator 
sympathizes properly with the recipient), but we can say that the consequences 
are disliked.  On the other hand, if, for whatever reason, the recipient does not like 
the consequences that the impartial spectator likes when the impartial spectator 
imagines herself in the situation of the recipient (there is no affect match between 
the recipient and the impartial spectator), the consequences are still liked (as it is 
the judgment of the impartial spectator that we rely upon) and the impartial 
spectator is said to sympathize illusively with the recipient.  If the recipient likes 
the consequences that the impartial spectator dislikes when the impartial spectator 
imagines herself in the situation of the recipient (again, there is no affect match 
between the two), then the consequences are disliked (as it is the judgment of the 
impartial spectator that we rely upon) and the impartial spectator is said to 
sympathize illusively with the recipient.  We rely on the impartial spectator’s 
reactions to determine whether the motive is approved of or not and whether the 
consequences are liked or not, but an affect match between the impartial spectator 
and the person principally concerned (sympathy proper) is required only for the 
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motive to be approved of (if there is no affect match between the agent and the 
impartial spectator than the motive is disapproved of); it is not required to 
determine whether the consequences are liked or disliked (all that is needed is 
illusive sympathy). 
So, even if the recipient does not experience pain when it is inflicted upon 
her, say she is comatose but someone is cutting her fingers off one by one, or she 
is not unhappy when someone steals something from her, say that the iPod of our 
comatose victim is stolen but she does not realize it has been stolen, the impartial 
spectator can still be said to sympathize (illusively) by experiencing pain or by 
disliking the fact that the iPod was stolen as the recipient would feel pain or 
dislike the consequences were she capable (TMS ii.i.5.1).  What matters when 
determining whether the consequences are liked or disliked, is whether the 
impartial spectator dislikes the consequences, even if she does not sympathize 
properly, but rather only sympathizes illusively, with the passions of the recipient 
of the action. 
It is possible for the impartial spectator to like a some consequence(s) of 
an act and yet dislike another some other(s).  However, if any consequence of an 
action is disliked by the impartial spectator, then the third condition for moral 
wrongness, that at least one consequence is disliked, has been met.  So, the 
impartial spectator is not aggregating the consequences and then determining 
whether as a whole they are liked or disliked.  Each consequence is considered 
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individually.  (If there is one disliked consequence, then the impartial spectator 
determines whether the other two conditions for moral wrongness have been 
satisfied in order to determine whether the act is morally wrong or not.  Again, if 
all three conditions are satisfied, then the action is morally wrong.  If even one of 
the conditions is not met, then the action is not morally wrong.)  
Consequences that are disliked are those that are harmful to the recipient.  
A recipient can be harmed in any number of ways depending on the type of being 
she is.  A normal adult human being can harmed in several ways: physically (e.g., 
by being subjected her to pain and suffering), psychologically (e.g., by being 
subjected her to stress, duress, or by restraining her liberty), and materially (e.g., 
by having her possessions stolen or having her property stolen).29  As with normal 
adult human beings, normal infant human beings can be harmed physically and 
psychologically (e.g., by being subjected to pain and suffering, by being subjected 
to duress or fear, although we would be hard pressed to say that their liberty can 
be restrained).  More often than not normal human infants cannot be harmed 
materially as most infants do not possess property.  Of course, some infants might 
have trust funds or other kinds of inheritances or property that can be stolen and if 
so then in fact they can be harmed materially.  A woman can be harmed 
physically and psychologically if she is forced to carry a fetus that is the result of 
rape, but a man cannot be harmed in these ways, at least not with respect to 
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 In LJ Smith explains how rights come to be and so how one can be injured by a 
violation of these rights (LJ i.12-26). 
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physical harm, as men are not capable of carrying fetuses.30  So, the impartial 
spectator will take into account the type of thing a being is as well as its 
circumstances in order to determine if the consequences are harmful.   
Although “harm” is a much debated concept, it is generally accepted that 
experiencing unnecessary pain and suffering as well as death are sufficient 
conditions for an individual to be thought to be harmed.  I want it to be clear, 
however, that I am not limiting the conditions for being harmed to just 
unnecessary pain and suffering and death.  As noted above, the ways a being can 
be harmed depend on the type of being it is.  Of course, this concept is worthy of 
much more attention than I am currently giving it.  All that is needed for the 
purposes of this argument is for us to have at least a basic understanding of what 
is meant by “harm”. 
   
1.2.3 The Impartial Spectator 
The impartial spectator, although a fictional device that is used in my 
theory as an expository tool, is the final judge of motives, consequences and, thus, 
actions.  She represents the viewpoint of the ordinary person when she is in the 
position of a non-involved spectator.  So, although she does not possess those 
traits specific to the person (people) principally involved, she does possess all the 
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 It might be the case that the rapist is harmed psychologically if the woman he has raped 
is forced to carry the fetus to term.  And it might be the case that the other males in her life will be 
psychologically harmed if she is forced to carry the fetus to term as might the other females in her 
life.  
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normal mental capacities and states characteristic of human nature.  The impartial 
spectator possesses enough human characteristics to make her a good heuristic 
device, yet she is also an impartial bystander and so is able to properly evaluate 
actions.  Furthermore, she is well-informed as she knows the relevant facts of the 
situation and she has no trouble determining whether or not she has all the 
relevant facts because they are those that would be important to her were she 
actually the agent or the recipient.  Yet, the impartial spectator is not omniscient 
and so is not the perfect moral judge in this sense of the term “perfect”.  She is 
perfect, however, in that her reactions to particular acts are perfectly indicative of 
their moral quality.  
For those familiar with ideal observer theories, I want to make clear that 
although the impartial spectator and the ideal observer do have some traits in 
common, (viz., they both judge from an impartial point of view), there are 
significant differences between them.  As noted above, the impartial spectator, 
unlike most ideal observers, does not necessarily possess all the facts.  Roderick 
Firth argues that the ideal observer is omniscient (with respect to non-ethical 
facts) as well as omnipercipient (which means she has unlimited powers of 
imagination), disinterested (which means she is entirely lacking in particular 
interests), and dispassionate (Firth 1952).  The impartial spectator does not 
possess “superhuman powers of thought, superhuman knowledge and no human 
weakness” as R.M. Hare’s ideal observer does (Hare 1981, 44).  Furthermore, as 
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was noted, the impartial spectator is not “incapable of experiencing any emotions 
at all” as is Firth’s ideal observer (Firth 1952, 340).  In criticism of ideal observer 
theories, Richard Brandt specifically points out that (unlike the impartial 
spectator) the ideal observer’s lack of emotional responses (or, rather, her 
inability to emotionally respond) makes it difficult for us not only to trust her 
judgments, but to consider them as definitive of morality (Brandt 1955, 226-228).  
In addition, the more we build into the definition of the ideal observer, the less 
useful it becomes as a heuristic device (Walker, 766-768).  The impartial 
spectator does not fall prey to these problems because she is ultimately more 
human-like than not.   
Some might worry that the impartial spectator’s judgments cannot be 
impartial because she is situated in a society and like all members of a society she 
is indelibly influenced by that society.  It might be argued that just as non-
fictional individuals have a difficult, if not impossible, time getting critical 
distance from their society’s existing institutions, customs, and traditions, the 
impartial spectator will also have a difficult, if not impossible, time getting critical 
distance from her society’s existing institutions, customs, and traditions.  These 
worries are misguided.  The impartial spectator is by nature impartial and so she 
will not have trouble getting the appropriate critical distance.  What is attractive 
about the impartial spectator presented here is that she is able to take into account 
the current conditions of a society while not being prejudiced towards its 
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institutions, customs, and traditions.  So, she can allow for capitalism and private 
property while seeing the benefits of more communal ideas, for example.31  
Further explanation and defense of the impartial spectator, especially with respect 
to partiality, relativism and custom, are offered in section 1.3 as well as in section 
2.1.3. 
 
1.2.4 Moral Agents and Moral Patients 
As stated above, only the actions of moral agents can be judged as morally 
wrong.  Moral agents are those who can be harmed and who can understand 
which motives are approved of (and which are not), which consequences are liked 
(and which are not), and can choose whether to act (or not act) accordingly.  
Moral patients are those who can be harmed but who cannot understand which 
motives are approved of (and which are not), which consequences are liked (and 
which are not), or cannot choose to act (or not act) accordingly.32    
It is necessary to distinguish between moral agents and moral patients, and 
to do so in the way I have done, because it is absurd to hold moral patients 
morally accountable for their actions.  If a moral patient harms another, for any 
reason, including selfishness, she will do something that the impartial spectator 
                                                 
31
 This is not to say that she will accept the use of nuclear weapons in war; this remains to 
be seen. 
32
 The class of moral agents shares at least one characteristic, that they can be harmed, 
with the class of moral patients, but these classes are in fact two distinct classes.  From this point 
forward, the term “moral agent” will refer to an agent whose actions can be judged as morally 
wrong, whereas the term “agent” will refer to either a moral agent or moral patient who commits 
an action.   
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will dislike and perhaps disapprove of, but this is not to say that she has done 
something morally wrong.  I think this is in harmony, at least for the most part, 
with our considered judgments regarding such matters.  Although we discourage 
moral patients, whether we classify them as I have or in some other way, from 
harming others and although we often punish them for harming others, I think we 
would be hard pressed to say that they do something morally wrong when they 
commit acts that have consequences that are disliked when they do not understand 
what they have done or when they do not intentionally choose to act from motives 
that are disapproved of.33  
The class of moral agents includes, but is not necessarily limited to, 
normal adult human beings.  The class of moral patients includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to, infants and young children, the senile, the mentally 
enfeebled, the psychologically compromised, and many, if not most, animals.34  
Things that are clearly not moral agents or moral patients are inanimate objects, 
e.g., chairs, houses, automobiles, computers, etc.  Things like plants and single-
celled animals are clearly not moral agents, but I think it remains to be seen 
whether or not they are moral patients.  However, this is not something I will 
                                                 
33
 Smith distinguishes not between moral agents and moral patients, but between proper 
objects of resentment and non-proper objects of resentment (e.g., TMS II.iii.4-7). 
34
 Smith agrees with this distinction and for similar reasons (LJ ii.178-179). 
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resolve in this dissertation.35  What matters for the purposes of this dissertation is 
that factory farm animals and research animals clearly fall into the category of 
moral patients as they can be harmed.  This will be discussed in further detail in 
chapter 3. 
 
1.3 Further Considerations 
 In this section, I will show how normative sentimentalism handles the 
issues of partiality, relativism and custom. 
 
1.3.1 Partiality 
This sentimentalist theory allows for some partiality toward our friends 
and family, without permitting every action committed because of such biases.  
That is, the impartial spectator will not condone our selfishly harming, or our 
selfishly contributing to or allowing another to be harmed, on behalf of a loved 
one or by a loved one.  However, we are permitted to favor our loved ones when 
making moral decisions when in doing so we do not neglect to give due 
consideration to the relevant interests of others.  For example, if my year-old 
nephew and another year-old infant are trapped in a burning building and I choose 
to save my year-old nephew, I will not have done anything morally wrong.  This 
is because although the impartial spectator dislikes the fact that the other infant 
                                                 
35
 I think that such a determination will require a more thorough understanding and 
consideration of harm.  If these things can be harmed in relevant ways, then they are moral 
patients.  If not, then they are not moral patients. 
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died as a result of my action, I did not leave him to die because of selfishness (and 
so the impartial spectator does not disapprove of my motive) as I did not fail to 
give due consideration to the relevant interests of those who will be affected by 
my act: my nephew, his loved ones, the other infant and his loved ones.  Rather, I 
gave all relevant interests due consideration, but had to make a decision and chose 
my nephew because of the fact that he is my nephew.  This is not to say that it 
would be necessarily morally wrong for me to have saved the other infant.  Again, 
as long as I gave due consideration to the relevant interests of those affected by an 
action, I have not acted from selfishness.  On the other hand, were I to allow my 
nephew to set fire to another infant because I knew he would enjoy it or because 
he would have a tantrum if I did not permit it, I would be allowing him to commit 
an act with disliked consequences for selfish reasons.  I would not have given due 
consideration to the relevant interests of the victim or his loved ones.  The infant’s 
interest in living, his interest in avoiding the pain and suffering he would be 
subjected to were he set on fire, and his family’s interest in avoiding the pain and 
anguish that they would suffer as a result of his death are relevant interests, 
whereas my nephew’s enjoyment of watching someone on fire or my desire to 
avoid his tantrum are trivial interests. 
Of course, to say that something is natural is not to say that it is morally 
acceptable.  In chapter 2, I will defend the fact that it is morally acceptable to be 
partial towards our loved ones, at least to some extent.   
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1.3.2 Relativism 
Although every action that harms a moral agent or moral patient will have 
at least one consequence that is disliked by the impartial spectator, it is not 
necessarily the case that every such action will be morally wrong (because it is 
not true that every action that results in disliked consequences is motivated by 
selfishness).  This does not mean that normative sentimentalism is a version of 
moral relativism.  According to relativism, any action or practice is acceptable as 
long as it is accepted by its society or culture.  However, because the judgments 
of the impartial spectator are determined by whether or not the motives of a moral 
agent are selfish (and thus whether or not they are disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator), and whether or not the consequences are harmful to a moral agent or 
moral patient (and thus whether or not they are disliked by the impartial 
spectator), there are certain motives and consequences that will be disapproved of 
and disliked by the impartial spectator in any and every society and culture.  For 
example, rape and random cruel acts of any kind that are committed by, 
contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent will be morally wrong no matter 
what culture one is in as the motives are disapproved of and the consequences are 
disliked by the impartial spectator.  The motives are disapproved of because they 
are selfish in nature.  In committing such acts, one is giving greater consideration 
to trivial interests, e.g., sexual pleasure or whatever the case might be, than to 
more significant interests, e.g., the interest in maintaining one’s psychological and 
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physical well-being. The consequences of such acts are disliked because they 
harm other moral agents or moral patients.  It might be the case, as will be 
discussed in greater detail below, that in one situation a certain act is judged as 
morally acceptable and in another situation the same act will be judged as morally 
wrong depending on the motives and circumstances of the agent in each situation.  
For example, stealing a car because you like it is morally wrong whereas stealing 
a car to avoid being raped is not.  Similar actions in different circumstances will 
permit different moral judgments, but this does not entail that anything goes.   
 
1.3.3 Custom 
Although the impartial spectator will be sensitive to and will take into 
consideration societal and cultural variations, she will not accept custom as an 
excuse for immoral behavior.  That is, it might be the case that at one point in a 
society’s history it was necessary for parents to take the lives of their children.  
For example, in his book on the history of infanticide, Hardness of 
Heart/Hardness of Life, Larry Milner explains that “self-survival often involves 
seeing a child as an adversary in competition for limited assets” (Milner, 10) and 
notes that in every day and age parents have killed their children, or at the very 
least abandoned them, in order to ensure their own survival (Milner, chapters 1-
5).  Adam Smith also recognized this: “The extreme indigence of a savage is often 
such that he himself is frequently exposed to the greatest extremity of hunger, he 
 43 
often dies of pure want, and it is frequently impossible for him to support both 
himself and his child” (TMS V.2.15).  Smith continues on by claiming that a 
person being chased by an enemy that cannot be avoided would be excused for 
abandoning her child because it slowed her down and put her own life in 
jeopardy.  The sentimentalist ethic presented here agrees with this position.  
Although the impartial spectator will dislike the consequences of abandoning the 
child in such situations, she will not disapprove of doing so because the parent 
does not act from selfishness.  In neither case (that of abandoning the infant 
because there are not enough resources or because the parent is being pursued by 
an enemy) does the parent fail to give due consideration to the relevant interests 
of the moral agents and moral patients affected by her act.36  In these types of 
circumstances, the parent has not given greater consideration to less significant or 
trivial interests than to more significant interests.  In such situations, either the 
parent, or child, or both will die and the parent must make a decision and being 
motivated by self-preservation is not selfish, as was explained above.   
According to the sentimentalist theory presented here, the problem 
morally with infanticide arises when conditions change and parents are 
abandoning their children merely because it has become custom to do so.  Both 
Smith and Milner note that in ancient Greece infanticide was permitted merely 
                                                 
36
 Milner also notes that killing or abandoning one’s own child in order to preserve one’s 
own life has historically often been met with acceptance (see chapters 1-5) along with little 
punishment, if any at all. 
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because it was more convenient for parents to kill their children than to provide 
for them (TMS V.2.15 and Milner, 23-24).  Such actions are morally wrong 
because all three conditions for moral wrongness are met: the agent’s committing 
the acts are moral agents, the consequences are disliked by the impartial spectator 
because they are harmful to moral patients, and the moral agents’ motives are 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator because the motives are selfish (the 
moral agents do not give due consideration to the relevant interests of those 
affected by their acts).  That is, just because it might be a bit of a burden to care 
for a child, e.g., one has to make sure the child is fed and clothed, one’s preferring 
to enjoy the freedom of being childless rather than taking care of these 
responsibilities and so ignoring the infant’s interest in not being harmed is giving 
greater consideration to less significant or trivial interests than to more significant 
or relevant interests. Therefore, as the infanticide example shows, according to 
normative sentimentalism, custom is no excuse for immoral behavior.37 
 
1.4 Moral Rules 
It might be argued that a fundamental problem with this theory is the 
difficulty in applying it.  That is, one might think it difficult to invoke the 
impartial spectator in every situation in which we find ourselves having to make a 
moral decision or judgment either because we are biased or are experiencing 
                                                 
37
 History agrees with this as we see the development of rules and laws forbidding such 
actions (Milner, chapters 1-5). 
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strong passions or for some other reason (Slote 2004a, 296-297; Goldman 1992, 
22; Goldman 1993, 357-359; Hoffman 2000, 13-14 and Chapter 8).  However, 
Smith believes, and I concur, that we learn what the impartial spectator approves 
and disapproves of, what she likes and dislikes, and what she judges to be morally 
right and wrong and then create rules by which we then direct our behavior.  And, 
it is our reverence for the rules that helps us correct our passions.  So, instead of 
determining what the impartial spectator would feel or do in a certain situation, 
we look to the moral rules as our guide.   
Unlike Kantian deontology which determines which motives and acts are 
appropriate based on whether they adhere to a rule, the rules developed in this 
sentimentalist ethic are formed by experience of what motives the impartial 
spectator approves of and which she disapproves of and which consequences she 
likes and which she dislikes, and therefore which acts are morally right and which 
are wrong.  So, we do not look to general rules and then determine whether a 
particular motive is approved of or not, or whether  any consequence is liked or 
not, or whether an act is morally right or wrong.  Rather, we look to the motives, 
and whether they are approved of or not, and consequences, and whether they are 
liked or not, and ultimately the actions, and whether they are morally right or 
wrong, and develop our moral rules from them.  Smith says: 
We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions; 
because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or 
inconsistent with a certain general rule.  The general rule, on the 
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contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of 
a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved 
or disapproved of. (TMS III.4.8)38   
 
The rules guide our behavior, and, as Smith says, “when they have been 
fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting the 
misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our 
particular situation” (TMS III.4.12).  A person may violate a rule because the 
passion is just too strong, but the person is fully aware of the fact that he is 
violating the rule and that after “his passion … [is] … gratified and palled, he 
begins to view what he has done in the light in which others are apt to view it: and 
actually feels, what he had only foreseen imperfectly before, the stings of remorse 
and repentance begin to agitate and torment him” (TMS III.4.12).  Also, we might 
not correct our passion and still act out of reverence for the rules.  That is, our 
self-love may still be excessive, but “the motive of … actions may be no other 
than a reverence for the established rule” (TMS III.5.1).39  
                                                 
38
 See also TMS III.4.7 and TMS III.4.9.   
39
 Smith also addresses the question of what actions should be done from duty alone (or 
solely from a regard for the general rules) and which should arise from a sentiment.  He says that 
such a determination is not easily made and that it depends “first upon the natural agreeableness or 
deformity of the sentiment or affection which would prompt us to any action independent of all 
regard to general rules; and secondly, upon the precision and exactness, or looseness and 
inaccuracy, of the general rules themselves” (TMS III.6.2).  Moreover, he says that we do not 
want people always acting solely out of duty and foresees one of the objections to deontology: that 
there are times when acting from duty just does not seem to be enough.  For example, Smith 
imagines the distress of a husband who finds his wife’s actions motivated solely by a sense of duty 
(TMS III.5.1).  I agree with this.  Again, the rules help us correct our passions so although there 
are times that we might have to act according to the rule in order to avoid being disapproved of or 
resented, the idea is for the rules to not only help guide our behavior, but to help us learn how to 
manage our passions. 
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The rules are not indisputable, however.  They are, in fact, open to 
revision and any revisions will depend upon the impartial spectator as she is the 
ultimate judge and court of appeal to the soundness of the rules.  Consider the 
infanticide example again.  It might be a rule that it is acceptable to abandon your 
infant child if your life is in jeopardy.  However, as times change and adoption 





The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the principle which is the 
foundation of normative sentimentalism.  That principle is: An act, or a failure to 
act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or 
allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator and the act results in any consequences that are disliked by the impartial 
spectator.  In introducing this principle, I explained what motive is disapproved of 
by the impartial spectator (selfishness because she cannot sympathize with it), 
which consequences are disliked by the impartial spectator (those that harm the 
individuals affected), the qualities of the impartial spectator that make her a 
competent moral judge (she possesses both human qualities and impartiality), and 
the difference between moral agents and moral patients (moral agents have 
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cognitive abilities that moral patients do not have).  Additionally, I noted that 
there is a place for moral rules in this ethic. 
 In the next chapter I address in further detail several aspects of this theory: 
the role of emotions in the theory, that both motives and consequences are taken 
into consideration when making moral judgments, and the role of the impartiality 
with respect to partiality, custom and relativism.  I also apply the theory to a 
couple of cases in order to show how it satisfactorily handles difficult issues. 
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Chapter 2: A Defense of Normative Sentimentalism 
 
 
In this chapter, I defend the normative sentimentalist theory developed in 
chapter 1.  I first explain its theoretical merits.  The merits addressed are (1) that 
the emotions are a vital, but not solitary, factor of the morality of an action, (2) 
that both motives and consequences are taken into account when making moral 
judgments and (3) that the impartial spectator is relied upon as a moral judge to 
properly evaluate motives and consequences.  I follow this with a discussion of 
practical merits of normative sentimentalism showing how it renders satisfactory 
moral judgments in two different cases, one which is uncontroversial and one 
which is controversial, while showing how other major moral theories only render 
a satisfactory moral judgment in the uncontroversial case.  In particular, I show 
how, in accord with our considered judgments, normative sentimentalism as well 
as other prominent moral theories judge a random drive-by shooting to be morally 
wrong.  I then show how normative sentimentalism judges acts of infanticide in 
ways that accord with our considered judgments whereas other prominent moral 
theories do not and cannot render such judgments. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Merits 
 I begin with a brief explication of why one of the advantages of normative 
sentimentalism is that its moral judgments rely to some extent on emotions.  I 
explain how the fact that normative sentimentalist judgments are determined by 
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evaluating both the agent’s motive and the consequences of her actions makes 
normative sentimentalism superior to other popular moral theories.  Finally, I 
clarify why the impartial spectator is necessary to this theory (and to some extent 
I explain why some version of the impartial spectator is necessary for any good 
moral theory).  In doing so, I highlight her role in making judgments involving 
bias and custom. 
 
2.1.1 The Role of Emotions 
Some of the best reasons for pursuing a sentimentalist ethic were 
mentioned in chapter 1.  Emotions, as Solomon points out, are the substance of 
life (Solomon, 2004).  According to Blackburn, feelings are at the heart of 
everyday ethics (Blackburn, 2000).  Midgley claims that “[o]ur emotional life 
includes the whole range of our feelings, motives and sympathies … [i]t is the 
power-house which keeps the whole lot going” (Midgley 1983, 35).  These 
reasons help show that normative sentimentalism satisfies Owen Flanagan’s 
Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism: “make sure when constructing a 
moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, 
and behavior prescribed are possible … for creatures like us” (Flanagan, 32).  
That is, humans are emotional creatures and our moral theory needs not only to 
respect this, but also to accommodate it.  This is something that many argue that 
Kantian deontology and utilitarianism fail to do.  On the other hand, many think 
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that the sentiments are in fact at the foundation of so-called reason based moral 
theories like utilitarianism and Kantian deontology.  For example, Slote argues 
that the roots of deontology might be in sentiments and that “it is our … 
sensitivity to situational factors of immediacy rather than a conscientious 
adherence to rules or explicit moral beliefs that can lead one not to kill or steal 
even if doing so would have better overall results” (Slote 2003, 136).  Regardless 
of whether Slote and others who share his opinion are correct, any moral theory 
from which the emotions are excluded is inadequate in its failure to incorporate 
such a critical aspect of human psychology. 
 
2.1.2 Motives and Consequences 
 
Another advantage of normative sentimentalism is that it accommodates 
our inclinations to judge actions based on both the sentiments that motivate the 
action and the consequences that are a result of the action.  In this way it is 
superior to both consequentialism, and utilitarianism in particular, which judges 
only consequences, and theories that judge only motives, e.g., deontology. 
One of the problems with judging only the consequences of an action is 
that we cannot always determine what the consequences will be or whether they 
will ultimately be good or bad.  Although the normative sentimentalist impartial 
spectator does evaluate consequences in order to make moral judgments, unlike 
the utilitarian she need not determine what every consequence of an agent’s action 
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will be in order to do so.  All the impartial spectator needs is to determine whether 
at least one of the consequences is harmful to the victim.  Furthermore, the 
impartial spectator need not try to complete the difficult task of determining 
whether, when aggregated, the consequences ultimately maximize overall well-
being (or not) as the utilitarian must.  Additionally, unlike utilitarianism, 
normative sentimentalism does not allow for an agent to act from ill-conceived 
motives and yet have her actions be judged as morally commendable.  For 
example, if an agent sets out to harm another, e.g., she pushes her victim in the 
back in hopes of causing her to fall down, but ultimately helps her, e.g., by 
dislodging a wad of gum from her throat thereby saving her life, the utilitarian 
will judge this action as morally right.  It seems odd to praise or morally 
commend someone for an act that was motivated by ill intentions.  So, although 
this action will not be morally wrong according to normative sentimentalism, 
neither will it be praised.40  The impartial spectator will disapprove of the motive, 
although she will not dislike any of the consequences.   
Likewise, it seems odd to judge as morally wrong an action which results 
in harmful consequences, but was committed by an agent who had good 
intentions.  For example, imagine a situation in which several hikers are lost in the 
woods and only one of them is strong enough to seek help.  Assume that it is 
                                                 
40
 Although I will not defend this position in this dissertation, it is my intuition that those 
actions that are deserving of moral praise are those which consist of a motive that the impartial 
spectator approves of and of which all the consequences are liked by the impartial spectator. 
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agreed that the healthy hiker should seek help and that she takes all the food and 
water with her so that she can sustain herself for as long as possible in order to 
maximize her chances of finding help.  Assume that it takes the hiker several days 
to actually find help and that when she does she and the rescuers return to find the 
others have perished from dehydration.  In a situation such as this, we would be 
hard-pressed to say that the healthy hiker has done something morally wrong and 
normative sentimentalism agrees with this, although someone like the utilitarian 
would not.  According to normative sentimentalism, although the consequences of 
the hiker’s actions will be disliked by the impartial spectator (because they were 
harmful), her motive will not be disapproved of (because she was not acting from 
selfishness) and so the act will not be judged as morally wrong. 
Similarly, only taking motives into consideration results in troubling moral 
judgments as well.  Recall the example used above of a moral agent who pushes 
her victim in hopes of causing her to fall down, yet ends saving her life by 
dislodging a wad of gum in her throat.  Assume that the moral agent’s desire to 
harm her victim is due to the fact that the victim disagrees with the agent’s 
political beliefs.   If only the motives of the moral agent were judged, then we 
would judge this action as morally wrong.  However, although we certainly do not 
want to encourage or condone such attitudes, to judge what the moral agent has 
done as morally wrong seems excessively harsh.  According to normative 
sentimentalism, the moral agent will not have done anything morally wrong; 
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although the impartial spectator will disapprove of the moral agent’s motive (the 
moral agent acted from selfishness), she will not dislike the consequences (the 
moral agent’s action did not result in any harmful consequences).   
 If normative sentimentalism was like other motive based theories or 
consequence based theories it would suffer from the problems from which they 
suffer.  That is, motive based theories judge actions that are motivated by 
questionable motives but result in good consequences as morally wrong.  
Consequence based theories judge actions that are motivated by good motives but 
result in harmful consequences as morally wrong.  Neither of these conclusions 
seems acceptable.  According to normative sentimentalism, neither actions that 
are motivated by ill intentions but result in good consequences nor actions that 
result in bad consequences but are motivated by good intentions are morally 
wrong, although they will not necessarily be praiseworthy either. 
 
2.1.3 Why the impartial spectator? 
 
As has been noted above and as we will see below, the impartial spectator 
is necessary to ensure impartial and informed judgments.  She is also necessary to 
ensure that moral judgments are made from a “normal” state of mind.  That is, 
many moral actions are committed by agents who are not only uninformed and 
perhaps biased, but are also often lacking in cognitive development or are 
suffering from fatigue, depression, or too much emotion or something of the like.  
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Such agents (whether moral agents or moral patients) are incapable of rendering 
proper moral judgments.  Because the impartial spectator is informed and 
impartial, but also possesses all the relevant human qualities and is in a normal 
frame of mind she is able to render proper moral judgments.   
The ethic presented here is not the first to rely upon some sort of moral 
judge.  Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all thought that only wise and virtuous people 
should be relied upon when determining the good, just and right.  In Crito, 
Socrates claims that the majority opinion should not be trusted and that it is only 
the opinions of those few who know the difference between the just and unjust 
with which one ought to be concerned (Crito, Stephanus 44d-48b).  Plato, of 
course, believed that only philosopher-kings truly understood justice and the good 
which was why they ought to rule (Republic, Book II).  And, Aristotle thought 
that only those who understood virtue could teach it (which meant that they were 
the only ones who could properly judge actions as virtuous or not) (NE, Books II 
and X in particular).  
John Stuart Mill also argued for what he called “competent judges”, the 
role of which is to decide between the various options with which one is faced in 
moral situations.  These judges have knowledge of all the options, they have 
experience with them, and so are able to decide which is the best choice when a 
decision must be made between two alternatives (Mill 2003, 103, for example).  
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More recently, John Rawls has argued that competent moral judges are 
necessary for proper decision-making in ethics (Rawls 1951, 178-181).41  The 
qualities he ascribes to such judges are: intelligence, reasonableness, impartiality, 
knowledge about the world around them, knowledge regarding the facts of the 
cases, and a sympathetic knowledge of human interests.42   
Although Richard Brandt did not specifically call for moral judges, he did 
argue that the attitudes and qualities I have ascribed to the impartial spectator are 
necessary in order to justify our ethical beliefs (Brandt 1959, 249-250).  
According to his qualified attitude method, the attitudes necessary for proper 
ethical thinking should be impartial, informed, the result of a normal state of 
mind, and compatible with a consistent and general system of principles.   
As we can see, there is a long history of moral theorists who thought we 
ought to rely on experts or expert opinions to make moral judgments.  In 
particular, they saw the need for us to view moral situations as clearly and 
impartially as possible and these needs gave rise to methods such as Brandt’s 
qualified attitude method and entities such as the philosopher-king, the competent 
judge, and more recently the ideal observer (as noted in chapter 1).  The impartial 
spectator introduced in this theory is merely the logical culmination of these ideas 
as her role is to quell confused attitudes while being concerned with accuracy 
                                                 
41
 I will return to Rawls and specifically his ideas regarding reflective equilibrium in 
section 2.2 on the practical merits of normative sentimentalism. 
42
 In fact Rawls calls for the judges to appraise interests “by means of an imaginative 
experience of it” because “no man can know all interests directly” (Rawls 1951, 179).   
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regarding matters such as partiality and custom so that proper moral judgments 
are made. 
 
The Impartial Spectator and Partiality 
 
It is through the impartial spectator that the theory accommodates our 
intuitions regarding partiality and impartiality.  As noted above, normative 
sentimentalism allows for some partiality, without permitting excessive partiality.  
It recognizes that we are biased towards those who are closer to us, and so it 
permits our giving greater consideration to our friends and family when making 
moral decisions, yet it does not sanction selfishly harming, contributing to the 
harm of, or allowing the harm of another.  For example, one can choose to save 
one’s loved one(s) rather than a stranger or group of strangers from a burning 
building and not have done anything morally wrong.  However, one is not morally 
permitted to cause harm to another merely because it satisfies a loved one’s desire 
to see another in pain.    
The reason the impartial spectator will allow for bias or partiality toward 
loved ones is because we naturally possess such biases and the impartial spectator 
possesses all the normal mental capacities and states characteristic of human 
nature.  According to Smith, “[r]elations being usually placed in situations which 
naturally create … [affection] … it is expected that a suitable degree of affection 
should take place among them” (TMS VI.iii.1.7).   Hume supports this and in fact 
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devotes all of Book II, Part II, Section IV of the Treatise to it.  There he says, 
“[w]hoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, 
proportion’d to the connexion … the relation of blood produces the strongest tie 
the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children, and a lesser degree 
of the same affection, as the relation lessens” (T352).43   
Recently, philosophers and others have been arguing that moral theories 
need to accommodate these natural inclinations and that a moral theory that does 
not do so is severely flawed.  Leading the way was Carol Gilligan whose 
psychological studies show that morality is more than just recognizing universal 
moral principles, rights and rules.  Moral decision making also takes into account 
what she calls a language of care which stresses relationships (Gilligan). 
Nel Noddings takes this idea further by advocating a care based normative 
moral theory.  She states: 
Ethical caring, the relation in which we do meet the other morally 
… [is] … described as arising out of natural caring – that relation 
in which we respond as one-caring out of love or natural 
inclination.  The relation of natural caring … [is] … identified as 
the human condition that we, consciously or unconsciously, 
perceive as “good”.   It is that condition toward which we long and 
strive, and it is our longing for caring – to be in that special 
relation – that provides the motivation for us to be moral.  We want 
to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance 
the ideal of ourselves as one-caring. (Noddings, 5) 
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 Hume makes a similar point in Dissertation II.iii.2.  Scientifically, it is argued that the 
preference for kin and other members of one’s own group is innate and has survival value (Nicoll 
and Russell, 155). 
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The impartial spectator takes into account these considerations while 
prohibiting them from unduly influencing moral judgments.  She will allow for an 
agent to give greater priority to her loved ones than to strangers, yet she will not 
permit the agent to give greater consideration to the trivial interests of her loved 
ones than to the significant interests of strangers.  One might say that this is 
something, given the criteria for trivial interests and significant interests, that an 
agent can determine on her own.  However, agents often do not, and cannot (in 
the case of moral patients), do this.  For example, a mother will often purchase 
items, e.g., an iPod, to appease the trivial interests of her child, e.g., the desire to 
“to be cool”, rather than spend the money on the significant interests of a stranger, 
e.g., donating the money to an organization that is fighting to stop the genocide in 
Darfur.  Given that the mother wants to be a good provider and she wants her 
child to be popular, she fails to see that what she has done is selfish even though 
she has given greater consideration to the trivial interests of her child than to the 
significant interests of those being attacked and killed in Darfur.  She has at the 
very least allowed for the harming of another as she has done nothing to stop the 
atrocities in Darfur.  Her motives will be disapproved of (as she will at the very 
least have allowed harm to come to another) and a consequence of her action will 
be disliked by the impartial spectator, and so her action will be morally wrong.  
This is arguably a situation in which the mother could see that she is not giving 
proper consideration to the significant interests of others and still fails to give 
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proper consideration to those interests.  The role of the impartial spectator is to 
bring such failures to the attention of moral agents and to ensure that such failures 
are judged properly. 
 
The Impartial Spectator and Custom 
 
As was discussed in section 1.3.2, normative sentimentalism allows for 
different judgments for different circumstances while not permitting any and 
every social custom.  As a result, custom is no excuse for immoral behavior.  So, 
as with partiality, customs are permitted as long as they do not cause a moral 
agent to commit, contribute to, or allow an action the motive of which is 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator and the consequences of which are 
disliked by the impartial spectator.  For example, the custom of greeting someone 
when introduced or when seeing an acquaintance is not morally wrong because 
the motive is not disapproved of by the impartial spectator (i.e., it is not selfish) 
nor is any consequence disliked by the impartial spectator (i.e., no consequence of 
the greeting results in harm to the recipient). 
On the other hand, a custom like infanticide will not necessarily stem from 
motives which are approved of by the impartial spectator or have consequences 
which are liked by the impartial spectator.  Recall that there have been times 
when infanticide was necessary in order to preserve life or to ensure that the 
infant did not suffer, so at the very least the motive was not disapproved of, and 
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therefore such actions were not morally wrong.  However, even after 
circumstances improved and killing infants in order to ensure another’s survival 
or to protect the infants from terrible pain and suffering was no longer necessary, 
infanticide had become a custom.  As a custom, it was accepted and permitted and 
was, arguably, being committed thoughtlessly.  In such situations, the motives are 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator and a consequence is disliked (the death 
of the infant) by the impartial spectator, and so the actions are morally wrong.  
The impartial spectator gives us that third person perspective, a thoughtful 
rather than thoughtless perspective, from which to evaluate motives and 
consequences in all situations including those in which customs are involved.  
Customs are so engrained in our culture that we often take them for granted.  As 
moral agents, we often fail to be clear about what purposes customs serve in our 
society or culture and many often fail to see customs for what they really are, as 
the infanticide example shows.  Because of her impartial position, because she is 
a spectator, because she possesses all relevant human qualities, and because she 
possesses all information relevant to the situation at hand, the impartial spectator 
is the one who can be relied upon to properly judge the morality of an agent’s 
action because she is able to assess motives and consequences while not being 
seduced by tradition. 
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2.2 Practical Application 
In this section, I briefly show how this ethic works in two cases which are 
at different ends of the moral spectrum, one that is uncontroversial insofar as we 
are confident regarding the outcome and the other controversial insofar as we are 
not confident about the outcome, in ways that other prominent normative moral 
theories do not.  The two cases to be discussed are a random drive-by shooting 
and infanticide.  In the first case, that of a random drive-by shooting, I will show 
that normative sentimentalism is in harmony with our considered judgments and 
with the other normative theories in judging it to be morally wrong.  In the second 
case, that of infanticide, I will show that sentimentalism is able to ascertain the 
morality of infanticide whereas other major normative moral theories fail to do so 
or do so in a ways that conflict with our considered judgments thereby showing 
the superiority of normative sentimentalism over these other moral theories.   
Before getting started, I want to briefly address my use of the term 
“considered judgments” in this section and throughout the rest of the dissertation.  
One of the more prominent philosophers who relies on this term is Rawls who 
states that considered judgments are “rendered … in circumstances where the 
more common excuses and explanations for making a mistake do not obtain” 
(Rawls 1999, 42).44  Considered judgments may be about particular cases, the 
principles or rules that govern the cases, or the theoretical considerations that bear 
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 Rawls claims that these judgments arise from a sense of justice and, although I am 
borrowing his term, I am not taking a stance regarding the basis for considered judgments. 
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on the cases, rules or principles.  When we get an acceptable coherence among 
our considered judgments, we achieve reflective equilibrium.  According to 
Rawls, reflective equilibrium is a “state … reached after a person has weighed 
various proposed conceptions and … has either revised his judgments to accord 
with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding 
conception)” (Rawls 1999, 43).  In striving to achieve reflective equilibrium, we 
may revise the considered judgments, the principles or rules, or the theoretical 
considerations.  Reflective equilibrium is achieved when we feel our considered 
judgments, principles and theories are no longer in need of revision because they 
are consistent with each other and because they have the highest degree of 
acceptability and credibility for us.   
For example, assume that Mary thinks that one ought always follow the 
commands of the Bible (this is one of her considered judgments regarding a 
general principle).  Assume also, however, that Mary does not think that one 
ought to kill those who work on the Sabbath (Exodus 31:15) (this is another of her 
considered judgments).  Mary achieves reflective equilibrium between her 
considered judgments and general principles when she either discards the general 
principle (for example, she either thinks that one ought not always, if ever, follow 
the commands of the Bible or that one ought only follow the Ten 
Commandments), modifies it (for example, she uses a different version of the 
Bible or reads Exodus figuratively), or changes her opinion regarding working on 
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the Sabbath to marry up with her general principles (and so decides that people 
who work on the Sabbath ought in fact be killed).   
In the examples that follow, I take a random drive by shooting to be 
uncontroversial because the considered judgments of moral agents, regardless of 
their moral theory of choice, are in agreement that such an action is morally 
wrong.  On the other hand, the considered judgments of moral agents are not 
always in agreement regarding the morality of infanticide.  What I show is that it 
is only with normative sentimentalism that we are able to reach reflective 
equilibrium with respect to infanticide.  It is with the other prominent normative 
moral theories that we fail to reach reflective equilibrium with respect to 
infanticide and therefore we end up having to compromise our considered 
judgments or our moral principles in ways that are unsatisfactory to us.   
 
2.2.1 Random Drive-by Shooting 
Kantian Deontology 
 According to Kant, the standard of morality is the Categorical Imperative 
(CI).  There are four formulations of the CI.   
(1) Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become universal law (FMM 421).45 
 
(2) Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only (FMM 429). 
 
                                                 
45
 References to the works of Kant will follow standard conventions. 
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(3) The Idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law 
(FMM 432). 
 
(4) Act according to the maxim of a member of a merely potential realm of 
ends who gives universal law (FMM 439).46 
 
It follows from the CI that killing is wrong.  According to the first 
formulation, what is referred to as the Formula of the Universal Law of Nature, it 
would not be rational for an agent to act on a maxim according to which one kills 
another.  This is because this formulation calls on an agent to conceive of a world 
in which everyone by nature must kill others.  If this is the case, then it is 
logically impossible for the agent to kill another because either she, or her victim, 
or both will not exist (as one, or the other, or both will likely have been killed by 
another; in fact, humanity itself would cease to exist).   So, it is inconceivable for 
the maxim “kill others” to exist with itself as a universal law.  Because of this, an 
agent is forbidden from killing others. 
 According to the second formulation, referred to as the Humanity 
Formula (or the Formula of the End Itself), we do not respect the humanity of 
others when we kill them.  That is, Kant thinks that those possessing certain 
qualities, viz., the capacities to engage in rational self-directed behavior and to 
adopt and pursue their own ends, deserve respect.  Such respect calls for beings of 
this type, persons, to be treated as ends, not merely as means to ends.  Therefore, 
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 Kant claims that all four formulations of the CI are equivalent (which means I really 
need only list one formulation to make the arguments that follow).  My purpose in listing each 
formulation is not to question this assertion.  I list each formulation for expository reasons only.  
And, for the sake of thoroughness, I address each formulation individually. 
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according to Kantian deontology, killing a person in a random drive-by shooting 
is morally wrong because such an action does not respect her as an end, but rather 
at most treats her merely as a means. 
According to the third formulation, referred to as the Autonomy Formula, 
agents must act in such a way so that through their maxims they become 
legislators of moral law (rather than just followers of moral law as the first 
formulation dictates).  So, this formulation makes agents the source of authority 
behind the moral laws that constrain our behavior.  Because of this, killing 
someone in a random drive-by shooting is morally wrong since this is not 
something that as legislators of moral law rational agents would legislate as it 
violates the first two formulations. 
 According to the fourth formulation, referred to as the Kingdom of Ends 
Formula, we ought to act only on a principle that would gain acceptance by a 
community of fully rational agents, persons, each of whom has an equal share in 
legislating these principles for their community.  A random drive-by shooting 
then is morally wrong because the corresponding principle “kill others” would not 










According to classic utilitarianism, an act is morally right if and only if it 
maximizes overall well-being.47  A random drive-by shooting does not maximize 
overall well-being.  Not only does the victim lose her life, but her family and 
loved ones suffer from losing her.  Members of the community also suffer as such 
an act causes fear and panic.  If the perpetrator is caught and convicted, then she 
will at the very least be confined to prison, but it is possible she will be sentenced 
to death.  Not only will she lose her freedom or her life, but her family and loved 
ones will have to deal with the consequences of her actions as well.  If the 
perpetrator is not caught or convicted, she may end up having to deal with the 
emotional baggage that comes with committing such an act, e.g., remorse, guilt, 
shame, etc.  Even if the perpetrator does not suffer any negative consequences, the 
family and the friends of the victim still suffer and because of their suffering 
overall well-being is not maximized.  Therefore, according to utilitarianism, 
killing someone in a random drive-by shooting is morally wrong. 
 
Social Contract Theory 
 
 According to social contract theory, it is through mutual agreement, a 
contract, that the content of moral norms is determined.48  Rational members of a 
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 I am using classic utilitarianism as the representative of all utilitarian theories for the 
sake of simplicity. 
48
 For the sake of simplicity, I will not distinguish between contractarianism and 
contractualism. 
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community agree to restrict their freedoms to allow the most liberty for everyone.  
With respect to killing, members of a community agree to give up their freedom 
to kill others in order to gain the benefit of not being killed.  Therefore, according 
to social contract theory, killing someone in a random drive-by shooting is 
morally wrong.   
It might be argued that in extreme circumstances rational members of a 
community might agree to norms that permit an agent to kill or, at the very least, 
not save another.  However, this case is clearly not extreme, and thus such a 




 Normative sentimentalism is no different than the other moral theories 
mentioned in judging the act of killing someone in a drive-by shooting as morally 
wrong, if the shooter is a moral agent.  That is, the shooter must be someone who 
can be harmed and who has the cognitive abilities to understand which motives 
are approved of (and which are not), which consequences are liked (and which are 
not), and can choose whether to act (or not act) accordingly.  If the shooter is a 
moral agent, then it must be determined whether her motive is approved of or not 
and whether any consequence of her action is disliked or not.  Given that the case 
is that of a random drive-by shooting and given that the agent did not give due 
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 I will address social contract theory and extreme circumstances in section 2.2.2 
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consideration to the relevant interests of those affected by the action, e.g., the 
interest the victim had in living, the motive is clearly selfish.  That is, although the 
shooter might have had an interest in inducing panic or inflicting pain and 
suffering on others just for fun, for example, such interests are trivial interests 
whereas the victim’s interest in living is a significant interest.50  The impartial 
spectator therefore will not approve of the motive.  In addition, given that many 
consequences of the action are harms to others, e.g., the victim, the victim’s 
family and loved ones, the community, and possibly the perpetrator herself as 
well as her loved ones, the impartial spectator will dislike at least one of the 
consequences (recall that all that is required is that one consequence be disliked 
for the impartial spectator to judge the consequences as disliked).  Therefore, 
according to normative sentimentalism, given that the perpetrator is a moral 
agent, given that her motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and given 
that at least one consequence of her action is disliked by the impartial spectator, 
killing someone in a random drive-by shooting is morally wrong. 
 
2.2.2 Infanticide 
 Although it appears that we reached reflective equilibrium with each 
theory with respect to a random drive-by shooting, this does not mean that it is 
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 It might be argued that the shooter is seeking revenge for a wrong done to her or 
something of the sort and that her interest in doing so is not trivial.  However, the example focuses 
on a random drive-by shooting, not one where the perpetrator might have good reason for shooting 
another.  I think someone would be hard pressed to say that in random drive-by shootings the 
perpetrators’ motives were anything but selfish. 
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achieved by each theory with respect to all circumstances.  As the infanticide case 
will show, utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and social contract theory do not 
achieve reflective equilibrium while normative sentimentalism does.  It is in part 
because the non-sentimentalist theories do not achieve reflective equilibrium 
regarding moral situations such as infanticide that we ought to reject them in 
favor of normative sentimentalism. 
In section 1.1.3, I used infanticide as an example and noted that there are 
different circumstances under which infanticide is and has been committed, viz., 
in times of poverty or limited resources, in life and death situations, and out of 
convenience.  These are not the only reasons infanticide is committed.  Children 
have been sacrificed for religious reasons and they have been killed because they 
were not healthy.  For each of these situations, I will explain whether and, if so, 
how each moral theory discussed above determines the morality of infanticide. 
 
Non-Extreme Situations: Infanticide for Convenience, Unhealthy Infants and 
Religious Sacrifice 
 
i. Kantian Deontology 
There are two different interpretations of Kant’s position regarding the 
killing of infants.  The first, a charitable interpretation, is based on the 
understanding of Kant explained in section 2.2.1.  According to this 
interpretation, infanticide for any reason is morally wrong because killing is 
wrong (as per the CI).  This interpretation gets support not only from Foundations 
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of the Metaphysics of Morals, but also in The Philosophy of Law where Kant says 
that maternal infanticide, which he takes to occur when a mother kills her 
illegitimate child at birth, is worthy of death.51  From this, we can read Kant as 
saying that children are protected by the CI.  
The second interpretation is less charitable, yet, it seems to be the one we 
must hold Kantians to if we are to take Kant seriously.  As we saw above (section 
2.2.1), the basis of morality according to Kant is rationality.  It is our humanity, 
our rational nature, that has absolute and unconditional value.  Beings with 
rational nature are persons while anything that lacks reason is merely an object.  
Because of their rational nature, persons must be respected as ends in themselves 
and ought not be used merely as means to ends; whereas, on the other hand, 
objects can be used merely as means to ends.  Infants, who arguably do not 
possess reason, appear to belong to the class of objects, not the class of persons.  
It follows then that we have no moral responsibilities to infants in and of 
themselves.  Therefore, it seems that according to Kantian deontology, infanticide 
is not morally wrong.52  If this is so, then infanticide for convenience, because the 
infant is unhealthy and for religious sacrifice would be morally acceptable 
according to Kantian deontology.  Yet, killing infants for such reasons contradict 
the considered judgments of many, if not most.  
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 Kant Philosophy of Law, 202.  In this section of Philosophy of Law (pages 202-204) 
Kant gives some interesting further reflections on the relationship between the law and morality, 
but it goes beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
52
 My thanks to Dale Miller for bringing this problem to my attention. 
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In addition, Kant distinguishes between direct and indirect duties.  
According to the CI, we have direct duties only to those with rational natures, 
viz., persons.  This means, as noted above, that we have moral obligations toward 
them in virtue of the fact that they are persons.  Kant says, however, that we have 
indirect duties to non-persons, viz., animals, insofar as our actions toward them 
affect our actions toward persons.  For example, he claims that we ought not to be 
cruel to animals because doing so causes us to be cruel to persons.53  If in fact 
infants are not persons, it seems we still have indirect duties toward them as it 
would be odd for our treatment of animals to affect our treatment of persons and 
yet for our treatment of infants to not affect it.  If this is true, then it seems that 
committing infanticide in non-extreme situations would be morally wrong (as 
doing so could cause us to be cruel to persons), but committing it in extreme 
situations might not be (as infants are not persons and so we can ultimately kill 
them if in fact we feel we need to do so).  Although the fact that it is morally 
unacceptable to commit infanticide in non-extreme situations and the fact that it is 
morally acceptable to commit it in extreme situations seems to accord with our 
considered judgments, the reasons why it is unacceptable in certain situations and 
acceptable in others are in conflict with our considered judgments.  That is, we do 
not think that children ought to be treated in certain ways merely because doing so 
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 Kant LE, 212-213. 
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ensures that we treat rational adult humans well; nor do we think treating children 
poorly is acceptable in virtue of the fact that they are not intrinsically valuable.  
 
ii. Utilitarianism  
As noted above, according to utilitarians, one is required, and therefore 
permitted, to commit any action that maximizes overall well-being.  It follows 
that if infanticide maximizes overall well-being, then one is permitted to commit 
infanticide.  This leaves us with two sets of possible conclusions regarding the 
morality of infanticide in non-extreme conditions.  The first is that if killing 
infants for convenience, or because they are unhealthy, or for religious reasons 
will maximize overall well-being, often thought to be happiness, then it is 
permissible.  The second is that if killing infants for convenience, or because they 
are unhealthy, or for religious reasons does not maximize overall well-being, or 
does not bring about the greatest amount of happiness, then it is morally 
unacceptable.   
The first set of conclusions is counterintuitive to many, if not most.  That 
is, many will argue that what ought to be considered in such situations is not 
(only) the happiness of those affected by the consequences of an act, but whether 
an action violates anyone’s rights or whether it properly respects life or something 
of the sort.  This criticism of utilitarianism is just an instance of one of the 
primary objections to utilitarianism: that consequences, and happiness in 
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particular, are not the only morally relevant considerations.  So, according to 
utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable for a parent to kill an infant in any 
situation in which the happiness that results from killing the infant is greater than 
the happiness that would result from not killing the infant.  For example, we can 
imagine a situation in which having a child interferes with a parent’s ability to 
spend time with children she already has, which in turn makes them unhappy, 
puts extra demands and stress on her, perhaps causes her to resent the newborn 
which might cause her to spend less time with it causing it to feel neglected, etc.  
In such a situation, we can imagine the happiness that would be brought about by 
the death of the infant is greater than the happiness that would result from letting 
the infant live.  However, although we might agree that these are not ideal 
circumstances for anyone involved and that happiness would be maximized by 
killing the infant, morally permitting the killing of the infant in such a situation is 
not in accord with the considered judgments of most.  Again, the point is that 
there is more to making moral judgments than just determining whether the 
consequences of an action bring about the greatest happiness (or maximizes 
overall well-being).  
 
iii. Social Contract Theory 
Social contract theory does not fare any better than Kantian deontology 
and utilitarianism with respect to determining the morality of infanticide in non-
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extreme situations.  The problem with relying on social contract theory to make 
such judgments is that infants are not transparently covered by the contract and so 
infanticide seems morally permissible in any and all circumstances.  That is, only 
those who are able to enter into the contract, who in turn are those who are able to 
understand it, who in turn are those who are rational, are covered by it.  If this is 
the case, then it seems that any and all actions toward beings that are not rational 
are morally permissible. This class of beings includes not only infants, but also 
the seriously mentally enfeebled, the senile, and animals (in other words, marginal 
cases).  That we can treat the members of this class in any way we choose is 
seriously counterintuitive to many. 
In their defense, social contract theorists have tried to cover marginal 
cases indirectly by arguing that since those in the class of marginal beings were 
rational, or will be rational, or are loved by those who are rational they ought to 
be covered by the contract.  Although this seems reasonable, many critics argue 
that given their own theoretical criteria, social contract theorists cannot really 
include marginal cases in the class of those who are protected by the contract.  
Furthermore, given the qualities and characteristics of those marginal cases that 
social contract theorists want to be moral patients, viz., infants, the senile and the 
otherwise mentally enfeebled, it follows that animals would also be moral 
patients.  That is, there is very little difference in the mental capacities of many 
animals and the mental capacities of infants, the senile and the otherwise mentally 
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enfeebled.  In fact, there are some animals, viz., adult mammals, that actually 
possess greater rational capacities than do other marginal beings.  Yet, most social 
contract theorists want to exclude animals from the class of moral patients.  In 
their defense, social contract theorists could argue that infants will be as rational 
as adult humans and that the senile used to be as rational as adult humans thereby 
giving them standing that even adult non-human mammals do not have (as they 
will never be as rational as adult humans).  However, there is a group of mentally 
enfeebled humans who never had and never will have the rational capacities of a 
healthy adult human and may not even possess the rational capacities of adult 
non-human mammals.  If they are to be covered by the contract, then it is unclear 
why animals would not also be covered.   
Another argument social contract theorists give to defend the status of 
infants, the senile and the mentally enfeebled as moral patients is that there is 
little difference between “a not-very-intelligent adult and a severe mental 
defective, or between a normal old person and someone who is severely senile” 
(Carruthers, 114).  Therefore, they argue, “the attempt to accord direct moral 
rights only to rational agents (normal adults) would be inherently dangerous and 
open to abuse” (Carruthers, 114).  In other words, their concern is that if human 
marginal cases are not treated as moral patients, then a slippery slope will occur 
and we will start treating moral agents in ways that are not permitted by the 
contract.  However, a concern that a slippery slope might occur as a result of 
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one’s position does not thereby entitled one to add moral principles to a theory 
that cannot be defended by that theory.   
In the end, there is no good way for social contract theorists to adequately 
and acceptably cover infants with the contract and we end up with conclusions 
that contradict our considered judgments. 
 
iv. Normative Sentimentalism  
According to normative sentimentalism, infanticide for convenience, e.g., 
in times of economic prosperity, is morally wrong.  During these times, the infant 
is likely to survive (and can thrive), the likelihood of it suffering significantly is 
minimal, and family members will generally not be unduly burdened nor will 
their lives be at stake.  In these situations, the moral agent, let us assume it is the 
mother, is harming the infant and she is acting from selfishness as she is not 
giving due consideration to the relevant interests of all those concerned, viz., the 
infant.  That is, she is giving greater priority to what are her own less significant 
or trivial interests, e.g., the interest in remaining burden free, than the significant 
interest the infant has in living. 
 It might be argued that the balancing of considerations here is the same 
type of process a utilitarian might engage in.  However, there are at least two 
major differences between the two theories.  Again, according to this version of 
sentimentalism, a necessary consideration in moral decision-making and judging 
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is the motive behind the act.  If selfishness motivates the act and the act results in 
any consequence that the impartial spectator does not like, then, and only then, is 
the act morally wrong.  The utilitarian is only concerned with either actual or 
expected consequences, viz., whether the act will bring about or is expected to 
bring about the best consequences; she is not concerned with the motive that 
underlies the act.  Secondly, as noted, this theory is not concerned with 
maximizing or aggregating consequences as utilitarianism is.  All that matters is 
whether or not any of the consequences is harmful. 
In the case of unhealthy infants, what will need to be taken into account is 
the extent of the illness and its corresponding symptoms.  If the infant has a 
chronic condition but her welfare and quality of life are not in serious jeopardy, 
e.g., the infant has autism or Down syndrome, but the parent, a moral agent, 
decides that it would interfere with her own life in that it would be an 
inconvenience to care for the child, then not only is the parent harming the infant, 
but she is also acting from selfishness when she kills it.  That is, although the 
parent might have a significant interest in not being burdened in this way, the 
infant’s significant interest in living is greater.  The impartial spectator both 
dislikes a consequence and disapproves of the motive of infanticide in these 
circumstances and so it is morally wrong.54  However, if the infant is seriously ill, 
e.g., she has severe spina bifida, and the parent is concerned with the infant’s 
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 This is assuming that death when one is relatively healthy is a harm. 
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welfare and the quality of her life then she is not acting from selfishness and in 
fact the consequence, death, might not be harmful as living with severe spina 
bifida can be very painful and the quality of life for an individual with spina 
bifidais very low.  Infanticide in situations such as this is not morally wrong 
because the impartial spectator at the very least does not disapprove of the motive, 
and may not dislike any consequence, thus not all three of the necessary criteria 
for moral wrongness are met. 
In chapter 1, I discussed the morality of the actions of the religious zealot.  
What I said there can be applied to cases of infanticide for religious reasons.  If a 
person who commits infanticide because she believes she must sacrifice an infant 
for religious reasons has been brainwashed, or something of the like, then the 
impartial spectator will not disapprove of her motive.  On the other hand, if such a 
person is acting from neglectful ignorance, then the impartial spectator will 
disapprove of her motive as she will be acting from selfishness.  Take, for 
example, a young woman who has been brainwashed since birth to believe that in 
order for her community to survive and thrive an infant must be sacrificed every 
year.  Assume she sincerely believes that if an infant is not sacrificed, then great 
tragedy will come to her community.  Assume that throughout her whole life her 
only interactions with others have been with those who have taught her to believe 
this.  If she acts on this belief and in fact kills an infant, the impartial spectator 
will not disapprove of her motive.  This is because the young woman did not act 
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from selfishness.  She acted according to her own significant interests as well as 
the significant interests of the members of her community.   
It is possible, of course, that a person in this situation has not really been 
brainwashed, but that this belief is a part of her culture.  Again, if this is a belief 
that is sincerely held, then infanticide in such situations would not be morally 
wrong.  On the other hand, if infanticide has just become a custom or is accepted 
due to neglectful ignorance, then it would be morally wrong as not only will the 
impartial spectator dislike the consequences of the act, but she will disapprove of 
the motive.   
 
Extreme Situations: Infanticide in Times of Poverty, Limited Resources, and in 
Life and Death Situations 
 
i. Kantian Deontology 
 
As noted above, according to a charitable interpretation of Kant’s theory, 
infanticide for any reason is morally wrong because killing is wrong (as per the 
CI).  However, if this is the case then Kantians are forced to accept a paradox.  
Take, for example, a situation in which one is forced to kill a single infant in order 
to keep five others (infants or otherwise) from being killed by someone else.  
Given that killing people is wrong, it seems paradoxical to permit the killing of 
more rather than fewer, yet Kantianism seems to demand just that.  Although 
Kantians will generally accept this paradox rather than modify their theory to 
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account for it, such an acceptance is perplexing not to mention the fact that it goes 
against the considered judgments of many.   
According to the less charitable interpretation of Kant’s theory presented 
in 2.2.1, infanticide in any situation is morally acceptable since infants are not 
persons.  If this interpretation is correct, then infanticide would be permissible in 
extreme situations.  But, this means it would be permissible in non-extreme 
situations as well, e.g., in situations in which the parents like to travel and will not 
be able to do as much traveling with an infant and therefore they kill the infant.  




One of the most well known criticisms of utilitarianism is that it is very 
difficult to determine whether any particular action will maximize overall well-
being.  Because of this, utilitarians face the difficulty of trying to determine 
whether killing an infant will actually maximize overall well-being.  For example, 
in times of limited resources, it might seem that killing an innocent child will 
relieve the family of a burden.  However, it might be the case that not killing the 
infant but instead allowing another family to raise it would maximize overall 
well-being.  It might also be the case that if the infant is seriously mentally or 
physically disabled, then perhaps it would maximize overall well-being to kill it.  
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One could also argue that keeping the infant alive and allowing it to be used for 
medical research would maximize the good.  On the other hand, if the parent is in 
a life or death situation and must choose between herself and the infant, there are 
a great many consequences that need to be taken into account to determine 
whether killing the infant will maximize overall well-being.  Not only is it often 
difficult to determine what the consequences will be, but it is often difficult to 
determine which of the consequences that can in fact be determined will 
maximize overall well-being and which will not.  Unfortunately for the utilitarian, 
we often have no way of knowing whether our actions will maximize well-being 
or not as we cannot foresee all the possible consequences of a particular act and 
nor can we easily determine whether the good consequences outweigh the bad. 
Of course, the moral theory I am proposing relies to some extent on the 
evaluation of consequences in order for the impartial spectator to render a moral 
judgment.  However, as was noted above, unlike utilitarianism which requires that 
all consequences be foreseen, normative sentimentalism only requires the 
impartial spectator to foresee enough consequences to determine whether there 
will be one harmful (disliked) consequence. 
 
iii. Social Contract Theory 
As noted above, if infants are not in fact covered by the social contract, 
then killing them in extreme situations is not morally wrong.  Nevertheless, for 
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the sake of argument, let us assume that infants are moral patients according to 
social contract theory and are therefore covered by the contract.  If this is the case, 
then it appears that killing them for any reason, whether there are extreme 
conditions or not, would be morally wrong.  However, recall that according to 
social contract theory moral agents agree to give up certain freedoms to allow the 
most liberty for everyone.  This is because, according to Hobbes, although men 
are self-interested, they are also rational (Hobbes Leviathan, chapter 5).  They 
realize they cannot live without a civil society and so it is in their best interests to 
live in peace when others are willing to do so (and to pursue war when others are 
not willing to pursue peace).  So, men agree to live under common laws.  Given 
this, it seems at the very least possible that moral agents agree to laws whereby in 
extreme conditions one is permitted to kill an infant in order to ensure her own 
survival, e.g., if the parent is running from an enemy.  So, social contract theorists 
are not always condemning killing, contrary to what might have been implied 
above.  And, that it is morally permissible for a person to kill another to save her 
own life is consistent with our considered judgments, at least in many situations.  
 Of course, if infants are not moral patients, then it is permissible to kill 
them to ensure our own survival, but then it is also permissible to kill them in 
non-extreme situations.  The problem, as noted above, is that it is not clear 
whether infants are or can be covered by the social contract.  This has to be 
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determined before it can be known whether and in what situations infanticide 
would be morally acceptable for the social contract theorist. 
iv. Normative Sentimentalism 
According to normative sentimentalism, if one is running from an enemy 
with a child in one’s arms, the practice of infanticide would not be morally wrong 
(as was noted in chapter 1).  This because the agent is not failing to give due 
consideration to the relevant interests of another; she is not acting from 
selfishness.  The agent’s life is in danger, as is the life of the infant, but according 
to normative sentimentalism, one never acts from selfishness when saving one’s 
own life.  Therefore, the impartial spectator will not disapprove of the motive 
behind acts of infanticide, even though she will dislike the consequences, viz., the 
death of the infant.55  Again, in order for an act to be morally wrong according to 
normative sentimentalism three conditions must be met: it must be committed by 
a moral agent, the motive must be disapproved of by the impartial spectator and 
the impartial spectator must dislike at least one consequence of the act.  In this 
case, only two of the conditions have been met. 
Accordingly, the impartial spectator would also think infanticide in times 
of tremendous poverty or limited resources would be morally acceptable: the 
                                                 
55
 Recall that it is being assumed that death is a harm.  It might be the case that in some 
situations death is not actually a harm, e.g., when the individual would suffer unbearable pain if 
she continues living, as is the case for an individual with spina bifida.  However, whether death is 
or is not a harm in this particular situation has no impact on the morality rightness or wrongness of 
the act. 
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chances that an infant will survive are slim, the suffering she will experience if 
not killed is great, and her existence can be an unbearable burden on the other 
members of the family.  In situations such as these, where the motive is to save 
the infant from great suffering and to preserve oneself and others, an individual 
has not acted from selfishness.  
Likewise, imagine a situation in which a family has been displaced by war 
and the infant has become a significant burden, although her presence would not 
necessarily be the direct cause of significant harm to herself or the rest of her 
family.  In a situation such as this, the impartial spectator will dislike the 
consequences of an infanticidal action, because although her life will not be ideal, 
death for the infant is a harm (this is similar to the case of an infant with autism or 
Down syndrome).  However, the impartial spectator will not disapprove of the 
agent’s motive because the agent, assuming it is a family member, is not failing to 
give due consideration to the relevant interests of those involved, viz., the 
interests in alleviating themselves of a huge burden in order minimize the strain of 
survival in such situations. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 Not only do the theoretical problems that Kantian deontology, 
utilitarianism and social contract theory have prohibit them from giving us 
acceptable conclusions regarding the morality of infanticide, but they are the 
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reasons why we ought to reject each of these theories as our moral theory of 
choice and instead turn to normative sentimentalism. 
 As noted above (section 2.2.2), there are two possible interpretations of 
Kantian deontology that are relevant to our purposes.  According to the charitable 
interpretation, infanticide for any reason is morally wrong because infants are 
persons and killing persons is wrong.  According to the second interpretation, the 
less charitable interpretation and the one I think is truer to Kant, infanticide for 
(most) any reason is morally acceptable because infants are not persons.  Given 
that infants are not persons, we do not have direct duties to them.  At most, we 
have indirect duties to them.  Both of these conclusions are contrary to the 
considered judgments of most.  Furthermore, the two interpretations arise from 
the fact that it is unclear whether or not infants are members of the class of 
persons given Kant’s own criteria for personhood and this determination will 
impact all the morality of our actions toward infants. 
 However, whether or not infants are persons is not the only classification 
Kantian deontology is unclear about.  The same confusion arises with respect to 
the status of the mentally enfeebled and the senile.  If we side with the charitable 
interpretation, then it seems they would belong to the class of persons.  However, 
Kant specifically excludes animals from the class of things to which we have 
direct duties.  The problem, which we saw also arises with respect to social 
contract theory, is that many adult mammals are at the very least on equal footing 
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with human infants, the mentally enfeebled and the senile with respect to their 
mental capacities.  Therefore, if infants, the mentally enfeebled and the senile are 
members of the class of persons, then it seems animals should be as well.  Some 
Kantians have tried to interpret Kant in such a way as to include animals in the 
class of persons or of things to which we have direct duties, but Kant himself 
specifically says, “if a man has his dog shot, because it can no longer earn a living 
for him, he is by no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter is 
incapable of judgement” (Kant LE, 212).  Given this, Kantians are forced to claim 
either that Kant contradicted himself or that animals are not covered which then 
prohibits them from including infants, the mentally enfeebled and the senile in the 
class of persons.  This, of course, goes against the considered judgments of most. 
In addition, Kantians suffer from the problem of having no good solution 
to a situation where the only options an individual has are to either kill one to save 
many or to allow the many to die to save the one.  This brings to light the inability 
of the Kantian to determine what an individual is to do when she is in a situation 
in which she is faced with a conflict of duties.    
 For the utilitarian, the problems with determining the morality of 
infanticide are the same problems she has in many other situations.  Not only is it 
very difficult to determine what the consequences of an action will be, but it is 
difficult to determine whether the consequences will actually maximize well-
being.  Furthermore, not only are many not convinced that the consequences of an 
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act are the only morally relevant considerations, but many are also not convinced 
that well-being (or happiness) ought to be the only morally relevant consideration 
as utilitarians argue.  Moreover, utilitarianism also permits the intentional 
infliction of pain on a being (or beings) if it will maximize the well-being of 
others and it allows for people to act from questionable motives if the 
consequences of their actions maximize well-being.  As noted above (section 
2.1.2), both of these notions are counterintuitive to many. 
As with Kantian deontology and utilitarianism, the problems with social 
contract theory that are displayed when applying it to infanticide are the problems 
with which the social contract theorist must contend in other situations.  On the 
one hand, it does not appear that infants, the mentally enfeebled and the senile are 
covered by the contract.  Because of this, we are morally permitted to treat these 
beings in any way we wish.  On the other hand, if, as some argue, infants, the 
mentally enfeebled and the senile are indirectly covered by the social contract and 
are in fact moral patients, then it follows that killing these beings for any reason 
will usually be morally wrong (although the contract might permit it in extreme 
situations).  Of course, if infants, the mentally enfeebled and the senile are all 
covered by the contract, then it follows that animals must be as well.  Yet, social 
contract theorists do not generally want to admit animals into the class of beings 
covered by the contract.   
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Not only does normative sentimentalism give us conclusions that are 
consistent with our considered judgments, but it is immune to the problems of the 
other prominent normative moral theories.  The upshot is that there will be 
situations, those that are extreme, in which infanticide is morally acceptable 
according to normative sentimentalism and situations, those that are not extreme, 
in which it is not morally acceptable according to normative sentimentalism. 
Normative sentimentalism does not suffer from the difficulties from which 
Kantian deontology and social contract suffer regarding the classification of 
infants, the mentally enfeebled, the senile or animals.  What matters for the 
normative sentimentalist in determining the moral considerability of a being is 
whether or not it can be harmed, not whether or what kind of rational or cognitive 
capacities it possesses.  This criterion enables the normative sentimentalist to 
avoid the inconsistencies, contradictions and difficulties Kantian deontology and 
social contract theory have in classifying persons, infants, the mentally enfeebled, 
the senile and animals.  If a being can be harmed, then its interests need to be 
given due consideration regardless of whether or not it is a person or rational 
being.  So, the class of moral patients as determined by normative sentimentalism 
is large enough to include all marginal cases but not so big that it includes 
inanimate objects like rocks or coffee mugs. 
The normative sentimentalist also avoids any problems regarding conflicts 
of duties because her concern is not with duty.  Rather, the concern is with 
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whether or not a moral agent or moral patient’s significant interests have been 
given due consideration.  Of course, there might be a case in which the significant 
interests of two moral agents or moral patients are in conflict.  However, unlike 
the Kantian deontologist who thinks an agent does something wrong when she 
acts against her duty in fulfilling another duty, the normative sentimentalist does 
not think an agent does something morally wrong when she chooses the 
significant interests of one over the significant interests of another as long as she 
has not selfishly chosen as such (even if it results in a consequence which is 
disliked). 
Furthermore, although motives and consequences are criteria for moral 
judgments in normative sentimentalism, each is not the sole criterion.  Contrary to 
motive-based normative moral theories, an action is not necessarily morally 
wrong according to normative sentimentalism if it arises from an ill intended 
motive.  And, unlike consequentialism, and utilitarianism specifically, normative 
sentimentalism does not face the difficulties in determining consequences that 
make these types of theories inadequate, viz., determining whether or not the 
aggregated consequences maximize well-being or happiness.  In contrast, the 
normative sentimentalist impartial spectator need only determine whether there 
will be at least one harmful consequence 
In sum, whereas the other prominent moral theories considered above fail 
to give us a definitive judgment regarding the morality of infanticide, or they give 
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us one that is not in harmony with our considered judgments, the normative 
sentimentalist theory presented here provides us with the moral prescription(s) we 
are seeking while avoiding the problems of the other prominent moral theories. 
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Chapter 3: A Sentimentalist Animal Ethic 
 
 
In this chapter, I apply the sentimentalist ethic developed in Chapter 1 and 
defended in Chapter 2 to the practices of factory farming and using animals for 
research in order to show how it contends with a pair of important contemporary 
moral issues.56  What I will show is that most of the conclusions reached by 
normative sentimentalism regarding the morality of these issues are in accord 
with our pre-existing intuitions.  The conclusions that are not in accord with our 
pre-existing intuitions will help us correct those intuitions thus allowing us to 
achieve reflective equilibrium with respect to using animals as food and as 
research subjects. 
 
3.1 Factory Farming and Research Practices 
In order to facilitate the arguments presented here, I first describe some 
factory farm and research practices.  I also explain the effects these practices have 
on the health of the animals and, in the case of factory farms, the workers and the 
environment. 
  
3.1.1 Factory Farming Practices 
Factory farms, also known as “confined animal feeding operations” 
(CAFOs), are the primary source of animal products.  Pigs raised in CAFOs are 
                                                 
56
 For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms “animals” and “non-human animals” 
will denote the same class of beings, as has already been implied. 
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kept in overcrowded, poorly designed confinement systems which cause stress 
and boredom that result not only in tail-biting (which, if blood is drawn, causes 
some pigs to bite even more earnestly resulting in a form of cannibalism), but in 
other physical problems which include damaged and deformed feet as well as 
porcine stress syndrome, the symptoms of which are rigidity, blotchy skin, 
panting, anxiety and often sudden death (Singer 1990, 119-129).  Chickens kept 
in unnaturally lit confined areas, usually half a square foot of space per four to 
five pound chicken, are subjected to continuous bright lights for twenty-four 
hours a day for the first two weeks of their confinement in order to speed the 
weight-gain process which results in aggression, feather-pecking and cannibalism.  
After a period of time during which the lights are turned on and off every two 
hours in order to encourage the chickens to eat (the idea being that the chickens 
will be more inclined to eat after a period of sleep), the chickens are then kept in 
darkness in order to reduce the aggression, feather-pecking and cannibalism 
caused by the crowding (Singer 1990, 99-119).  Some beef cattle seem to have it 
pretty good compared to pigs and chickens because they are raised outdoors.  
However, they are fed an unnatural diet of corn and cereals in order to accelerate 
the growth process.  Due to this diet, the cattle suffer from a lack of fiber.  To try 
to rectify this, the cattle lick their own and each other’s coats.  It is believed that 
the resulting large amount of hair in their rumen causes painful abscesses.  Cattle 
that are raised indoors are overcrowded and often become lame from the slatted 
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floors, which are used to make cleaning easier, on which they stand (Singer 1990, 
139-141). 
Not only are CAFOs hard on the animals, but they are also hard on the 
workers.  Workers often suffer from bacterial diseases due to contact with fecal 
matter, injury due to being kicked or rammed by cows and pigs, respiratory 
problems such as chronic bronchitis due to regular contact from the dust of 
confined animals, and neurological diseases from contact with poisonous gases 
from manure.  In 2005 (the most recent year with data available), there were 629 
injuries per 100,000 workers in the entire agriculture industry while there were 
5,667 injuries per 100,000 workers in animal production alone (CFOI).57  This 
same year, there were 73.75 fatalities per 100,000 workers in the entire 
agriculture industry while there were 107.81 fatalities per 100,000 workers in 
animal production alone (CFOI).58  In the manufacturing industry, there were 44 
injuries per 100,000 workers in 2005 (CFOI).59  In animal slaughtering and 
processing, a subcategory of manufacturing, there were 1,807 injuries per 100,000 
                                                 
57
 The agriculture industry includes crop production and animal production, forestry, 
fishing and hunting.  Animal production includes cattle ranching and farming (including feedlots), 
dairy cattle and milk production, hog and pig farming, and poultry and egg production. It does not 
include animal slaughtering and processing, dairy product manufacturing or seafood product 
preparation and packaging which are included in the manufacturing category.  I should also note 
that Human Rights Watch reports that there is not only an underreporting of injuries but that the 
meat and poultry industry manipulates injury reports (Human Rights Watch, 52-56). 
58
 In fact, in 2005 22 percent of the fatalities in the agriculture industry were in animal 
production. 
59
 The manufacturing industry includes not only food manufacturing, but also textile 
mills, wood products, machine shops, and motor vehicle manufacturing amongst others. 
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workers (CFOI).60  Of the total number of fatalities in food manufacturing in 
2005, 29 percent were in animal slaughtering and processing (CFOI).  
Not only do CAFO workers have a high rate of injury and death, but they 
work under very bad conditions.  Most workers work 12-16 hours a day six days a 
week without breaks and often do not have health insurance (Peck; Human Rights 
Watch).  The workers in animal production (those who feed, water, herd, castrate, 
de-beak, clean and maintain housing areas, administer medications, vaccinations 
and insecticides, and load the animals for transportation) made on average $9.56 
per hour in 2005 (for an annual salary of $19,890) (OES Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates).  Workers in animal slaughtering and 
processing made on average $11.95 per hour in 2005 (for an annual salary of 
$24,850) (OES Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates).   
In addition, CAFOs have a terrible impact on the environment.  It takes 
thirteen pounds of protein to feed a calf to produce one pound of boneless animal 
protein for humans (Singer 2006, 232).  Because of this, forests, wetlands and 
other ecosystems and wildlife habitats have been decimated and turned into crop 
and grazing land (Singer 1990, 168-169).  It takes 792,000 gallons of water to 
produce a 1,000-pound steer (Singer 2006, 235) and 300 million acres are used 
for grazing (Singer 2006, 238).  In areas that have a high concentration of factory 
farms, waterways and groundwater are rife with bacteria that kill fish (not to 
                                                 
60
 For some first hand accounts of the types of dangers workers face see Eisnitz. 
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mention the sores, nausea, fatigue and disorientation they cause in humans) 
(Sierra Club).  In fact, waste from factory farms has polluted 35,000 miles of 
rivers in 22 states and the groundwater in 17 states (Sierra Club).  The animals we 
eat emit millions of pounds of both CO2 and methane, both greenhouse gases 
which are 90 percent responsible for the global warming problems we are facing 
today (Crawford).61  In fact, the animals we eat are responsible for 21 percent of 
all the CO2 that can be attributed to human activities (Brook). 
 
3.1.2 Research Practices 
 
Animals are used in a variety of ways for a variety of reasons for research 
under the guise of improving the health and lives of humans.  For example, 
animals are used in disease research.  In some experiments, animals are subjected 
to chemicals and other possible carcinogens in order to determine whether or not 
these products are actually cancer causing agents.  In one experiment, animals 
were either forced to inhale or were injected with asbestos which caused painful 
lesions on the animals (Greek and Greek, 128).62  In other cancer research, tumors 
are actually transplanted from humans to other animals, e.g., often to the leg of 
the animals.  In many cases, the tumors grow to the point that the leg must be 
amputated.  In other cases, the growing tumors cause the animals great distress 
                                                 
61
 Recently it has been shown that the (unnatural) diets of CAFO dairy cows are 
responsible for up to 35 liters of methane per liter of milk instead of the usual 20-25 liters 
(Crawford). 
62
 As will be discussed in further detail below, the asbestos did not actually cause cancer 
in the animals.  Once the asbestos was withdrawn, the lesions disappeared. 
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and most enter what doctors refer to as a cachectic state which is physical wasting 
with loss of weight and muscle mass (Rowan, 171-172).   
Animals are also used to test the toxicity of various substances.  For 
example, in acute oral toxicity tests, animals are forced to ingest, either by being 
force-fed by mouth or by having a tube inserted down their throats, both edible 
and inedible (e.g., lipstick and paper) products in order to determine how 
poisonous a substance is.  Depending on the length of time the animal survives, 
the tests last anywhere from fourteen days to six months during which the animals 
experience vomiting, diarrhea, paralysis, convulsions, and internal bleeding – all 
classic symptoms of poisoning.  Other toxicity tests include the infamous LD50, 
“lethal dose 50 percent”, the purpose of which is to determine the amount of a 
substance required to kill half the animals in the study; the Draize eye irritancy 
test in which a substance (e.g., bleach, shampoo, ink) is placed in an animal’s 
eyes, usually those of a rabbit, while the animal is in a holding device (preventing 
it from moving or scratching) to determine the substance’s irritancy and the 
consequences range from massive infection to blindness; and dermal, inhalation, 
immersion and injection studies in which the substance is either placed directly on 
the animal’s skin or in which animals inhale, are immersed in, or are injected with 
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the substance and then suffer from rotting skin and intestines and diarrhea (Singer 
1990, 52-57).63  
 
3.2 A Sentimentalist Animal Ethic 
Recall the moral principle defended in chapter 1: An act, or a failure to 
act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or 
allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator and the act results in any consequence that is disliked by the impartial 
spectator.  According to this principle, three conditions must be met for an action 
to be judged as morally wrong: (1) it must be committed by, contributed to by, or 
allowed by a moral agent; (2) the motive must be disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator; and (3) any consequence of the act must be disliked by the impartial 
spectator.   If it turns out that the actions committed by those involved in factory 
farm and research practices satisfy all three conditions, then their actions will be 
morally wrong.  If any of these three conditions is not satisfied, then the moral 
agents’ actions will not be morally wrong. 
To begin, CAFO and research animals are moral patients.  (Recall that 
moral patients are those who can be harmed but who cannot understand which 
motives are approved of and which are disapproved of, or which consequences 
are liked and which are disliked, or cannot choose to act or not act accordingly.)  
                                                 
63
 It is interesting to note that the United States Food and Drug Administration no longer 
requires the LD50. It now accepts in vitro tests for genotoxicity, although the Environmental 
Protection Agency still requires it (Greek and Greek, 56).  
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Because CAFO and research animals are moral patients and because the 
consequences of an agent’s actions are harmful to these animals the third 
condition is met: a consequence is disliked by the impartial spectator.  So, what 
needs to be established is whether the two other conditions for moral wrongness 
are met.  We have to determine whether the agents who commit, contribute to, or 
allow the actions are moral agents, or whether they are just moral patients, and 
whether, if the agents are moral agents, their motives are approved of or 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  If the individuals who commit, 
contribute to, or allow the actions (CAFO and research practices) that result in 
consequences that are disliked by the impartial spectator are moral agents and if 
their motives are disapproved of, their actions will be morally wrong.  If the 
agents involved are not moral agents, but are merely moral patients, or if their 
motives are not disapproved of by the impartial spectator, then their actions will 
not be morally wrong.   
The purpose of sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 is to establish whether these two 
criteria are met and thus to ascertain whether factory farm and research practices 
are morally wrong.  To do this, we must first get clear about those involved in 
factory farming and research practices.  The class of those involved in factory 
farm practices includes the owners, the workers, the consumers, advertising 
companies, government agencies, and suppliers.  The class of those involved with 
using animals as research subjects includes the funding agencies, the researchers, 
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the suppliers, and the beneficiaries of the research.  For the sake of simplicity and 
for space considerations, the discussion of the morality of these practices will 
focus on CAFO owners, CAFO workers, the consumers of CAFO products, 
researchers, the beneficiaries of research and the general public.   
 
3.2.1 Factory Farming 
CAFO Owners 
The first thing we need to determine with respect to the morality of CAFO 
practices is whether or not the owners of factory farms, who commit, contribute 
to, and allow actions that result in harm to the CAFO animals, are moral agents.  
Again, moral agents are those who can be harmed and who can understand which 
motives are approved of (and which are not), which actions are liked (and which 
are not), and can choose whether to act (or not act) accordingly.  Most factory 
farm owners are actually corporations.64  There are, of course, people who 
manage and control these corporations and so we will think of them as the owners 
of factory farms.65  Clearly, these people can be harmed and can understand 
which motives are approved of (and which are not), which actions are liked (and 
which are not), and can choose whether to act (or not act) accordingly.  Hence, the 
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 For example, four corporations control over 80 percent of the 35 million beef cattle 
slaughtered every year in the United States (Farm Sanctuary 2006b) and Tyson Foods, Inc. alone 
controls almost a quarter of the U.S. chicken market (Singer and Mason, 21).   
65
 It might be argued that managers are oftentimes more like regular employees than like 
owners.  I do not deny this.  For the sake of simplicity, I include managers in the class of owners 
for I am thinking about managers as white collar employees.  However, in cases in which 
managers are more like regular employees, blue collar workers, than owners, then what is said in 
the “CAFO employees” section will apply to them. 
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owners of CAFOs are moral agents and therefore two of the three criteria for 
moral wrongness have been met.  
The next thing we need to determine is whether or not the motives of the 
CAFO owners are disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  That is, we need to 
determine whether or not the owners are acting from selfishness.  In order to 
determine this, we need to determine whether or not CAFO owners are giving due 
consideration to the relevant interests of those affected by their actions.  If it turns 
out that the CAFO owners are giving greater consideration to their own less 
significant or trivial interests or to the less significant or trivial interests of others 
than to the more significant interests of the animals, then their motives will be 
disapproved of.  If this is the case, then all three conditions for moral wrongness 
will be satisfied and so their actions will be judged as morally wrong. 
Given that CAFO animals are treated in ways that result in physical, and 
arguably psychological, harm, let alone death, the interests of the animals that are 
of concern here are significant (see section 3.1.1).66  Is it the case then that CAFO 
owners are giving greater consideration to their own equally significant interests 
or to those of others or are they giving greater consideration to their own less 
significant or trivial interests or to those of others?  The primary concern of 
                                                 
66
 Recall the class of significant interests includes the interests one has in maintaining 
one’s physical, psychological and material well-being.  On the other hand, the class of trivial 
interests includes but is not necessarily limited to the interest one has in indulging the bodily 
pleasures, see section 1.2.1.  We can argue that psychological harm can be done to animals as 
many scientists believe that many animals are at the very least capable of anxiety (Regan 1983, 
75-76; Rollin; Rowan, 83; Singer 1990, chapters 2 and 3). 
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CAFO owners, as is the case with most business owners, is to maximize profit.  
As Adam Smith said:  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.  We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages. (WN I.ii.2)  
 
This is not to say, of course, that being concerned with profit is in and of itself 
wrong.  It is wrong when the concern with profit causes the profiteers to not give 
due consideration to the relevant (significant) interests of others and when the 
purpose of the profit is merely for the sake of profit itself or to increase the 
profiteers’ consumption of goods for bodily pleasure and results in harm to 
another.  In such situations, the interest in making a profit is a trivial interest.  
Given that the interests of the animals are more significant than those of the 
CAFO owners, they ought to be given greater consideration by the owners.  
Because the CAFO owners are not giving due consideration to the interests of the 
animals, the impartial spectator will disapprove of the CAFO owners’ motives.  
Therefore, her actions are morally wrong. 
 One might argue that the CAFO owners’ concern with making a profit is 
as relevant an interest as those of the CAFO animals, for without a profit these 
owners cannot support themselves or their families.  Their interest, it appears, is 
in maintaining their physical and material well-being (in which case the profit is a 
 103 
means to satisfying the interest).67  However, although the interests in maintaining 
one’s own and one’s family’s physical and material well-being are rather 
significant interests, as would be the interest in the means to do this, it does not 
necessarily follow that maximizing profit is a relevant interest.  Excessive profits 
are typically used to supply people with the means to satiate their less relevant or 
trivial interests such as owning expensive cars, boats, houses, fashionable clothes, 
jewelry, etc.  Given that CAFO owners are generally corporations run by already 
wealthy business people, I think it would be very difficult, if not impossible to 
prove that the profits being reaped by these moral agents are used to satisfy 
interests that are equal to or greater than the interests of the animals, as was noted 
above.   
Granted, if CAFO owners were to cease production at CAFO facilities, 
they might have to make changes to their ways of life, e.g., giving up new cars, 
clothes, etc.  But, their lives will not be at stake, as is the case with the CAFO 
animals, nor will they be subjected to the pain and suffering to which the CAFO 
animals are subjected.  Furthermore, there are ways for people to maintain their 
own physical and material well-being other than to subject animals to the pain and 
suffering that CAFO animals endure.68  Because CAFO owners are moral agents, 
                                                 
67
 Keep in mind that what is meant by material well-being is maintaining one’s 
possessions, e.g., house, clothes, etc.  So, the idea here is that often, especially for humans, 
physical and material well-being will be interconnected. 
68
 I will talk about situations in which it might be necessary to kill an animal when I 
address the consumer’s role in factory farming. 
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because their actions result in a consequence that is disapproved of by the 
impartial spectator and because they are not giving due consideration to the 
relevant interests of those affected by their actions (because they are acting from 
selfishness and in some cases from excessive self-love), their actions are morally 
wrong. 
If it were the case that the profits were being used to ensure that physical, 
material and psychological interests were fulfilled, then it would have to be 
determined whether these interests of the CAFO owners and their families should 
be given greater consideration than the equivalent interests of the CAFO animals.  
As was noted above (section 1.2.1), the impartial spectator will sympathize with 
someone giving greater consideration to her own or her loved ones’ interests than 
to the interests of strangers, as long as the interests of the individual or her family 
are equal to or greater than the interests of strangers (and will thus approve of her 
motive).  If it is the case that the profits are being used to maintain the CAFO 
owners’ and their families’ physical and material well-being, then the impartial 
spectator will not disapprove of their motives.  This case is analogous to the case 
of the owners of what we call “family farms.” 
The argument is that the motives of the proprietors of family farms, who 
are moral agents, are not selfish, but stem from self-preservation and therefore 
what they are doing is not morally wrong.  The point is that the family farmers are 
giving greater consideration to their own relevant interests than to the equally 
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relevant interests of the animals and that this is acceptable given the standards put 
forth in section 1.2.1.  However, it is very doubtful that family farm owners and 
their families would die if prevented from farming animals or would suffer as 
much pain and suffering as the animals that die at their hands do.  Of course, the 
impartial spectator would not be ignorant of the fact that the farmers’ and their 
families’ lives would change, viz., they would suffer some hardships, financial in 
particular, from the loss of this livelihood.  However, other livelihoods can be 
found, as difficult as it may be to do so.  The pain and suffering endured by the 
animals is greater than the pain and suffering the farmers and their families would 
be subjected to were they to give up this particular livelihood.  Because of this, 
the interests of the animals should be given greater consideration than the interests 
of the farmers and their families.  Failing to do so entails that the impartial 
spectator will disapprove of the motives of the family farm owners.  Because of 
this, and because family farm owners are moral agents, and because at least one 
consequence of their actions is disliked by the impartial spectator, the actions of 
family farm owners are morally wrong. 
It might also be argued that the animals on family farms are usually 
treated better than CAFO animals and so the farmers are not in fact giving greater 
consideration to their own less significant or trivial interests than to the more 
significant interests of the animals.  The argument is that many family farmers 
rear their animal as “free range” (meaning that the animals are not confined) and 
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that because of this the significant interests of the animals are being given due 
consideration.  It follows, so the argument goes, that in these cases the interests of 
the family are equal to or greater than the interests of the animals.  However, even 
on family farms, animals are often confined to small areas just as CAFO animals 
are and so suffer from the same diseases and behaviors as the CAFO animals do.  
So-called free range animals are fed the same chemicals CAFO animals are fed, 
and they are packed into trucks to transport them to the same slaughterhouses to 
which CAFO animals are transported to be killed.  Furthermore, to designate food 
animals as “free range” does not really mean very much.  The only requirement 
the United States Department of Agriculture has for such a designation is with 
respect to poultry and all that is required is that the poultry have access to the 
outside (USDA 2006).69  What this often entails is that the facility has a small 
space outdoors, which is usually filled with a large amount of fecal matter, into 
which a large number of chickens or turkeys are crammed with little room to 
                                                 
69
 Some organizations have created their own standards for non-poultry products.  For 
example, Humane Farm Animal Care, is an organization that claims its mission is to “improve the 
lives of farm animals by providing viable, credible, duly monitored standards for food production 
and ensuring consumers that certified products meet these standards” (Humane Farm Animal 
Care).  These standards include feeding the animals a “nutritious diet without antibiotics, or 
hormones, animals raised with shelter, resting areas, sufficient space and the ability to engage in 
natural behaviors” (Humane Farm Animal Care).  However, these standards also include 
American Meat Institute’s guidelines for slaughter.  According to these guidelines, as many as five 
percent of cattle and sheep can fail to be rendered insensible by one shot, that as many as one 
percent of pigs can vocalize during hot wanding procedures, and that as many as two cattle per 
1000 and one pig or sheep per 1000 can be sensible on the bleed rail (the rail the animals are 
moved on after being stunned or having had their throats slit in order to be decapitated) (Grandin, 
2005).  Although these percentages and numbers seem small, given that approximately 10 billion 
animals are killed for food every year in the United States alone, they in fact add up to over a 
million animals being tortured every year. 
 107 
move.  So, once again, the relevant interests of the animals are not being given 
due consideration and therefore the impartial spectator will disapprove of the 
motives of the family farm owners, and because they are moral agents and 
because at least one consequence of their action is disapproved of, their actions 
are morally wrong. 
 
CAFO Employees 
The case of CAFO employees, who commit, contribute to, and allow 
actions that result in harm to the CAFO animals, is analogous to the case of the 
family farmers.  CAFO employees are moral agents as they can be harmed and 
can understand which motives are approved of (and which are not), which actions 
are liked (and which are not), and can choose whether to act (or not act) 
accordingly.  Many CAFO employees are those with minimal skills in geographic 
areas in which there are very few opportunities for making a decent living.  The 
interest in being employed is a relevant interest as it is necessary to satisfy other 
relevant interests, e.g., maintaining one’s own and one’s family’s physical, 
psychological and material well-being. However, that it might be difficult for the 
CAFO worker to find other employment is no excuse for their giving greater 
consideration to their less significant interests than they are giving to the more 
significant interests of the animals.  As was the case with the factory farm owners, 
because of the pain and suffering the animals are subjected to, not to mention 
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their deaths, the interests of the animals outweigh the interests of the CAFO 
workers.  Because the CAFO employees are not giving due consideration to the 
relevant interests of those being affected by their actions, they are acting from 
selfishness, and hence their motives are disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  
Because of this, and because they are moral agents, and because at least one 
consequence of their actions is disliked by the impartial spectator, their actions 
are morally wrong. 
 
CAFO Product Consumers 
The case of the consumers of CAFO products, most of whom contribute to 
and allow actions that result in harms to the CAFO animals, is slightly different 
from that of the CAFO owners or workers.  Although most consumers of such 
products are moral agents, not all are.  Infants, young children, the mentally 
enfeebled, and the senile are not moral agents. Although they can be harmed, they 
cannot, for the most part, understand which motives are approved of (and which 
are not) and which actions are liked (and which are not).  Even if they can, e.g., 
they are adolescents, they cannot always choose whether to act (or not act) 
accordingly because they are often constrained, e.g., by parental control. 
Of those consumers who are moral agents, all are aware that animals are 
killed for their food and many, if not most, are very well aware of how the 
animals are treated in the process. If a consumer has this knowledge and she still 
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chooses to consume CAFO products, then not only is a consequence of her action 
disliked, but her motive is disapproved of because she is putting her own less 
significant or trivial interests, e.g., the interest in gastronomical pleasure (a bodily 
pleasure), over the more significant interests of the animal, e.g., the interest the 
animal has in maintaining her physical and psychological well-being and so her 
desire to avoid pain and suffering and to continue to live.  Therefore, the 
consumer’s action is morally wrong (because her action not only allows the 
CAFO owners and employees to harm the animals, but in addition her demand for 
the product actually contributes to the actions of the CAFO owners and 
employees). 
It might be wondered whether the number of people experiencing 
gastronomical pleasure will have any impact on the above conclusions.  That is, 
one might ask if enough people enjoy the products made available by the 
slaughtered animal, do their interests outweigh those of the animal?  For example, 
let us say that 100 normal adults get great gastronomical pleasure out of the meat 
products derived from a single butchered cow (whether these people are at a 
backyard barbecue or one of the finest restaurants in town does not matter).  To 
some, viz., utilitarians, a strong argument can be made that there is nothing 
morally wrong with slaughtering and butchering the cow because the amount of 
pleasure the action brings is greater than the amount of pain that it brings.  
Normative sentimentalism disagrees with this conclusion.  Even if an action 
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brings about a great deal of pleasure, if it results in at least one consequence that 
is disliked, if it is motivated by selfishness, and if it is committed by, contributed 
to by, or allowed by a moral agent it is morally wrong.  In this example, the pain, 
suffering and death of the cow are all disliked by the impartial spectator (because 
these are harms), the motives are disapproved of (because the consumers are not 
giving due consideration to the relevant interests of the cow), and the consumers 
are moral agents.  Therefore, their actions are morally wrong. 
Without a doubt, many consumers who are moral agents are acting with 
ignorance with respect to their consumption of CAFO products: ignorance with 
respect to the practices of CAFOs and ignorance with respect to the actual dietary 
needs of their bodies for animal products.  However, even if a consumer is 
unaware of the pain and suffering inflicted upon animals at CAFOs, she is 
certainly aware that they are killed in order to be a source of food.  So, at the very 
least, her failure to give due consideration to the fact that harm is inflicted upon 
the CAFO animal is selfish.  Therefore, the consumer’s motive will be 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator which means her action is morally 
wrong (as it results in a consequence that is disliked).  
Many consumers have been led to believe that animal products are 
necessary to their diets by both governmental agencies and advertisers 
representing CAFO companies.  For example, most, if not all, primary school 
students in the United States learn about the United States Department of 
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Agriculture’s food pyramid which claims that people need a certain amount of 
meat and dairy products every day.  Also, the California Milk Processor Board 
has used the slogan “Got Milk?” along with pictures of celebrities which include 
messages from the celebrities indicating how important drinking milk is to one’s 
health.  Similar messages have been distributed by the Cattlemen’s Beef Board 
and National Cattlemen’s Beef Association with their campaign “Beef, it’s what’s 
for dinner” and the National Pork Board’s campaign “Pork, the other white meat.”  
There are questions, however, about the accuracy of the information published by 
those who claim that animal products are necessary for one’s diet.  This is 
because many critics believe that agencies such as the USDA claim that animal 
products are necessary in order to keep the CAFO industry alive and well.   
In part because of the desire of some to set the record straight, there has 
recently been in influx of material published supporting the health benefits of, at 
the very least, a meat-free diet (see for example HHS and USDA).70  Additionally, 
many celebrities have also been very vocal about the merits of such a diet (e.g., 
singer Paul McCartney, his daughter, designer Stella McCartney, actors Alec and 
Billy Baldwin, and Anthony Robbins, motivational speaker and son of the 
founder of Baskin-Robbins corporation).  So, that a vegetarian diet is a feasible 
and healthy diet is becoming more and more well-known.  It is reasonable, then, 
to expect that people at least investigate the option.  Moral agents who eat a 
                                                 
70
 Although the HHS and USDA still promote a diet with meat and other animal products, 
since 1995 they have also specifically addressed a vegetarian diet.  
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CAFO product based diet without some investigation into the advantages and 
disadvantage of it as well as to the advantages and disadvantages of a vegetarian 
diet are acting from neglectful ignorance, their motives are disapproved of by the 
impartial spectator, and they are committing, contributing to, and allowing acts 
that are morally wrong. 
Admittedly, once one engages in such an investigation, one is faced with 
conflicting information regarding the dietary needs of most humans.  That is, 
there are some experts who claim that animal products are necessary to maintain 
one’s health, e.g., see the USDA’s food pyramid, and who argue that vegetarian 
diets are difficult to follow and that they are nutritionally inadequate.  On the 
other hand, not only can a diet that includes animal products be nutritionally 
inadequate, but some argue that a vegetarian diet is not only healthy, but that it 
might in fact be better for humans than a non-vegetarian diet, e.g., the Mayo 
Clinic (Mayo Clinic Staff).  If, after completing a reasonable investigation, a 
consumer truly believes she will die or suffer serious health problems without 
consuming animal products, then she is not acting from selfishness and so her 
action is not morally wrong.  However, I have serious doubts about the possibility 
of this as a justifiable outcome to such an investigation in part because of the 
published evidence, but also because there are so many healthy people living on 
vegetarian diets today.   
 113 
Even if it were the case that humans needed animal products to survive, 
this does not entail that we must consume CAFO animals and their products to do 
so.  There are other less harmful ways to prepare animals for human consumption, 
e.g., we could quickly and painlessly kill wild animals.  So, although we may 
choose to give greater consideration to our own equal or greater interests than to 
those of animals, failing to give due consideration to any of their relevant 
interests, e.g., the pain and suffering they endure as CAFO animals, will be 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator and so the actions committed by those 
involved in such treatment of animals (whether it is the CAFO owners, workers or 
consumers) will be morally wrong.  So, even believing that on balance it is 
necessary to consume animal products does not let a moral agent completely off 
the hook with respect to her actions toward the animals being used as food 
sources. 
There are two final points I want to make regarding the consumption of 
animal products before moving on to the use of animals in research.  The first is 
that given the criteria of normative sentimentalism, if an agent has a choice 
between killing and eating an animal and dying, then there is nothing morally 
wrong with her choosing to kill and eat the animal.  As noted above (section 
1.2.1), in such a situation she is not necessarily failing to give due consideration 
to the relevant interests of the animal.  Rather, the interests that both the agent and 
the animal have in living are at the very least equal.  So, in choosing self-
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preservation, a relevant interest, over the life of another, an equally relevant 
interest, the agent is not acting from selfishness (or excessive self-love).   
Of course, there are differences in life and death situations.  For example, 
imagine a person who is stranded on a desert island which is also home to a 
hundred cows.  Imagine that she has every reason to believe that she will be 
rescued in due time.  The impartial spectator will not disapprove of her motive if 
she kills and eats the cows to survive because she is merely giving greater 
consideration to her own relevant interests than to the relevant interests of each 
the cows.  So, even if we assume that the castaway is a moral agent and we know 
that at least one consequence of her action will be disliked (viz., the deaths of the 
cows), given that her motive is not disapproved of, her action will not be wrong.71 
On the other hand, imagine our castaway in a situation in which she is 
known to have a very limited time to live, let us say two weeks, but she will die in 
a just a couple of days if she does not kill and eat one of the cows.  Let us also 
assume that there is no hope that she will be rescued in the next few days and that 
she has no good reason for staying alive other than just prolonging her life; that is, 
she is not going to bear a child in the next few days or create any masterpiece, or 
                                                 
71
 That the relevant interests of a number of cows have to be sacrificed in order for the 
agent to save her own life is unfortunate.  However, unlike utilitarianism, normative 
sentimentalism does not require the aggregating of interests.  So, although when added together 
the interests of the cows outnumber the interests of the human, it is still not morally wrong for her 
to choose her own relevant interests over the equally relevant interests of each of the cows.  It is 
assumed here that the cows’ interest in avoiding the pain and suffering that will likely precede 
their death is equivalent to that of the castaway.  Although some might reject this, I agree with 
Singer that all sentient beings have an equivalent interest in avoiding pain and suffering (and 
possibly in living) (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 and Singer 1990, chapter 1). 
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find a cure for cancer or AIDS or something of the like.  In a case such as this, the 
impartial spectator will disapprove of the agent’s motive.  This is because 
although both the agent and the cow have perhaps an equivalent interest in living, 
given that the agent’s life is doomed as it is and she has no hope of making any 
kind of contribution to the world, for her to give greater consideration to her 
interest in living over the cow’s equally relevant interest in living (the cow’s 
interest in living could be greater than the agent’s in virtue of the fact that the 
cow’s life, as far as we know, is not in immediate jeopardy) and in avoiding the 
pain and suffering that comes along with being killed for consumption is selfish.  
Of course, if the castaway is not aware that her life will come to an end in two 
weeks and is under the belief that she could be rescued, then the impartial 
spectator will not disapprove of the castaway’s giving greater consideration to her 
interest in living than to the cows’ interest in living.72  Again, she is not acting 
from selfishness, bur rather giving greater consideration to her own relevant 
interest. 
Finally, given the criteria of normative sentimentalism, there is nothing 
morally wrong with consuming the flesh or carcass of an animal that has died 
from natural causes or from being accidentally hit by a car or that was killed by 
                                                 
72
 One might argue that the interest a person has in living is greater than the interest the 
cow has in living because person’s are self-aware in ways that cows are not and so the person is 
not motivated by selfishness in any situation in which she acts to save her own life, even when she 
has to sacrifice the life of another.  Although it might be true that on balance persons have a 
greater interest in self-preservation than animals do, I do not think that this is necessarily true in 
all cases as I have tried to show above. 
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another animal, even if the consumer does so for gastronomical pleasure.  This is 
because, on the face of it, there are no consequences of her action that harm 
another and so they will not be disliked by the impartial spectator.  If no 
consequences of a moral agent’s action are disliked, then the action is not morally 
wrong regardless of whether or not she acts from selfishness and regardless of the 




As noted above, at least one of the consequences of the actions committed 
by researchers toward animals is that the animals who are moral patients are 
harmed.  We can say, then, that at least one consequence of these actions is 
disliked by the impartial spectator.  Therefore, one of the three conditions that an 
action must satisfy in order to be morally wrong is met.  As was the case with 
CAFO owners, employees and consumers, what now must be determined is 
whether the researchers are moral agents and whether their motives are 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator. 
Clearly, researchers are moral agents.  Researchers can be harmed, they 
can understand which motives are approved of and disapproved of and they can 
understand which consequences are liked and which are disliked and can choose 
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whether to act or not accordingly.  Thus, two of the three conditions required for 
an action to be morally wrong have been met. 
The question then is whether or not the motives of the researchers are 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  That is, are the researchers motivated 
by selfishness?  Do they fail to give due consideration to the relevant interests of 
those affected by their actions?  Or, do they merely give greater consideration to 
their own relevant interests or to the relevant interests of some of those affected 
by their actions than they give to the equally relevant interests of others affected 
by their actions?  Or, do the researchers give greater consideration to their own 
less significant or trivial interests or to the less significant or trivial interests of 
some of those affected by their actions than they give to the more significant 
interests of others affected by their actions? 
If the researcher’s motive is that she just enjoys performing experiments 
on animals, regardless of whether or not the results are useful, then it will be 
disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  In acting from such a motive, the 
researcher is clearly giving greater consideration to her own less significant or 
trivial interests than to the more significant interests of the animals.  This is not to 
say that the researcher should not enjoy doing research.  It is only to say that if 
she likes performing experiments merely for the sake of performing experiments, 
and if she performs them on animals merely because she enjoys doing so, then she 
fails to give due consideration to the relevant interests (at minimum, their interest 
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in maintaining their physical well-being and so in avoiding pain and suffering) of 
the animals being used.  Of course, it seems highly unlikely that any professional 
scientist performs animal research for just such a reason. 
Given this, I want to address two contrary positions regarding the 
usefulness of animal experimentation.  On the one hand, there are those who 
argue that using animals for research is not only useful, but necessary to ensure 
the well-being of humans.  If this is true and if we assume that the interests of the 
humans and the animals are equally relevant, the motives of the scientists will not 
be disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  On the other hand, there are those 
who argue that the research done on animals is not really useful and that in fact 
such research can be harmful to humans and that this is generally known and 
accepted by scientists.  If this is true, then a strong case can be made that the 
scientists are at the very least acting from neglectful ignorance and so their 
motives will be disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  I will first discuss the 
more charitable reading, that using animals for research is on the whole useful and 
necessary, and follow it with a discussion of the less charitable reading, that using 
animals for research is not useful or necessary.  
Most scientists perform research in order to get answers to questions, e.g., 
as noted in section 3.1.2, what causes cancer, how does cancer grow, what 
substances are safe for human use or consumption.  It is argued that William 
Jenner’s work with cowpox and horsepox led to his demonstration of the efficacy 
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of the smallpox vaccination (Kiple and Coneè Ornelas, 26); that Louis Pasteur’s 
animal experimentation led to vaccines for both anthrax and rabies (Kiple and 
Coneè Ornelas, 27); that beriberi and its cure were first discovered in chickens 
(Kiple and Coneè Ornelas, 27); that it was due to research on monkeys and mice 
that the vaccine for yellow fever was developed (Kiple and Coneè Ornelas, 29-
32); and that animals have played no small role in the research and developed of 
azidothymidine (AZT), a drug used to prolong the period of HIV latency (Kiple 
and Coneè Ornelas, 32-37).  Additionally, in both animal and human test subjects 
the ingestion of acetaminophen resulted in hepatic necrosis (a severe and rapidly 
progressing form of hepatitis accompanied by hepatocellular death), the use of 
methanol resulted in blindness, the use of morphine resulted in physical and 
psychological dependence, and the use of vitamins A and D resulted in osteopathy 
and nephrocalcinosis (a kidney disorder) respectively (Morton, 4-5).73  Other 
experiments have shown that animals (viz., mice, rats, dogs and monkeys) have 
the same maximum tolerance dose of anti-cancer agents as humans (Schein, 25).  
Of course, we are able to use some of these drugs in limited quantities.  The point 
is that animals and humans had similar reactions when comparably dangerous 
doses were administered to each. 
                                                 
73
 Others that defend the use of animals in research are Phillips and Sechzer, Englehardt, 
Jr., and Singleton, Jr. 
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As well, both Sigma Xi, the scientific research society, and the American 
Medical Association have published statements defending the use of animals for 
research.  According to Sigma Xi: 
Results from work with animals have led to understanding 
mechanisms of bodily function in humans, with substantial and 
tangible applications to medicine and surgery (e.g., antibiotics, 
imaging technologies, coronary bypass surgery, anti-cancer 
therapies), public health (e.g., nutrition, agriculture, immunization, 
toxicology and product safety) … As the Surgeon General has 
stated, research with animals has made possible most of the 
advances in medicine that we today take for granted. An end to 
animal research would mean an end to our best hope for finding 
treatments that still elude us. (Sigma Xi, 74) 
 
The American Medical Association has stated: 
 
[V]irtually every advance in medical science in the 20th century 
from antibiotics to vaccines to antidepressant drugs and organ 
transplants, has been achieved either directly or indirectly through 
the use of animals in laboratory experiments.  The result of these 
experiments has been the elimination or control of many infectious 
diseases – smallpox, poliomyelitis, measles – and the development 
of numerous life-saving techniques – blood transfusions, burn 
therapy, open-heart and brain surgery.  This has meant a longer, 
healthier, better life with much less pain and suffering.  For many, 
it has meant life itself … Despite advances in public health and 
nutrition, eradication or control of these and most other infectious 
diseases was not achieved until the development of vaccines and 
drugs through research using animals. (American Medical 
Association, 11-12) 
 
It is not only the medical community that defends the use of animals in research 
for the sake of human welfare.  For example, Carl Cohen is one philosopher who 
presents a strong utilitarian argument for the use of animals in research.  He 
claims that the pain and suffering of humans that would have occurred without 
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animal research surely would outweigh the pain and suffering of the animals used 
in the research (Cohen 1986 and Cohen and Regan, 85-123).74   
Furthermore, unlike those who argue that there are other better methods 
for doing medical research (e.g., in vitro testing, autopsies, epidemiology, 
mathematical modeling and computer-assisted research, genetic research, and 
diagnostic imaging), many scientists agree with Silvio Garattini, a prominent 
pharmacologist, who states that “[i]t is in fact difficult to imagine how to set up in 
vitro techniques for diseases which are expressed under the influence of complex 
systems such as blood circulation, nervous system regulation, neuroendocrine 
secretion, immune defences” (Garattini, 1).  He argues that non-animal techniques 
are not really alternatives to animal techniques, but rather they compliment animal 
techniques because “at best they can cut down the number of animals or enable us 
to obtain more and better information with the same number” (Garattini, 1) and 
that animal research should actually increase in some areas due to new 
technologies which he claims allows for more accurate reproduction of human 
diseases, e.g., genetic engineering using transgenic animals. 
 It would appear, then, that research scientists are giving due consideration 
to the relevant interests of those affected by their actions.  Their motives stem 
from a desire to save human lives, to extend the length and improve the quality of 
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 Other philosophers who also defend the use of animals as food and as research subjects 
are Ray Frey (see, for example, Frey 1977a, 1977b, and 1997) and Peter Carruthers (see, for 
example, Carruthers). 
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human life, and to reduce undue pain and suffering.  Given that maintaining their 
physical and psychological well-being are significant interests of humans, it looks 
as if researchers are giving due consideration to the relevant interests of at least 
some of the moral agents and moral patients who are affected by their actions.  
So, even though animals are being harmed by these experiments, it could be 
argued that the researchers are not giving greater consideration to the less 
significant or trivial interests of humans when they perform experiments on the 
animals.  Rather, they are merely giving greater consideration to the relevant 
interests of humans, which are at the very least equal to the interests of the 
animals.  Therefore, given the criteria put forth in section 1.2.1, the researchers 
are not doing anything morally wrong because their motives are not disapproved 
of even though their actions result in harm to some of those affected by their 
actions. 
On the other hand, there are those who argue that not only is animal 
research useless but that it can actually be harmful because of the differences 
between humans and animals.  The problem is not with our ancestors and their 
lack of knowledge regarding the similarities and differences between humans and 
animals.  The problem is with contemporary scientists who have adequate 
knowledge or are capable of acquiring it rather easily and yet either choose to 
ignore it or fail to take the measures to have a full understanding of what is at 
stake.  For example, as was noted above (section 3.1.2), animals (mice, hamsters, 
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cats, guinea pigs, rabbits and rats) were used to test asbestos in order to determine 
whether it was a carcinogen even though it was well-known and accepted that 
people who had been exposed to asbestos developed cancer.  Although painful 
lesions occurred on the animals, they disappeared when the asbestos was removed 
and so the disease was not permanent in the animals like it is in humans (the 
results then were a false negative).  In addition, one set of scientists, who 
published their findings in the Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences 
concluded after experimenting with asbestos on hamsters that: “The experiments 
show that asbestos can induce mesotheliomas in hamsters.  They raise a question 
as to whether these tumors signify a primary carcinogenic action of asbestos 
fibers or are secondary and nonspecific epiphenomena of fibrosis” (Smith, et al., 
487).  The animal studies had failed to provide any definitive evidence for 
occurrence of malignant tumors in animals.75  Because of this, and because of 
strong resistance from the asbestos lobby, it was not until 1986 that the 
Environmental Protection Agency recommended a ban on the use of asbestos and 
its products even though humans who came into contact with asbestos continued 
to contract cancer (Greek and Greek, 128).76 
                                                 
75
 To be fair, Morton states that mesothelioma was a reaction animals had to contact with 
asbestos (Morton, 4). 
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 Other sources defending the idea that animal research is useless and harmful are 
LaFollette; Page; Regan 1983, chapter 9, section 4; Rollin, 18-19; Rowan; and Singer 1990, 
chapter 2.  I rely on Greek and Greek to the extent that I do because their book is the most recent 
and comprehensive source I could find. 
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As noted above (section 3.1.2), researchers also transplant tumors from 
humans to animals under the guise of determining the mechanisms of induction 
and spread of cancer.  Large and growing tumors cause the animals great distress.  
Not only is this worrisome in and of itself, but it can interfere with the 
researcher’s ability to properly interpret the data.  According to one scientist, 
“The experimenter who makes observations on tumor growth or behavior after an 
animal has reached … [a] … moribund cachectic state without regard to its 
influence on what he is observing or measuring, cannot possibly make a valid 
interpretation of his data” (Hewitt, 162). 
There are also problems with using animals to test drugs.  Although 
mothers who had taken thalidomide (a drug that ameliorated morning sickness) 
gave birth to children with severe deformities, e.g., the children were often 
crippled insofar as they were born without limbs or with flippers or something of 
the like, massive testing was done on animals who subsequently failed to produce 
offspring with such defects (so the animal tests resulted in false negatives).  Only 
when high doses, 10 to 300 times that given to humans, were given to animals did 
it have any effect and then only with certain rabbit and monkey species (Greek 
and Greek, 45).  The drug was on the market five years and its use resulted in 
over 10,000 children being born crippled before it was pulled (Greek and Greek, 
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46).77  In fact, there is only a five to twenty-five percent correlation of adverse 
reactions in man and animal toxicity data (Heywood, 57 and 61-62).78 
The concern is not only with false negatives, however.  There is also a 
problem with false positives.  The list of drugs that caused false positives in 
animals, even in low doses (some doses much less than the analogous dose in 
humans), during research includes Tylenol, aspirin, ibuprofen, penicillin, and 
fluoride (Greek and Greek, chapter 4).  If researchers had relied on animal data 
with respect to these and other drugs, many people would have suffered or died 
over the years (even more than the number that succumbed because of the delay 
in releasing the drugs which was due to the conclusions reached from testing on 
animals). 
The problem is that although humans and animals are similar enough to be 
in the same kingdom (or even phyla, class, order, or family), they differ on the 
cellular and molecular level which is where disease occurs.  Therefore, testing 
animals not only for diseases, but even for toxicity is usually unhelpful.  For 
example, of 45 drugs tested using the LD50 test in 1978, only 25 percent of the 
effects noted on animals actually transpired in humans (Greek and Greek, 56).79  
Furthermore, in 1987, toxicologists testified to Congress that the LD50 does not 
address toxicity to organs (Greek and Greek, 56). 
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 For more recent examples, see Greek and Greek, chapter 4. 
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 See also Greek and Greek, 56. 
79
 On the other hand, in a study of six drugs published in 1962, only between 36 and 46 
percent of the 78 side effects seen in humans were seen in rats or dogs (Greek and Greek, 48). 
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 It would seem then that scientists would be aware that testing on animals 
not only harms the animals, which is disliked by the impartial spectator, but that it 
is uncalled for. The suffering and deaths of research animals are not acceptable as 
they do not occur because the equally relevant or more relevant interests of 
humans are at stake.  And, in fact the use of animals for research can result in 
harm to humans. 
What is even more disconcerting is that most scientists recognize that 
information regarding diseases as well as the development of drugs and 
technologies did not rely on animal testing and in fact believe that animal testing 
is at the very least inadequate (Greek and Greek, chapter 5).  It is apparently 
common knowledge that in vitro testing, autopsies, epidemiology, mathematical 
modeling and computer-assisted research, genetic research, diagnostic imaging 
and postmarketing drug surveillance are better ways to determine the 
effectiveness of treatments or the toxicity of substances (Greek and Greek, 
chapter 6).80  In addition, it is agreed that the best ways to find new medications 
are to discover new substances from nature, to uncover a different curative value 
in an existing medication, to modify the chemical structure of a medication (based 
on previous knowledge about chemical structures), and to design a new 
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 Those on the other side of the debate argue that animal use will actually increase rather 
than decrease in the future even with these new developments because, it is argued, these 
alternatives are only adjuncts to using animal subjects in research, some physiological processes 
cannot be studied in isolation, and computer simulations may raise questions that can be addressed 
only by using animal subjects (LaFollette, 5). 
 127 
medication from scratch based on what the medication is needed for (again using 
knowledge gained from previous experience) (Greek and Greek, 112).81 
The question that comes to mind is: why, if this is true, do researchers 
continue to experiment on animals?  In defense of the scientists, the reason many 
of them rely on research involving animals is because they are legally compelled 
to do so.  In 1961, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Act which requires 
substantial evidence of the safety and efficacy of drugs.  It also gave the control of 
determining whether or not the evidence provided by the pharmaceutical 
companies is sufficient to the FDA who interpreted (and continues to interpret) 
this to mean that animal testing is required even though many scientists at that 
time, as is the case today, knew there were significant problems with relying on 
animal testing (Greek and Greek, 47-48) and even though the government itself 
has noted that applying animal data to humans is a “leap of faith” (Greek and 
Greek, 58).  
So, at first glance it may look as though the motives of the researchers 
would not be disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  However, as has been 
shown, a very good argument can be made that the scientists are either acting 
from neglectful ignorance in that they choose not to pay attention to the fact that 
using animals for research in the ways that they do does not really provide us with 
the desired information or they are blatantly ignoring the evidence that using 
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 See also the rest of Greek and Greek, chapter 7. 
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animals for research does not provide us with the desired information.  And, 
because they are not giving due consideration to the relevant interests of those 
affected by their actions, they are committing (as they actually perform the 
experiments), contributing to, and allowing acts (as for the most part they do 
nothing to change policies that require experimenting on animals) that harm not 
only the animals, but also human beings.  Therefore, given that they are moral 
agents, and given that the actions of the scientists result in harmful consequences 
which are disliked by the impartial spectator, and given that the impartial 
spectator disapproves of their motives, the scientists’ actions are morally wrong. 
One might argue that the scientists are not doing anything morally wrong 
because they are not acting from selfishness because they are merely following 
the law.  That is, although they understand that using animals for research is either 
all but useless or results in harm to both humans and animals, they are not 
ignoring this information, they are not failing to give due consideration to the 
relevant interests of the animals, but are just acting out of respect for the law.  
Although I think this is a valid point, this does not let scientists off the hook.  As 
they are the ones who have this knowledge and information, as they are the 
experts in such matters, it is their responsibility to take action to change the laws.  
Failing to do for fear of professional repercussions, or because it is too time 
consuming or difficult, is failing to give due consideration to the relevant interests 
of the animals.  That is, although at least some of the interests of the scientists are 
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relevant, e.g., their professional well-being, these are less significant than the 
interests the animals have in their physical well-being (i.e., in avoiding pain and 
suffering and death).  Giving greater consideration to their own interests then is 
selfish and their motives will be disapproved of by the impartial spectator and so 
their actions will be morally wrong. 
Before moving on to the morality of the actions of those who seem to 
benefit from animal research, I briefly want to address two other issues that arise 
with respect to the use of animals for research for the benefit of humans.  The first 
is the use of animal products and by-products in pharmaceuticals, e.g., influenza 
vaccines are grown on egg embryos.  The second is using animals as research 
subjects in experiments that in fact could help humans in significant ways.   
 With respect to using animal products and animal by-products, it would 
have to be determined whether such use has any harmful consequences.  For 
example, it would have to be determined whether egg embryos are harmed when 
using them to create the influenza vaccine.  If they are not harmed, then there is 
nothing morally wrong with using them for this reason.  If, however, either the 
egg embryo or the hen who lays it is harmed in this process, then it would have to 
be determined whether inflicting the harm (or contributing to it or allowing it) 
entails that the individual is giving greater consideration to the less significant or 
trivial interests of some who are affected by her actions than to the more 
significant interests of others affected by her actions.  If so, and if it is the case 
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that the moral agent is giving greater consideration to the less significant interests 
of humans than to the more significant interests of the eggs, then using the 
embryo in that way is morally wrong.  If this is not the case, then using the egg 
embryo in that way is not morally wrong.  The same would be the case for any 
use of any animal product or by-product (i.e., products of animal origin which are 
not used for human consumption) for any scientific purpose (or for any purpose 
whatsoever).  Due to the fact that only a very basic understanding of harm is 
being relied on in this dissertation and so the line between what can be harmed 
and what cannot be harmed has not been thoroughly established, I am not going to 
address these types of cases here.   
If it does turn out to be the case that using animals as research subjects in 
some experiments will in fact help humans significantly, scientists still have a 
responsibility to only disregard the interests of animals for the sake of equivalent 
or greater human interests.  This means that scientists must only use animals in 
these ways in situations in which they are as certain as they can possibly be that 
disregarding the interests of the animals in these ways will in fact serve the 
equally relevant or more significant interests of humans.  If the scientists act from 
neglectful ignorance, their actions will be morally wrong.  The relevant interests 
of the animals need to be given due consideration in order for the motives of the 
scientists to be approved of by the impartial spectator. 
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Beneficiaries of Research  
Although I agree with those noted above that using animals for research is 
not beneficial, and is even harmful, to humans, given that it is legally required for 
scientists to test pharmaceuticals on animals, and had the researchers refused to 
test on animals useful drugs would not have been released for use by the general 
public, we can say that there are beneficiaries of such research.  Then again, given 
that we also know that the research done on animals harms them as well as the 
humans it is designed to help, the two questions that we need to answer to 
determine whether those benefiting from the products or drugs that are a result of 
the research are committing actions that are morally wrong are (1) whether the 
beneficiaries are moral agents or not and (2) whether their motives are 
disapproved of or not.  If the so-called beneficiaries of such research are not 
moral agents, then even though they are using the products, their actions are not 
morally wrong.  In this category are infants, many adolescents, the mentally 
enfeebled and the senile.  These individuals can be harmed but cannot understand 
which motives are approved of (and which are not), which consequences are liked 
(and which are not), or cannot choose to act (or not act) accordingly.  In addition, 
we can include in this class those who are so seriously ill that they are at the very 
least temporarily unable to understand which motives are approved of (and which 
are not), which consequences are liked (and which are not), or cannot choose to 
act (or not act) accordingly.  So, in making use of products that are available 
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because of experiments done on animals, these people are not doing anything 
morally wrong. 
Of course, there are those who make use of these products and are also 
moral agents, viz., normal adult human beings.  The question then is whether or 
not their motives are approved of by the impartial spectator; that is, whether or 
not they are acting from selfishness; that is, whether or not they are giving due 
consideration to the relevant interests of those affected by their actions.  The 
question regarding motive needs to be focused on current research and possible 
beneficiaries.  It would be odd to accuse people who now benefit from products 
such as Tylenol, aspirin, ibuprofen, penicillin, and fluoride of acting selfishly 
because research on these products was performed on animals some time in the 
past.  That is, my use of ibuprofen now to control my back pain does not 
necessarily entail that I contribute to or allow actions that harm others.  Given that 
this research was done well before I began to use ibuprofen, I cannot be said to 
have failed to give due consideration to the relevant interests of those affected.  
Therefore, the impartial spectator will not disapprove of my motives and my 
actions are not morally wrong. 
The question then is with respect to the fact that research using animals 
continues and most, if not all, moral agents stand to benefit from it.  So, in the 
next section I discuss the moral obligations of moral agents with respect to current 
research being performed on animals. 
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Moral Obligations of Moral Agents 
Without a doubt, many moral agents who use pharmaceuticals or other 
consumer products that are tested on animals are acting with some ignorance.  If a 
moral agent is ignorant of the fact that such products are tested on animals, then 
we have to ask whether it is reasonable to think that she ought to have such 
knowledge in order to determine whether she is acting from selfishness.  Most 
normal adult humans are aware that animals are used as research subjects in 
medical experiments as well as in the development of other consumer products.  
In fact, this seems to be common knowledge.  It is not unreasonable to expect that 
a normal moral agent possess such knowledge.  Of course, if the moral agent has 
been in some sort of lifelong solitary confinement (or a situation similar to the 
brainwashed dutiful Nazi or the brainwashed religious zealot mentioned in section 
1.2.1) which would make it impossible for her to know this then it would be 
absurd to claim that she is neglectfully ignorant.   
The ignorance of moral agents is usually with respect to what the 
experiments entail and the necessity of these experiments.  Because the 
experiments take place behind closed doors and because they are not recorded for 
public use (and even if they are recorded, such recordings are not usually made 
available to the general public), it does take a bit of work to find out exactly what 
goes on during such experiments and whether the results are actually useful.  
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However, given that moral agents generally know that animals are being 
experimented on, it is reasonable to expect that they are at the very least aware 
that animals are being harmed.  Furthermore, investigating research practices 
involving animals can be performed with relative ease these days given the 
number of books and websites dedicated to making this information public 
knowledge.  Failure to make one’s self aware of the harms to which the animals 
are being subjected is neglectful ignorance.  The agent is acting from selfishness 
because she is not giving due consideration to the relevant interests of others who 
are being affected by the act.  For example, an agent who spends her time 
watching American Idol rather than doing research on the use of animals in 
research is giving greater consideration to her trivial interests than she is to the 
more significant interests of the animals.  Therefore, the impartial spectator will 
disapprove of her motive.  Because her motive is disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator and because a consequence of the moral agent’s action (or inaction as 
the case may be) is disliked by the impartial spectator, her action is morally 
wrong. 
Although most moral agents are aware that animals are used as research 
subjects and are subjected to at least some harm, most have also been convinced 
by the government and by those conducting the research that such research is 
necessary in order to provide better and longer lives for humans (as was noted in 
section 3.2.2).  Many moral agents think that the interests of humans are greater 
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than those of the animals.  If they are correct or at the very least are truly 
convinced they are correct, then their motive is not selfishness and thus they are 
not doing anything morally wrong by allowing the research to occur.   
On the other hand, as was shown above, the fact that research on animals 
is necessary for the well-being of humans is not necessarily true.  Again, it often 
results in harmful consequences, not only for the animals, but also for humans.  
Even with the publication of books by reputable authors and even with the 
documentation provided on various websites, that experimenting on animals is 
either useless or harmful to humans is a well kept secret.  These books do not get 
much publicity or attention and many of the websites upon which this information 
is found are thought to be radical and unreliable, e.g., the website for the 
organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.   
The ignorance of moral agents regarding the usefulness and effects of 
animal research is also due in part to the fact that our government requires 
research on animals and we assume and expect the governmental agencies that 
oversee such things to be experts on such matters.  Furthermore, animal research 
is big business.  Not only do animal breeders profit from animal research, but 
those who manufacture devices used in animal research do as well.  These people 
are connected to very powerful lobbies that also spend a lot of money to refute the 
facts presented by those who oppose the use of animals in research.  In addition, 
much of the grant money that colleges and universities acquire is because of the 
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research of its professors and graduate students, much of which is animal 
research.  Because the government currently requires animal experimentation for 
pharmaceuticals and other consumer products and because the government also 
gives the most amount of money in grants and research funds, speaking out 
against the use of animal experimentation could be very costly to one’s career 
(Greek and Greek, chapter 5).  So, even those who have the knowledge regarding 
the usefulness of animal research remain silent which results in the continuing 
ignorance of moral agents. 
With all of this being the case, the average moral agent is not necessarily 
neglectfully ignorant of the fact that there is good reason to believe that animal 
experimentation is not only unnecessary but also harmful to both the animals and 
the well-being of humans.  That is, there is a lot of conflicting information to sort 
through.  As long as a moral agent has done a reasonable amount of research and 
decides that animal experimentation is necessary or that she has to leave it up to 
the so-called experts to determine, then her motives for allowing or contributing 
to it will not be disapproved of by the impartial spectator.  The responsibility for 
making the public clear about when the interests of humans are equally or more 
relevant than those of animals and vice versa is the responsibility of the scientists 
and other experts.  Of course, the non-expert moral agents who have the means to 




Given the standards set out by the normative sentimentalist ethic presented 
in chapter 1 and defended in chapter 2, CAFO owners, CAFO workers and most 
CAFO product consumers, those who raise “free range” or “certified humane” 
animals for food, along with scientists, the beneficiaries of research and moral 
agents in general are contributing to or allowing actions that are morally wrong.  
Yet, it is not always immoral to consume animals or their products.  It is morally 
acceptable to consume animals or their products when the animal has died of 
natural causes (or something of the like) or if one’s own life is at stake.  But, this 
does not mean that an agent is permitted to treat the animal in any way she likes.  
If an agent must kill an animal in order to sustain herself, she must still give due 
consideration to their relevant interests of the animal which entails she kill the 
animal in the least cruel and painful way possible.   
These conclusions lead us to ask what types of actions are required of 
moral agents when it comes to the treatment of animals.  At minimum, those 
whose actions are morally wrong ought to stop committing such actions.  This 
means that CAFO owners, CAFO employees, most CAFO product consumers and 
scientists who use animals as research subjects ought to stop raising, killing, 
consuming and performing research on animals.  Any CAFO product consumer 
who is still convinced after a reasonable investigation that animal products are 
necessary to her physical well-being, needs to make sure that the products she 
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consumes have been produced in the most humane way possible.  Moral agents 
need to make sure that they undertake a reasonable investigation to determine 
both the merits of using animals for research or for food and whether the scientists 
really were giving greater consideration to the more significant interests of the 
beneficiaries than to the less significant or trivial interests of the animals.  
The question that arises at this point is: what are research beneficiaries, 
consumers and moral agents (who are bystanders) required to do if scientists, 
CAFO owners, and CAFO workers do not themselves discontinue their immoral 
actions?  As mentioned very briefly in section 1.2, I am inclined to say that moral 
agents are required to perform actions that stem from motives that are approved of 
by the impartial spectator and the consequences of which are liked by the 
impartial spectator.  This entails that moral agents who are aware that other moral 
agents are committing actions that are morally wrong ought to act so as to prevent 
the transgressors from acting as they are.  These actions involve convincing the 
transgressors that their actions are morally unacceptable and can include things 
such as discussions, writing letters, articles or books that address the subject, 
protesting, etc.  If such actions fail then petitioning the governing bodies to make 
such activities illegal might be the next step.  The list of possibilities for 
addressing the actions of CAFO owners, etc., is lengthy and so I will not list every 
option.  The idea is just that, as was noted above in section 1.2, allowing actions 
which stem from motives that are disapproved of by the impartial spectator and at 
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least one consequence of which is disliked by the impartial spectator is morally 
wrong and those in such a position ought to act to end such actions. 
Although I have focused on CAFOs and animal research, the ethic 
presented here will very clearly have implications for using animals for sport 
(e.g., hunting, and this with respect to animals being used as both the hunters, e.g., 
dogs, and the hunted, e.g., deer, fox, etc.) and entertainment (e.g., circuses and 
zoos).  Normative sentimentalism will, for the most part I think, find the 
individuals engaged in these activities, as well as those contributing to and 
allowing them, to be doing something morally wrong.  Not only are those 
involved moral agents, but their motives are selfish (most people hunt for 
pleasure, not for need, and we can think of circus owners and employees as 
analogous to CAFO owners and employees in that their motivation is profit or 
income) and at least one of the consequences is disliked (in the case of hunting 
the hunted are killed after being stalked and in the case of circuses the animals are 
often abused or kept in poor conditions).  The morality of zoo owners and 
employees is a bit more complicated because it is not always the case that they are 
acting from selfishness.  In many cases they are actually trying to improve the 
conditions of animals even though the animals are often harmed in the process.  
Some research would have to be done to determine whether zoos are actually 
helpful to animals or whether the zoo owners and employees are acting from 
neglectful ignorance.  Of course, if these actions are morally wrong, then moral 
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agents who are bystanders are morally obligated to act so as to prevent them or 
bring them to an end. 
As a final point, the discussion here is very clearly based on practices 
prevalent in the industrialized world.  Remember, in order to determine the 
morality of a moral agent’s action(s), the impartial spectator will take into account 
the circumstances in which the moral agent finds herself.  So, given that those 
living in non-industrialized countries are living in very different conditions and 
have very different capabilities (e.g., their access to information or other food 
sources), the standards imposed on them will be very different.  Although their 
actions may result in harmful consequences to animals and may be very similar to 
the actions of those in industrialized countries, they may not be acting from 
selfishness as are their counterparts in industrialized countries. 
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Chapter 4: Non-Sentimentalist Animal Ethics 
 
In this chapter I present the two most well-known arguments condemning 
the ways CAFO and research animals are currently treated.  The first is Peter 
Singer’s preference utilitarian view demanding the liberation of animals.  The 
second is Tom Regan’s view that animals, like most humans, have rights and that 
the possession of these rights by animals ought to dictate our actions toward them.  
I also present two types of criticisms to each of these theories – those that are 
answered satisfactorily by the respective theory and those that are not.  The reason 
for presenting these theories and criticisms is to compare a couple of non-
sentimentalist animal ethics to the sentimentalist animal ethic presented in this 
dissertation in order to show that the sentimentalist ethic is the superior ethic.  
That normative sentimentalism is the superior ethic will be demonstrated by its 
ability to respond to the criticisms to which preference utilitarianism and rights 
theory have satisfactory responses and by its ability to respond to those criticisms 
to which these non-sentimentalist theories do not have satisfactory responses.   
Due to the fact that this dissertation is not about Singer’s and Regan’s 
theories, the discussion regarding the objections to each theory is limited.  I 
present only those objections I find to be the most compelling, the most 
interesting or the most relevant to our discussion of normative sentimentalism and 
animal ethics.  Therefore, I do not discuss the problems inherent in utilitarianism 
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or rights theory, e.g., how do we decide which action will in fact maximize 
pleasure (or, in the case of Singer’ utilitarianism, preference satisfaction) or 
whether or not there are in fact such things as rights.  Nor do I present every 
objection that arises when these theories are applied to animal issues.  Again, the 
objections that are addressed are those that are most pertinent to the project at 
hand. 
 
4.1 Singer’s Liberation for Animals 
I begin the discussion of Singer’s preference utilitarianism in section 4.1.1 
by presenting it without reference to its application to the treatment of CAFO and 
research animals.  In section 4.1.2, I explain how Singer applies his preference 
utilitarianism to the treatment of animals by showing how it condemns the current 
treatment of CAFO and most research animals.  I then present some objections to 
Singer’s animal ethic in 4.1.3 beginning with those for which he has satisfactory 
responses and followed by those for which he does not have satisfactory 
responses. 
 
4.1.1 Singer’s Preference Utilitarianism 
Peter Singer is a preference utilitarian and thus believes that the moral 
rightness or wrongness of an act is determined by whether or not it maximizes 
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preference satisfaction or, in other words, the satisfaction of interests.82  The basis 
of preference utilitarianism is the principle of equal consideration of interests 
(PECI).  The essence of this principle is that we ought to “give equal weight in 
our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions” 
(Singer 1993, 21).83  Singer explains: 
The principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of 
scales, weighing interests impartially.  True scales favour the side 
where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to 
outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but they take no 
account of whose interests they are weighing. (Singer 1993, 22) 
 
There are several things to take note of here.  The first is that, like other 
forms of utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism demands that one must be 
impartial when making moral decisions.  Accordingly, each individual counts for 
one and for no more than one (Singer 1993, 12-13).  This means that one cannot 
give greater consideration to her own interests or to those of her loved ones no 
matter how great her inclination to do so may be.  Furthermore, greater 
consideration cannot be given to the interests of those who are of a particular sex, 
race or intelligence just in virtue of the fact that they are, say, male, white and 
have an IQ of 125 or higher.  According to Singer, “[t]here is no logically 
compelling reason for assuming a difference in ability [or race or sex] justifies 
                                                 
82
 Singer says, “It is preference utilitarianism … if … we make the plausible move of 
taking a person’s interests to be what, on balance and after reflection on all the relevant facts, a 
person prefers” (Singer 1993, 94). 
83
 See also Singer 1990, 8. 
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any difference in the amount of consideration we give to … [an individual’s] … 
interests” (Singer 1993, 20-21).84   
Secondly, equal consideration of like interests does not necessarily entail 
equal treatment.  Consider, for example, the interest in having physical pain 
relieved.  Even though two individuals might share this interest, this does not 
mean that both should be treated equally in all situations.  Singer uses the 
following example to clarify this point. 
Imagine that after an earthquake I come across two victims, one 
with a crushed leg, in agony, and one with a gashed thigh, in slight 
pain.  I have only two shots of morphine left.  Equal treatment 
would suggest that I give one to each injured person, but one shot 
would not do much to relieve the pain of the person with the 
crushed leg.  She would still be in much more pain than the other 
victim, and even after I have given her one shot, giving her the 
second shot would bring greater relief than giving a shot to the 
person in slight pain.  Hence equal consideration of interests in this 
situation leads to what some may consider an inegalitarian result: 
two shots of morphine for one person, and none for the other. 
(Singer 1993, 24) 
 
 Thirdly, like his predecessor Jeremy Bentham, Singer thinks the capacity 
for suffering and enjoying happiness is the “vital characteristic that entitles a 
being to equal consideration” (Singer 1993, 57 and Singer 1990, 7); it is “the 
prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we 
can speak of interests in a meaningful way” (Singer 1993, 57 and Singer 1990, 7).  
He continues on: 
                                                 
84
 See also Singer 1990, 6 and 9. 
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If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to 
take that suffering into consideration.  No matter what the nature of 
the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be 
counted equally with the like suffering – insofar as rough 
comparisons can be made – of any other being.  If a being is not 
capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, 
there is nothing that can be taken into account.  So the limit of 
sentience (using the term as a convenient if not strictly accurate 
shorthand for the capacity to suffer and/or experience enjoyment) 
is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of 
others. (Singer 1993, 57-58 and Singer 1990, 8) 
 
Singer equates suffering with the occurrence of pain.  However, pain is a 
mental state and cannot be observed.  Given that we cannot observe pain, it might 
be argued that we cannot be certain whether another is actually in pain.  If we 
cannot be certain whether another is in pain, then we cannot give equal 
consideration to her interest in not being in pain.  However, as Singer points out, 
reaction to pain can be observed.  That is, although we can each only be certain 
that we ourselves are in pain because we cannot see or feel another’s pain, there 
are certain responses and actions, i.e., pain behaviors, that are usually displayed 
by those in pain: screaming, removing oneself from the source of pain, squirming, 
etc.  We can be pretty sure that another is in pain when she displays behaviors in 
these ways.  In addition, all human beings have similar nervous systems which 
function in the same way.  So, if, through experience, we come to know that 
certain stimuli have caused pain in some humans, then we can infer that these 
stimuli will most likely cause pain in most other humans.  Therefore, if a human 
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being is in a situation which we believe would be causing us pain, we can, with 
great certainty, be sure that it is in fact causing her pain. 
As was noted, the capacity for suffering and for enjoyment is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for having any interests at all.  It is, however, not the only 
factor that matters when applying PECI.  That is, although having a capacity for 
suffering and for enjoyment entails that an individual has an interest in avoiding 
pain and experiencing enjoyment, this interest is not necessarily the only interest 
that ought to be taken into consideration when making decisions regarding 
treatment. 
I do not, of course, hold that ‘the capacity to suffer is the only 
standard of consideration of treatment’ … What I do hold is that 
the capacity to suffer, or more fully, to suffer or to experience 
some form of pleasure or enjoyment is a sufficient condition for 
being given equal consideration.  To say this is a sufficient 
condition is not to say that it is the ‘only standard’ to be applied.  If 
an individual can suffer, its interests in not suffering are to be 
taken into account and given equal weight alongside the similar 
interests of other beings.  This is entirely compatible with saying 
that among these beings capable of suffering, some of them may 
also have other interests, for example in fulfilling their future 
plans, and these interests should be given additional consideration. 
(Singer 1983, 90)85 
 
What Singer is saying here is that PECI leads us to focus on suffering when the 
interest in not suffering is the interest affected.  However, the principle might lead 
us to focus on some other interest when it is the interest affected.  Furthermore, if 
                                                 
85
 The idea that interests other than an interest in avoiding pain and suffering should be 
given additional consideration is crucial to Singer’s ideas regarding the wrongness of painlessly 
killing humans and certain animals (Singer 1990, 17-22 and Singer 1993, chapters 4-7).  This will 
be discussed further in 4.1.3. 
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there is more than one interest that will be affected, then the interests are weighed 
and the most significant interest is the one that is given the greatest consideration.  
 To help clarify this point, let us return to our earthquake victims.  As 
presented, both victims are in pain and have an interest in not being in pain and in 
not suffering.  Given this, according to PECI it is the interest the victims have in 
not being in pain and suffering that ought to be our concern and we need to 
determine how best to satisfy that interest (and so how best to maximize 
preference satisfaction).  The best way to do this is, as Singer points out, to 
administer two shots of morphine to one of the victims.  If, however, there is only 
one victim and she is unconscious (and so cannot feel pain or suffer) and dying 
(let us assume she is buried beneath the rubble and is suffocating), then the 
interest on which we should focus would be her interest in living (or in fulfilling 
future projects), not on her interest in avoiding pain and suffering.  Therefore, she 
ought to be pulled from the rubble, not administered a shot of morphine.  If we 
happen upon a situation in which one of the victims has a gashed thigh and is 
conscious and the other is unconscious and suffocating underneath the rubble and 
we can only help one of them, then we ought to act to save the buried victim 
because her interest in living is more significant than the first victim’s interest in 
avoiding pain and suffering.   
Although the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is the necessary 
condition for having any interests at all and although it is the quality that makes 
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subjecting an individual to unnecessary pain and suffering morally wrong, it does 
not make killing an individual morally wrong (at least not if the killing can be 
done painlessly),  according to Singer.  Rather, it is the desire to continue living 
that Singer ultimately argues is what makes killing those who possess it morally 
wrong. 
While self-awareness, the capacity to think ahead and have hopes 
and aspirations for the future, the capacity for meaningful relations 
with others and so on are not relevant to the question of inflicting 
pain … these capacities are relevant to the question of taking life.  
It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable 
of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of 
communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being 
without these capacities. (Singer 1990, 20) 86 
 
If an individual possesses these capacities, then killing her is prima facie wrong.  
Therefore, because normal adult humans possess these capacities, killing them is 
prima facie morally wrong.87  In most cases, then, in which we have to make a 
choice between saving a normal adult human and saving an animal, we ought to 
choose to save the human because she possesses desires and preferences the 
satisfaction of which maximizes preference satisfaction.  For example, if there are 
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 Singer refers to humans who have these capacities as “persons” (Singer 1993, 87).  He 
says, “This definition … [of] … ‘person’ … selects two crucial characteristics – rationality and 
self-consciousness – as the core of the concept” (Singer 1993, 87).  According to Singer, 
rationality and self-consciousness are central to the concept of a “person”, while self-control, a 
sense of the future, a sense of the past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for others, 
communication and curiosity follow from these (Singer 1993, 86 and 87).  Singer’s position on 
personhood will be discussed further in 4.1.3. 
87
 I say it is only prima facie wrong or not wrong because it might be the case that 
preference satisfaction could be maximized by killing or not killing a person.  As Singer points 
out, “an action contrary to the preference of any being is, unless this preference is outweighed by 
contrary preferences, wrong” (Singer 1993, 94).  The wrongness of killing persons will be 
discussed further in 4.1.3 
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five normal adult humans and a large tortoise in a lifeboat and there is only 
enough room in the boat for any five of the six, then the tortoise ought to be 
thrown over.  However, there may be situations in which we have to choose 
between saving a human and saving an animal and the human, e.g., a human 
vegetable, is not self-aware, or capable of abstract thought, of planning for the 
future, or of complex acts of communication and so it might turn out that we 
ought to choose to save the animal, e.g., a normal adult chimpanzee, because 
doing so maximizes preference satisfaction.   
In sum, if a being has the capacity for suffering and enjoyment, it is 
sentient.  All sentient creatures have an interest in not suffering (and so in not 
experiencing pain).  Whether an individual is suffering can, for the most part, be 
determined by observing pain behaviors and from past knowledge of what stimuli 
cause pain to individuals with nervous systems similar to our own.  The interest a 
sentient creature has in not suffering should be given equal consideration to the 
similar interest another sentient being has in not suffering, regardless of race, sex, 
intellect and, as we will see below, species.  Giving equal consideration to this 
interest does not necessarily entail equal treatment as there may be other interests 
that ought to be taken into account when making decisions regarding treatment 





4.1.2 Singer’s Preference Utilitarian Animal Ethic 
  Given the standards Singer has proposed for moral considerability, most 
animals (viz., mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and crustacea) will be in the class of 
sentient beings (Singer 1993, 55-68 and Singer 1990, 171-173).88  Firstly, the pain 
responses of these animals are very similar to our responses to pain: they moan, or 
make other analogous noises, writhe, contort their faces, try to escape the source 
of pain, show fear at the prospect that the pain will repeat, etc. (Singer 1990, 11).  
Secondly, we know that animals, viz., other mammals and birds, have nervous 
systems very much like our own which respond physiologically like ours when 
the animal is subjected to stimuli that would cause us pain: there is a rise in blood 
pressure, increased pulse rate, dilated pupils, etc. (Singer 1990, 11).  And, 
although the nervous systems of fish, reptiles and crustacea are different from our 
own, fish and reptiles do have centrally organized nerve pathways and the 
nervous systems of crustacea are very complex and their nerve cells are very 
similar to those of humans (Singer 1990, 174).  Moreover, the part of the brain 
that controls impulses, emotions and feelings, the diencephalon, is very well 
developed in other species of animals, including mammals and birds.  Finally, the 
nervous systems of animals developed very much as the human nervous system 
did with their primary purpose to be enhancing a species’ prospects of survival 
                                                 
88
 While he admits that “one cannot with any confidence say that … [mollusks] … feel 
pain”, he also claims that “one can equally have little confidence in saying that they do not feel 
pain” and so encourages us to refrain from consuming them (Singer 1990, 174). 
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(Singer 1990, 11).  As Singer claims, it would be odd if physiologically similar 
nervous systems which have a common origin, a common function and cause 
similar behavioral responses to like stimuli would operate differently with respect 
to subjective feelings (Singer 1990, 11).89 
 According to Singer, then, CAFO and research animals are sentient.  
Given that they are sentient, and so have an interest in avoiding pain and 
suffering, we ought to stop eating CAFO animals and their products and we ought 
to stop using most animals as research subjects (as raising them as CAFO animals 
and using them as research subjects clearly causes them pain and suffering; see 
sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2).  By using animals in these ways, we fail to give proper 
consideration to their interest in avoiding pain and suffering; we fail to abide by 
PECI.  Thus, we fail to maximize preferences and we are committing actions that 
are morally wrong. 
 To be clear, according to Singer’s preference utilitarianism, it is not 
necessarily the case that we ought never to kill animals for consumption or use 
them for research.  If doing so maximizes preference satisfaction, then doing so is 
morally permissible.  His point is that factory farming and most uses of animals 
for research do not in fact maximize preference satisfaction because of the amount 
of pain and suffering inflicted upon the animals.  That is, the pain and suffering 
the animals endure as CAFO animals and as research subjects is greater than the 
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 Singer provides a list of studies and books proving that animals feel pain and suffer 
(Singer 1990, 12-13). 
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gastronomical pleasure we get from eating them.  In other words, the animals 
have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering and the humans that consume 
CAFO products have an interest in experiencing gastronomical pleasure.  
However, the interest the animals have in avoiding pain and suffering is more 
significant than the interest the humans have in experiencing gastronomical 
pleasure.  Similarly, animals that are used as research subjects have an interest in 
avoiding pain and suffering while the humans that benefit from these experiments 
have an interest in making their lives better and longer.  However, given that 
Singer believes that most experiments involving animals are either useless or 
unnecessary, the interests of the animals are more significant than the interests of 
the (alleged) human beneficiaries (Singer 1990, chapter 2).  
 
4.1.3 Objections to Singer’s Preference Utilitarian Animal Ethic 
 Before presenting some objections to Singer’s theory for which he does 
not have satisfactory responses, I will briefly present some objections to his 
theory for which he does have satisfactory responses.  These responses include 
those that Singer himself gives as well as those that he does not give but which 
can be inferred from his theory. 
 
Answered Objections 
 Four criticisms will be presented in this section.  According to the first 
objection, which I call the “speciesism objection”, animals are a different species 
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than humans and because of this they do not deserve the same consideration as 
humans and so humans have a right to treat them as we please.  The second, 
which I call the “natural predator objection”, holds that because animals eat each 
other (and humans when given the opportunity) there is nothing wrong with 
humans eating animals.  The third objection, which I call the “animal interests 
objection”, states that the interests of animals are not as important as the interests 
of humans and so do not deserve the type of consideration demanded by PECI.  
According to the final objection, which I call the “preference satisfaction 
objection”, preference satisfaction is maximized through using CAFO animals as 
food and using animals for research and therefore these practices are not morally 
wrong. 
 
i. Speciesism Objection 
 The first criticism, that because animals are a different species than 
humans we can treat them as we please, is easily answered by Singer.  He 
responds by likening our treatment of animals in virtue of the fact that they are of 
a different species to the treatment of non-whites and females because they are 
not white or male.  That is, he argues against what he calls “speciesism” which is 
defined as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of one’s own 
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species and against those of members of other species” (Singer 1990, 6).90  He 
claims that just as it is unacceptable for human beings of a certain intelligence, 
race or sex to discriminate against, oppress or use for their own ends human 
beings of lesser intelligence, a different race or sex, it is unacceptable for human 
beings to discriminate against, oppress or use for their own ends members of other 
species.  Singer’s point is that if intelligence, race or sex are not good enough 
reasons to keep us from abiding by PECI when considering the interests of 
members of our own species, then species is not a good enough reason to keep us 
from abiding by the principle when considering the interests of members of other 
species, especially when the interest of concern is the interest in avoiding pain and 
suffering.  If a being can feel pain and suffer, then it has an interest in avoiding it.  
According to PECI, the interest animals have in avoiding pain and suffering 
deserves the same consideration that is given to the interest humans have in 
avoiding pain and suffering.  It is the interest that matters, not the species, race, 
sex, or intellect of the being that possesses it.  Therefore, even though animals are 
a different species than humans, we cannot treat them any way we please. 
 
ii. Natural Predator Objection 
 Singer finds the objection ‘animals kill other animals for food so it is 
acceptable for us to kill animals for food’ especially peculiar.  He states, “It is odd 
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 See also Singer 1993, 58.  Richard Ryder first coined the term “speciesism” in 1979 
and distributed a pamphlet titled “Speciesism” that same year.  However, my research indicates 
that there are no copies of the pamphlet available (Ryder).  
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how humans, who normally consider themselves so far above other animals, will, 
if it seems to support their dietary preferences, use an argument that implies that 
we ought to look to other animals for moral inspiration and guidance” (Singer 
1990, 224).91 
 Peculiarity aside, Singer notes that not only do some animals have to eat 
each other to survive and not only are these animals not the ones we usually 
consume or use as research subjects (interestingly humans primarily consume 
herbivores and most research animals are herbivores), but even if carnivorous 
animals could survive without consuming other animals, they are incapable of 
making the choice to do so.  Singer says, “We cannot evade our responsibility for 
our choice by imitating the actions of beings that are incapable of making this 
kind of choice” (Singer 1990, 225).  If by refraining from consuming CAFO 
animals and using them for research we can reduce the amount of suffering in the 
world, then we are morally obligated to do so even if these same animals are 
incapable of making a similar choice. 
 Singer could also respond by saying that this objection implies that 
because infants, the mentally enfeebled, and the senile behave in certain ways, 
e.g., infants often cry incessantly in public and the mentally enfeebled and the 
senile often throw tantrums when they are upset or confused or they will often 
steal things from others (because they think they can just take what they want), 
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 See also Singer 1993, 71. 
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normal adult humans should be permitted to act in these ways as well.  This is 
absurd and few, if any, would agree. 
 
iii. Animal Interests Objection 
 Singer shows in chapter 1 of Animal Liberation that most animals do have 
interests and in particular the interest in avoiding pain and suffering (see also 
section 4.1.2).  So, any arguments to the contrary are irrelevant. 
Some argue that because animals have lower intelligence, their interests 
are not due the type of consideration demanded by PECI.  However, as Singer 
points out, many animals have higher intelligence than many humans.  So, if an 
individual thinks that it is acceptable to use animals for, say, research because 
they lack intelligence, then they ought to be willing to use infants who have equal 
or less intelligence than research animals, e.g., those who are severely brain 
damaged and orphaned (Singer 1993, 67-68 and Singer 1990, 82). 
A critic might respond by saying that in general humans have greater 
interests than animals (at least in part because they are rational and self-
conscious) and that these interests need to be given greater consideration.  As was 
noted above in section 4.1.1, Singer does not deny this.  In fact, he admits that the 
superior mental powers of normal adult humans make a difference in many 
situations, e.g., those in which there is anticipation and greater knowledge of what 
is happening (Singer 1993, 59-61 and Singer 1990, 16).  In addition, he allows 
 157 
“that comparisons of suffering between members of different species cannot be 
made precisely” (Singer 1993, 61 and Singer 1990, 16).  However, he claims that 
“precision is not essential” (Singer 1993, 61 and Singer 1990, 16). 
Even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals 
only when it is quite certain that the interests of humans will not be 
affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, we 
would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of 
animals that would involve our diet, the farming methods we use, 
experimental procedures in many fields of science, our approach to 
wildlife and to hunting, trapping and wearing of furs, and areas of 
entertainment like circuses, rodeos, and zoos.  As a result, a vast 
amount of suffering would be avoided. (Singer 1990, 16)92 
 
So, the interests of normal adult humans may deserve greater consideration, but, 
even so, the practices of factory farming and using most animals for research are 
morally wrong because the interests the animals have in not suffering is greater 
than the interests normal adult humans have in experiencing gastronomical 
pleasure and because most experiments using animals for human benefit are of 
little to no use for humans. 
 
iv. Preference Satisfaction Objection 
 
One could, even as a hedonistic or preference utilitarian, argue that the net 
amount of pleasure or preference satisfaction brought about by factory farming 
(e.g., gastronomical pleasure) and using animals for research (e.g., improving the 
quality of and prolonging life) far outweighs the pain the animals are subjected to 
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 See also Singer 1993, 61. 
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or lack of preferences that are satisfied in the process.  Singer does have a 
response to this: viz., it is not in fact true that the preference satisfaction achieved 
by those who consume and enjoy CAFO products or that is a result of animal 
research outweighs the pain to which the animals are subjected (see section 4.1.2); 
the preference an animal has for not being subjected to pain and suffering is more 
significant than the preference humans have for gastronomical pleasure.  In 
addition, as was argued above (section 3.2.2), the notion that using animals as 
research subjects improves the quality of and prolongs life is a highly contested 
notion.  Singer gives many other examples of fruitless research involving animals 
to further defend the idea that in fact most research is not useful (Singer 1990, 
chapter 2).93  Thus, our preference for better and longer lives is not in fact 
satisfied by the results of the experiments to which the animals are subjected.  
Therefore, overall preference satisfaction would be maximized were we to stop 
using animals for research (thus satisfying the animals’ preference for avoiding 
pain and suffering). 
 
Unanswered Objection: The Moral Standing Objection 
 In this section I will present what I think is the strongest objection against 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism, what I call the “moral standing objection”.  
According to this objection, Singer’s preference utilitarianism has a number of 
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 I also defended this position in chapter 3. 
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problems concerning the moral standing of sentient beings.94  In particular, even 
though Singer claims sentient beings have considerable moral standing, his 
preference utilitarianism does not go far enough in protecting them against certain 
types of actions, viz., it does not offer them enough protection against killing. 
 After explaining what is required for a being to have value according to 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism, I distinguish between Singer’s two categories 
of sentient beings, persons and merely conscious beings.  I then explain the 
problems with the moral standing of persons first and conclude with a discussion 
of the problems of the moral standing of merely conscious beings.   
 As was noted above in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, according to Singer only 
sentient beings are morally considerable.  He says, “This … ethic draws the 
boundary of moral consideration around all sentient creatures, but leaves other 
living things outside that boundary” (Singer 1993, 276).95  Singer further states: 
The most obvious reason for valuing the life of a being capable of 
experiencing pleasure or pain is the pleasure it can experience.  If 
we value our own pleasures … then the universal aspect of ethical 
judgments requires us to extend our positive evaluation of our own 
experience of these pleasures to the similar experiences of all who 
can experience them. (Singer 1993, 101) 
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 Some of what follows was discussed briefly in 4.1.1, but more detail is needed for the 
purposes of presenting this objection.   
95
 Recall that Singer thinks that the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is the condition 
for having interests at all.  Recall also that he thinks that if a being can feel pain and suffer, then 
there is no good reason not to give that pain and suffering the same consideration we give our own 
(see 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). 
 160 
Singer classifies sentient (or conscious) beings into two different 
categories, persons and merely conscious beings.  The class of persons consists of 
those sentient beings who are rational and self-aware; and because they are 
rational and self-aware they possess self-control, a sense of the future, a sense of 
the past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for others, communication and 
curiosity (Singer 1993, 86-87; see also section 4.1.1).  Archetypal persons are 
normal adult humans, but the category also includes the great apes and most likely 
whales, dolphins, dogs, cats, pigs and the like (Singer 1993, 118-119 and Singer 
1993, 182).  The class of merely conscious beings consists of those sentient 
beings who are not rational and self-aware and so do not possess the other 
qualities; in particular they do not possess a sense of the future or of the past 
(Singer 1993, 101).  In this category are many animals, e.g., chickens, ducks and 
mice, as well as human newborn infants and some intellectually disabled humans 
(Singer 1993, 101, 133 and chapter 7).  
  
a. Moral Standing of Persons 
 Singer thinks it is prima facie wrong to kill either persons or merely 
conscious beings.  Regarding the wrongness of killing persons he says: 
According to preference utilitarianism, an action contrary to the 
preference of any being is, unless outweighed by contrary 
preferences, wrong.  Killing a person who prefers to continue 




So, it is wrong to kill a person because persons have the preference to continue 
living.  However, it is only prima facie wrong to kill a person because her 
preference to live could be outweighed by the preferences of others. 
Although preference utilitarianism does provide a direct reason for 
not killing a person, some may find the reason … not sufficiently 
stringent.  Even for preference utilitarianism, the wrong done to the 
person killed is merely one factor to be taken into account, and the 
preference of the victim could sometimes be outweighed by the 
preferences of others. (Singer 1993, 95) 
 
Some might object to the fact that it is merely prima facie wrong to kill 
persons according to Singer’s preference utilitarianism.  However, I do not think 
that this objection is a very serious one.  Very few hold that it is always, in every 
case and for every reason, wrong to kill a person: Kantian deontologists allow the 
killing for punishment of some individuals Singer regards as persons, social 
contract theorists will also usually allow it for transgressors, even divine 
command theorists and natural law theorists permit the killing of non-innocents. 
Normative sentimentalists allow for it in certain circumstances (see chapters 1 and 
2) and even those who think that life is sacred usually allow for killing as 
punishment or in self-defense.  So, I do not think that this criticism is a difficult 
one for Singer to overcome. 
The real problem with Singer’s position on killing persons is that it not 
only permits, but calls for, the killing of one to save many.  For example, if five 
people need organ transplants or they will die and the organs of one healthy 
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person can be used to successfully save the five, then not only is it morally 
permissible to kill the one without her permission to save the five, but it is 
morally required.  Although all six are persons, the preferences of the five sick 
persons outweigh the preferences of the one.  However, it is wrong to require the 
death of a person merely because more preferences will be satisfied by doing so.   
Another problem arises for Singer when we consider further the 
implications of his preference utilitarianism with respect to the wrongness of 
killing persons.  Even though it is morally wrong to kill both persons and merely 
conscious beings, Singer claims that it is more morally wrong to kill persons than 
to kill merely conscious beings.  
A self-conscious being is aware of itself as a distinct entity, with a 
past and a future … A being aware of itself in this way will be 
capable of having desires about its own future … To take the lives 
of … these people, without their consent, is to thwart their desires 
for the future … Killing … [merely conscious beings] … does not 
thwart desires of this kind, because … [they] … are incapable of 
having such desires. (Singer 1993, 90) 
 
A few pages later he says: 
 
For preference utilitarians, taking the life of a person will normally 
be worse than taking the life of some other being, since persons are 
highly future-oriented in their preferences.  To kill a person is 
therefore, normally, to violate not just one, but a wide range of the 
most central and significant preferences a being can have.  Very 
often, it will make nonsense of everything that the victim has been 




Although it might be prima facie more morally wrong to kill persons than 
to kill merely conscious beings, this does not mean that the preferences of persons 
always outweigh the preferences of merely conscious beings.  Again, what Singer 
advocates is preference satisfaction maximization.  So, it is not necessarily the 
case that the preference to live of a single person outweighs the preferences to 
avoid pain and suffering of a group of merely conscious beings.  For example, 
imagine that we have to choose between torturing one hundred chickens and 
killing one 95-year-old normal adult human.  It can be argued that preference 
satisfaction will be maximized if we choose to kill the 95-year-old adult as 
arguably the preference to avoid pain and suffering of the hundred chickens 
outweighs the preference to continue living of the 95-year-old.  Even if we set 
aside our speciesist intuitions, that Singer’s preference utilitarianism allows for 
the preferences, and thus moral standing, of persons to be outweighed by those of 
merely conscious beings in many situations leaves us to question the strength of 
the protections his theory offers persons. 
Not only does Singer think that killing a person is prima facie wrong 
because doing so is an action contrary to the preferences of the person, but he 
thinks there are three further reasons for thinking it is wrong to kill persons.  
Unfortunately, these reasons seem to offer him less help than he thinks they do.  
The first reason he gives to defend his position that killing a person is 
wrong is that it is wrong because of the indirect harm it does to others.  Singer 
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says, “the killing of the person may become known to other persons, who derive 
from this knowledge a more gloomy estimate of their chances of living to a ripe 
old age, or simply become fearful of being murdered” (Singer 1993, 92).  For 
example, if it were the case that healthy people could be killed for the sake of sick 
people, knowing that as healthy individuals we might be killed to save sick people 
would interfere with our preference satisfaction as we would fear for our lives.   
The problem is that this does not necessarily prohibit killing persons in 
secrecy.  For example, let us again assume that a healthy person is killed to save 
the lives of five sick people.  We can imagine a situation in which the healthy 
person is a recluse or a runaway or a homeless person and so does not have a 
circle or network of loved ones either concerned about her existence or aware of 
her whereabouts.  We can also imagine that the sick people are told that their new 
organs have been donated by an organ donor who died of a stroke or in a car 
accident or something of the like.  In a case such as this, one in which people are 
not aware that healthy people are being killed to save sick people, killing healthy 
people would not interfere with the preference satisfaction of those who would be 
negatively affected, albeit indirectly, by knowing such things.  Therefore, there 
does not seem to be any indirect harm done to anyone and so Singer does not get 
the support he desires from this justification. 
The second reason Singer gives in order to support his position that killing 
persons is wrong is that those who conceive of themselves as existing over time 
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have a right to life.  He agrees with Michael Tooley that to have a right to life one 
must have, or at one time had, the concept of having a continued existence (Singer 
1993, 96-98).  This is because, according to Tooley, there is a conceptual 
connection between the desires a being is capable of having and the rights a being 
can be said to have.   
The basic intuition is that a right is something that can be violated 
and that, in general, to violate an individual’s right to something is 
to frustrate the corresponding desire. (Singer 1993, 96) 
 
 So, Tooley’s view demands that the desire necessary to having a right to life is 
the desire to continue existing as a distinct entity and only those who are capable 
of seeing themselves as distinct entities existing over time have these desires. 
I find Singer’s use of this view curious because he claims that “I am not 
convinced that the notion of a moral right is a helpful or meaningful one, except 
when it is used as a shorthand way of referring to more fundamental moral 
considerations” (Singer 1993, 96).  Given that Singer is not committed to the idea 
or existence of rights, it is not clear to what extent Singer is affirming Tooley’s 
right to life view by appealing to it for support of his own position.  Yet, oddly, it 
is included in his defense of his stance on infanticide, abortion, euthanasia and the 
killing of animals insofar as he thinks it makes clear which of these actions 
violates a being’s right to life.  However, Singer leaves it off of the list of reasons 
a utilitarian can accept for the wrongness of killing persons (Singer 1993, 100).  
In fact, all he explicitly claims is that this reason cannot be rejected out of hand 
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(Singer 1993, 100).  This is because, of course, Singer is a preference utilitarian 
and to be true to his view he has to hold that the wrongness of killing is based on 
the fact that it does not maximize preference satisfaction not that it violates a 
right. 
The third reason Singer gives to defend his position that killing persons is 
wrong is that it violates a being’s autonomy. 
There is a strand of ethical thought, associated with Kant but 
including many modern writers who are not Kantians, according to 
which respect for autonomy is a basic moral principle.  By 
‘autonomy’ is meant the capacity to choose, to make and act on 
one’s own decisions.  Rational and self-conscious beings 
presumably have this ability, whereas beings who cannot consider 
the alternatives open to them are not capable of choosing in the 
required sense and hence cannot be autonomous.  In particular, 
only a being who can grasp the difference between dying and 
continuing to live can autonomously continue to live … [K]illing a 
person who does not choose to die is the gravest possible violation 
of that person’s autonomy. (Singer 1993, 99) 
 
So, on this view, only a being that can grasp the difference between living and 
dying can autonomously choose to continue living.  Killing a being that grasps 
this difference and chooses to live is wrong.  Persons have this ability, while 
merely conscious beings do not.  Therefore, killing a person who does not choose 
to die fails to respect her autonomy and is wrong.   
The respect for autonomy view has its problems, e.g., the class of beings it 
covers is limited and excludes infants, the senile, the mentally enfeebled and most 
animals.  However, like Tooley’s right to life argument, Singer relies on it to 
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defend his stance on infanticide, abortion, euthanasia and the killing of animals.  
Yet, as was the case with Tooley’s view, it is not clear the extent to which Singer 
is affirming this view as he admits that utilitarians cannot respect autonomy for its 
own sake (Singer 1993, 99).  Rather, he acknowledges that at most the utilitarian 
can give weight to a person’s desire to continue living for determinations 
regarding preference satisfaction or as evidence that the person’s life was a happy 
one on the whole.  In fact, he claims that utilitarians would “probably advocate 
respect for autonomy” but acknowledges that they cannot accept it as a reason for 
the wrongness of killing (Singer 1993, 100).   
In sum, although persons have moral standing according to Singer, their 
preferences can in many situations be outweighed by the preferences not only of 
other persons, but also by those of merely conscious beings thereby leaving 
persons much more unprotected than is desirable. 
 
b. Moral Standing of Merely Conscious Beings 
Although Singer thinks it is more morally wrong to kill persons than to 
kill merely conscious beings, he does think that, like the morality of killing 
persons, it is prima facie wrong to kill merely conscious beings and he says so in 
a lengthier version of a quote noted above. 
The most obvious reason for valuing the life of a being capable of 
experiencing pleasure or pain is the pleasure it can experience.  If 
we value our own pleasures … then the universal aspect of ethical 
judgments requires us to extend our positive evaluation of our own 
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experience of these pleasures to the similar experiences of all who 
can experience them.  But death is the end of all pleasurable 
experiences.  Thus the fact that beings will experience pleasure in 
the future is a reason for saying that it would be wrong to kill 
them. (Singer 1993, 101) 
 
Nevertheless, the protections offered merely conscious beings are even 
weaker than those offered to persons.  This means that we are left with some 
pretty displeasing conclusions.  For example, according to Singer’s theory, there 
is some number of healthy merely conscious beings that we are obligated to kill 
for their organs in order to save the lives of persons.  This means that there is an 
acceptable number of very mentally disabled but otherwise healthy humans whose 
lives we are required to take in order to give their organs to persons who do not 
have healthy organs.  That is to say, we cannot take the lives of an infinite number 
of healthy merely conscious beings to save the lives of a few persons.  There is a 
limit to the number we could use.  However, there is still some acceptable number 
of merely conscious beings whom we are required to use in such a way.   
Singer’s view also results in our being required to kill orphaned human 
newborn infants in order to save the lives of adult chimpanzees if we find that the 
organs of the infants are good replacements for those of the chimpanzees; 
chimpanzees are persons whereas newborn human infants are not and so even if 
we cannot painlessly kill the infants, the preferences of the chimpanzees to live 
outweigh the preferences of the infants.  In addition, if we are in a situation in 
which we have to choose between saving a healthy 95-year-old human, at least as 
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healthy as a 95-year-old human can be, and a healthy week-old orphaned human 
newborn, we have to save the 95-year-old because her preferences outweigh the 
preferences of the infant – the 95-year-old is a person and the infant is a merely 
conscious being.  Similarly, imagine a situation in which an orphaned human 
newborn (let us assume she is perfectly healthy) and a dog are trapped inside a 
burning building.  Imagine also that you are the only one present and you have 
time to save either the infant or the dog; you do not have time to save both before 
the fire consumes the building.  Singer would argue that it is the dog that ought to 
be saved because she is a person whereas the infant is only a merely conscious 
being; preference satisfaction is maximized by saving the dog rather than the 
infant.   
That it is morally required of us to commit these actions, viz., killing the 
mentally enfeebled for the sake of persons, killing newborns for the sake of 
chimpanzees, allowing newborns to die for the sake of the very, very elderly and 
allowing newborns to die for the sake of dogs, are all extremely problematic 
consequences of Singer’s view.  Not only will each of these conclusions be 
rejected by one moral theorist or another, but it is likely that only the most 
committed preference utilitarian will hold even one of them. 
Another concern regarding the moral standing of merely conscious beings 
is that Singer actually thinks that they are replaceable.  Singer makes the 
following claim. 
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[I]t is possible to regard non-self-conscious animals as 
interchangeable with each other in a way that self-conscious beings 
are not.  This means that in some circumstances – when animals 
lead pleasant lives, are killed painlessly, their deaths do not cause 
suffering to other animals, and the killing of one animal makes 
possible its replacement by another who would not otherwise have 
lived – the killing of non-self-conscious animals may not be 
wrong. (Singer 1993, 133)96 
 
It appears then that there are at least two circumstances under which it is not 
morally wrong to kill merely conscious beings: (1) if the situation is one in which 
the preferences of another being, whether a person or a merely conscious being, 
outweigh the preferences of the merely conscious being and (2) if the situation is 
one in which the merely conscious being is replaced by another merely conscious 
being who will lead an equally pleasant life.  We have already seen the types of 
consequences that arise from the first circumstance.  Consequences like the 
following arise from the second circumstance: 
Is it possible … to justify raising chickens for their meat, not in 
factory farm conditions but roaming freely around a farmyard?  Let 
us make the questionable assumption that chickens are not self-
conscious.  Assume also that the birds can be killed painlessly, and 
the survivors do not appear to be affected by the death of one of 
their numbers.  Assume, finally, that for economic reasons we 
could not rear the birds if we did not eat them.  Then the 
replaceability argument appears to justify killing the birds, because 
depriving them of the pleasures of their existence can be offset 
against the pleasures of the chickens who do not yet exist, and will 
exist only if existing chickens are killed. (Singer 1993, 133) 
 
                                                 
96
 See also Singer 1993, 121 and 125.  Note that Singer does not think persons are 
replaceable: “[P]erhaps the capacity to see oneself as existing over time, and thus to aspire to 
longer life (as well as to have other non-momentary, future-directed interests) is the characteristic 
that marks out those beings who cannot be considered replaceable” (Singer 1993, 125). 
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 One implication of this position is that we are permitted to kill as many 
newborn human infants as we like as long as we replace them with other 
newborns who will live equally pleasant lives.  In addition, fetuses can be aborted 
as long as an equal number of fetuses are conceived who will have equally 
pleasant existences.  The same goes for any other merely conscious being 
including the mentally disabled.  Even if we do not think infanticide, abortion or 
killing the mentally disabled are wrong, we do not think of these beings as 
replaceable.  Another implication of this position is that not only is there an 
acceptable number of healthy merely conscious beings whose lives we are 
required to take in order to save the lives of unhealthy persons, but given that 
merely conscious beings are replaceable, there is actually no limit to the number 
of merely conscious beings whom we are required to kill for the benefit of 
persons as long as we replace them with other merely conscious beings whose 
lives are equally pleasant. 
Singer’s view regarding the replaceability of merely conscious beings also 
seems to have the very odd implication that we can, for example, kill newborns 
and replace them not with other newborns, but with some other type of merely 
conscious being that we would treat similarly, say the mentally enfeebled.  We 
could, theoretically, kill off one species of merely conscious beings if we replace 
it with an equal number of another species of merely conscious beings, e.g., we 
could replace chickens with mice, or newborns, or the mentally enfeebled, or 
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animal or human fetuses.  It is not at all clear to me why we would want to accept 
this. 
In sum, according to Singer, although it is prima facie wrong to kill both 
persons and merely conscious beings, there are a great many circumstances in 
which we are not only permitted to kill them, but which in fact we are obligated to 
kill them, viz., if their preferences are outweighed by other persons or merely 
conscious beings.  Furthermore, killing merely conscious beings for any reason is 
not morally wrong if we replace them with other merely conscious beings that 
will live equally happy lives. 
 
4.2  Regan’s Case for Animal Rights 
I begin this section by presenting Regan’s moral theory without reference 
to its application to the treatment of CAFO and research animals.  In section 4.2.2, 
I explain how Regan applies his rights theory to the treatment of animals thereby 
showing how it condemns the current treatment of CAFO and research animals.  I 
then present some objections to Regan’s animal ethic beginning with those for 
which he has satisfactory responses.  These are followed by those for which he 
does not have satisfactory responses. 
 
4.2.1 Regan’s Rights Theory 
 In contrast to Singer’s preference utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s rights 
theory maintains not that the maximization of preference satisfaction is what 
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should motivate our moral decisions, but rather that our moral decisions should be 
based upon the fact that all moral agents and moral patients have certain basic 
moral rights and that these rights ought to be respected.  The foundation of his 
theory is what he calls the respect principle: 
Respect Principle 
We are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that 
respect their inherent value. (Regan 2004, 248)97 
 
Regan’s view is that those who have inherent value have the basic moral right to 
respectful treatment.  A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for having 
inherent value is to be a subject of a life which not only requires that one be alive 
and be conscious, but also that one have beliefs and desires; perceptions; memory 
and a sense of the future, including one’s own future; an emotional life together 
with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare interests; the ability to 
initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals; psychophysical identity over time; 
and individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for 
them logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently 
of their being the object of anyone else’s interests (Regan 2004, 243).   
To be clear, the equal inherent value of individuals who have it is not 
derived from the subject of a life criterion.  That certain individuals have equal 
                                                 
97
 Regan thinks this principle meets the requirements necessary for making an ideal moral 
judgment: adequacy of scope, precision, consistency, conformity with our reflective intuitions 
(Regan 2004, 258-260 and 277). 
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inherent value is a theoretical assumption, a postulate.98  The assumption, Regan 
says, is made before the subject of a life criterion is introduced.  The subject of a 
life criterion merely specifies “a relevant similarity among all those individuals 
who, by force of argument, are to be viewed as having equal inherent value” 
(Regan 2004, 248).  This is why being a subject of a life is a sufficient, but not 
necessary, condition for having inherent value (and therefore for having a right to 
be treated according to the respect principle).  Thus, it is possible for those who 
are not subjects of a life to have inherent value and to have a right to be treated 
according to the respect principle, as will be discussed further below. 
Moral agents possess all the qualities listed above which means they are 
subjects of a life and have a right to respectful treatment.  In addition, they can 
understand and also choose to act according to or contrary to moral principles.  
Moral agents are individuals who have a variety of sophisticated 
abilities, including the particular ability to bring impartial moral 
principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, 
morally ought to be done, and having made this determination, to 
freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive 
it, requires … [They] not only can do what is right or wrong, they 
may also be on the receiving end, so to speak, of the right or wrong 
acts of other moral agents. (Regan 2004, 151-152) 
 
On the other hand, moral patients cannot understand or choose to act 
according to or contrary to moral principles. 
Moral patients lack the prerequisites that would enable them to 
control their own behavior in ways that would make them morally 
                                                 
98
 Regan gives his reasons for postulating this at Regan 2004, 247. 
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accountable for what they do.  A moral patient lacks the ability to 
formulate, let alone bring to bear, moral principles in deliberating 
about which one among a number of possible acts it would be right 
or proper to perform.  Moral patients, in a word, cannot do what is 
right, nor can they do what is wrong. (Regan 2004, 152) 
   
Yet, like moral agents, moral patients can be on the receiving end of the right or 
wrong acts of moral agents (Regan 2004, 154).    
According to Regan, the class of moral patients consists of both (a) those 
who are conscious and sentient but who lack other mental abilities, viz., those 
required of a subject of a life, and (b) those who are conscious, sentient and 
possess other cognitive and volitional abilities, viz., those required of a subject of 
a life (Regan 2004, 153).  Regan advises that his primary concern is with those 
moral patients in (b) because they are actually subjects of a life (and so clearly 
have inherent value).  So, when the term “moral patients” is used in this section 
(4.2), it is referring to the individuals in (b).  The moral patients in (a) which 
include some humans (and animals) are not subjects of a life, but this is not 
necessarily to say that they do not possess inherent value (because, again, being a 
subject of a life is merely a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for having 
inherent value).  Regan claims it is quite possible that the beings in (a) do in fact 
possess inherent value, but he admits that such determinations are beyond the 
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scope of the project in The Case for Animal Rights and that the project is therefore 
incomplete in this way (Regan 2004, 246).99  
It is important to note, however, that Regan does think we need to give 
those in (a) the benefit of the doubt and treat them according to the respect 
principle.  He states, “The rights view advocates taking steps that foster the 
creation of a moral climate where the rights of the individual are taken seriously 
indeed.  Better, then, to adopt a policy that errs on the side of caution when the 
recognition of moral rights is at issue” (Regan 2004, 319-320).  Not only does 
Regan think that it is best to err on the side of caution where moral rights are 
concerned, but he also thinks that our treatment of those beings whose status as 
subjects of a life or as possessors of inherent value is uncertain (viz., the moral 
patients in (a)) could impact our treatment of those beings who are in fact subjects 
                                                 
99
 It is curious to me as to why Regan puts these beings (those who are merely sentient 
and conscious) in the moral patients category since they are not clearly subjects of a life, nor is it 
clear whether they possess inherent value.  On the face of it, they do not have any rights.  Since it 
is not clear whether they are subjects of a life or have inherent value, it is not at all clear whether 
and why they are morally considerable.  It is thus difficult to see why they belong in the same 
class as those who are clearly morally considerable.  We will see below that Regan says we need 
to give these beings the benefit of the doubt and treat them as if they are subjects of a life, but that 
does not justify putting them in the moral patients category at this stage of the game, especially 
since Regan himself admits that these beings are not in the group of those being referred to when 
he speaks of moral patients.  Whether or not the beings in (a) have inherent value is an issue that is 
left unresolved in The Case for Animal Rights and is an issue he has not revisited, as far as I can 
determine, since The Case for Animal Rights was first published (as Regan has not resolved them 
in the second edition).  So, the actual moral status of these beings remains unclear.   
Regan also acknowledges that natural objects or collections of natural objects, e.g., trees, 
rivers, and rocks, might have inherent value as well, but he leaves such determinations for others 
to make (Regan 2004, 246).  These entities are also excluded from the group referred to when he 
speaks of moral patients, but, unlike the beings in (a), he never claims that we ought to give them 
the benefit of the doubt.  Although the beings in (a) possess sentience and are conscious, it is not 
clear to me why one group of beings or entities whose moral status is unclear is to be given the 
benefit of the doubt and the other is not.   
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of a life (and certainly have inherent value; viz., moral agents and moral patients 
in (b)).  In order to ensure that we maintain the proper attitude towards subjects of 
a life (and those with inherent value) and treat them with the respect they deserve, 
we ought to treat those whose status is uncertain with the respect demanded by the 
respect principle (Regan 2004, 368). 
So, all subjects of a life (moral agents and moral patients) have inherent 
value and thus are to be treated according to the respect principle which means 
they are bearers of at least certain basic moral rights.  According to Regan, to say 
that subjects of a life have certain basic moral rights is to say that: 
(1) those with inherent value possess certain rights independently 
of anyone’s voluntary acts, either their own or those of others, and 
independently of the position they happen to occupy in any given 
institutional arrangement [i.e., the rights are unacquired]; 
 
(2) these rights are universal – that is, they are possessed by all 
relevantly similar individuals, independently of those 
considerations mentioned in (1); 
 
(3) all who possess these rights possess them equally (Regan 2004, 
327). 
 
Not only are moral rights universal, equal and not the result of the creative acts of 
any individual (e.g., a despot) or group (e.g., a legislative assembly), but they do 
not depend on an individual’s race, sex, religion, place of birth or country of 
domicile (Regan 2004, 267-268).  (Nor, as we will see below in section 4.2.2, do 
they depend on an individual’s species.)    
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In order to distinguish his view from utilitarianism, Regan makes very 
clear that those who possess inherent value, and therefore have the right to 
respectful treatment, are not receptacles of value nor are they replaceable (because 
their value is independent of their utility).  He says: 
All moral agents and patients must always be treated in ways that 
are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of … 
[inherent value] … The basic moral right to respectful treatment 
prohibits treating moral agents or patients as if they were mere 
receptacles of intrinsic values (e.g., pleasure) lacking any value of 
their own, since such a view of these individuals would allow 
harming some (e.g., by making them suffer) on the grounds that 
the aggregate consequences for all those other “receptacles” 
affected by the outcome would be “the best”. (Regan 2004, 328) 
 
A practice, institution, enterprise, or similar undertaking is unjust if 
it permits or requires treating individuals with inherent value as if 
they were renewable resources, and such individuals are treated as 
if they were such resources if … they are killed, their “place” to be 
filled by another, similar individual whose life will be similarly 
terminated, and so on. (Regan 2004, 343) 
 
The rest of the discussion in this section focuses on what the right to 
respectful treatment entails and when it can be overridden.  The principles that are 
discussed apply both to those we are sure have inherent value, subjects of a life 
(both moral agents and moral patients), and to those who are borderline, but to 
whom Regan thinks we ought to give the benefit of the doubt (those moral 
patients in (a)).100  Given that Regan uses the term “individuals” to refer to those 
who have inherent value, the term will be used as such throughout this section. 
                                                 
100
 There is further discussion of borderline cases below. 
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According to Regan, the right to respectful treatment includes the right not 
to be harmed as per the harm principle. 
Harm Principle 
[W]e have a direct prima facie duty not to harm individuals. 
(Regan 2004, 187) 
 
Because this duty is only a prima facie duty, it can be overridden in certain 
circumstances and these exceptions include self-defense (against both moral 
agents and moral patients), punishment of the guilty, and innocent shields 
(innocents being used to protect those engaged in unlawful activities).   
There are other times, however, when we are permitted to harm innocent 
subjects of a life.  To help us make decisions about when it is acceptable to harm 
innocents, Regan gives us the miniride principle (he also calls this the minimize 
overriding principle), the worse-off principle, and the liberty principle.  These 
three principles, Regan claims, are consistent with each other and are derived 
from the respect principle. 
Miniride Principle 
Special considerations aside, when we must choose between 
overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights of few 
who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be 
harmed in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose 
to override the rights of the few in preference to overriding the 
rights of the many. (Regan 2004, 305) 
 
According to the miniride principle, when the harms for each individual affected 
are prima facie comparable and there are no special considerations at hand, and 
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we have a choice between overriding the rights of the few or overriding the rights 
of the many, we must choose to override the rights of the few.  When we are 
faced with a situation in which, to borrow from Regan, we have to choose 
between options, one of which will harm A, one of which will harm B, C and D, 
and one of which will harm A, B, C and D, and when the harms for each of A, B, 
C and D are prima facie comparable and there are no special considerations at 
hand, then the number of individuals affected matters and we ought to choose to 
override the rights of A.  The respect principle demands we choose this option 
precisely because each subject of a life counts for one and no one for more than 
one.  In addition, in order to be consistent with showing equal respect for the 
equal rights of all the individuals involved, we need to choose to override the 
rights of only one (the few) as compared to overriding the rights of the other three 
(the many).   
According to Regan, the worse-off principle applies in cases where the 
harms faced by the individuals are not prima facie comparable.   
Worse-off Principle 
 
Special considerations aside, when we must decide to override the 
rights of the many or the rights of the few who are innocent, and 
when the harm faced by the few would make them worse-off than 
any of the many would be if any other option were chosen, then we 
ought to override the rights of the many. (Regan 2004, 308) 
 
For example, again borrowing from Regan, consider a situation in which the 
options are harm A quite radically (-125) or harm a thousand modestly (-1 each).  
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The worse-off principle demands overriding the rights of the thousand (the many) 
even though doing so brings about a greater aggregate amount of harm than 
overriding the rights of A (the few) would bring about.  In contrast to the cases to 
which the miniride principle applies, the number of individuals affected does not 
matter in the cases to which the worse-off principle applies; what matters in these 
types of cases is the extent of the harm done to each individual affected. 
I want to emphasize the fact that according to Regan’s rights theory we are 
to appeal to the miniride principle when the harms are prima facie comparable 
and to the worse-off principle when the harms are not prima facie comparable.  
Again, if the harm a single individual will suffer is prima facie comparable to the 
harm any individual of a group will suffer, then we are to override the rights of 
the one.  On the other hand, if the harm a single individual will suffer is greater 
than any harm any one of a group will suffer, then we are to override the rights of 
the many.  So, when faced with a situation like the one noted above, Regan states: 
“It is the magnitude of the harm done to A and each individual member of the 
thousand not the sum of A’s harm compared with the sum of the thousands’, that 
determines whose right overrides whose” (Regan 2004, 309-310).   
Another point I want to call attention to is that according to Regan “prima 
facie comparable” means “equal”.   
To say that two individuals, M and N, have an equal right not to be 
harmed, based on the equal respect each is owed, does not imply 
that each and every harm either may suffer is equally harmful.  If 
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we are to show equal respect for the value and rights of 
individuals, therefore, we cannot count a lesser harm to N as equal 
to or greater than a greater harm to M.  To show equal respect for 
the equal rights of the two, one must count their equal harms 
equally, not their unequal harms equally, a requirement that entails, 
other things being equal in prevention cases, that M’s right 
override N’s when the harm done to M would be greater if one 
choice were made than the harm done to N would be if another 
option were chosen. (Regan 2004, 309) 
 
For example, imagine a case in which we must choose between harming A -125 
and harming B -124.  Because the harms A and B will suffer are not prima facie 
comparable, because the harm A will suffer is greater than the harm B will suffer, 
we ought to harm B.  Similarly, if we must choose between harming A -125 and 
harming the thousand not -1 each but rather -124 each, we ought to harm the 
thousand because the harm A will suffer is not prima facie comparable to the 
harm any of the thousand will suffer; it is greater.101 
 Regan thinks that individuals have certain rights, subject to certain 
qualifications, to do what is necessary to avoid being made worse-off relative to 
other innocents even if doing so involves harming other innocents.  These rights 
are defended by the liberty principle. 
Liberty Principle 
Provided that all those involved are treated with respect, and 
assuming that no special considerations obtain, an innocent 
                                                 
101
 In addition, as was noted above, adding numbers does not make a difference and so 
the aggregate harm done to the thousand does not count.  What matters is the harm done to each 
individual and the harm each individual in the thousand will suffer is less than the harm A will 
suffer.  Of course, one should see Regan 2004, 305-312 for a more thorough explanation and 
defense of these ideas. 
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individual has the right to act to avoid being made worse-off even 
if doing so harms other innocents. (Regan 2004, 331) 
 
Because all those involved must be treated with respect, I cannot, for example, 
torture my Introduction to Ethics students even if I would be made worse off 
relative to them if I were to forgo the pleasure of doing so.  To harm them in this 
way is to fail to treat them with the respect they are due as subjects of a life.  In 
addition, the types of special considerations Regan has in mind are rights other 
than the right not to be harmed, e.g., property rights.  For example, that I am 
worse off than my friends who own flats in both London and Brighton while I do 
not own a home at all does not mean that I can take possession of either or both of 
their flats.  In addition to our mutual right not to be harmed, they possess an 
additional property right which is the special consideration that limits my liberty, 
assuming they have themselves acquired their property justly.  However, if I am 
in a lifeboat with a dog and the lifeboat will only support one of us, I am 
permitted to throw the dog overboard.  This is because I am not failing to treat the 
dog with the respect he is due (I am not treating him as a receptacle of value or as 
replaceable) and the harm done to me by death is prima facie greater than the 
harm done to the dog.  My losses are greater as the opportunities for satisfaction 
that death forecloses for me are greater in number than those it forecloses for the 
dog (Regan 2004, 324).  Because my losses are greater, I would be made worse 
off relative to the dog if I were the one to be thrown overboard.  
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 It is important at this point to be clear about the types of things that should 
be taken into account as special considerations.  Regan claims that there are at 
least three different types of special considerations.  The first kind consists of 
acquired duties and rights which arise as a result of either voluntary agreements 
(e.g., promises or contracts, these include promises and contract-like agreements 
made with loved ones) or as a result of one’s voluntarily assuming a position 
within a given institutional structure (e.g., taking a job or joining the military) 
(Regan 2004, 322).  These claims are in addition to the basic moral rights shared 
by everyone.  They add to the strength of the claims of those who have acquired 
rights.  The second kind consists of those that arise from an individual voluntarily 
engaging in certain kinds of activities, including high-risk activities (e.g., 
mountain climbing or sky diving) and competitive activities (e.g., long-distance 
races or poker games) (Regan 2004, 322).  These considerations subtract from the 
strength of the claims made by those who partake in these activities.  Those who 
voluntarily choose to engage in high-risk activities place themselves outside the 
protections afforded by the rights theory principles.  The third kind consists of the 
historical background leading up to situations where we are called upon to decide 
whose right not to be harmed should be overridden (Regan 2004, 322).  The 
concern here is with individuals who are in a potentially harmful situation because 
others have violated their rights in the past.  Regan has us imagine an example in 
which a single individual is trapped inside a mine shaft after having been put there 
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by fifty miners who felt that they would benefit from her forced labor.  Assuming 
the harms the individuals face are prima facie comparable, in failing to respect the 
value of the single miner, the fifty miners have lost their right to coverage by the 
miniride principle.  So, those who are parties to injustices lose the protections of 
the rights theory principles. 
Regan makes clear that he is not claiming this list of special considerations 
is exhaustive.  However, there is at least one important consideration that Regan 
fails to address and it is with respect to the liberty principle.  Consider a situation 
in which my niece needs a leotard for her dance recital and that without the 
leotard she will not be permitted to perform.  Let us assume she needs the leotard 
the next day and that a talent agent will be attending the performance looking for 
possible clients.  If she does not perform all of her preparations go to waste and 
she will miss out on an opportunity to get an agent.  Imagine my niece goes to the 
dancewear store (the only one within driving distance) and a woman has just 
picked up the last leotard the store has in the style, size and color my niece needs.  
Imagine that the woman does not need the leotard in the same way my niece 
needs the leotard; that is, the woman, who is the same size as my niece, was just 
browsing and came upon the leotard and liked the style and color and decided to 
purchase it to wear to her dance class.  Clearly, my niece is made worse off if she 
is not permitted to purchase the leotard.  Yet, it seems odd to say that my niece 
has a right to the leotard.  Regan neither admits nor denies that one can have 
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special claims of this sort on objects.  It is cases like this, however, that illustrate 
the need for Regan’s list of special considerations to be more precise so that there 
is not uncertainty when we apply the liberty, miniride or worse-off principles. 
 In sum, those who possess inherent value, e.g., subjects of a life, have the 
basic moral right to respectful treatment.  In particular, they have a right not to be 
harmed.  In situations in which one’s options are harm few beings with inherent 
value or harm many beings with inherent value, one should choose to harm the 
few if the harms are prima facie comparable (equal).  In situations in which the 
harms are not prima facie comparable (equal) and one’s options are (1) harm few 
beings with inherent value significantly or (2) harm many beings with inherent 
value minimally, one must choose (2), to harm the many minimally.  In situations 
where an innocent individual would be made worse off if she fails to harm other 
innocents, she is permitted to harm the other innocents as long as there are no 
special considerations to be taken into account. 
 
4.2.2 Regan’s Rights for Animals 
 According to the rights theory as presented by Regan, all actions will be 
judged according to the respect principle, the harm principle, the miniride 
principle, the worse-off principle and the liberty principle.  Those with inherent 
value, the class of which includes subjects of a life, are covered by these 
principles.  According to Regan, the individuals that are in fact members of the 
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class of subjects of a life are “normal mammalian animals, aged one or more, as 
well as humans like these animals in the relevant respects” (Regan 2004, 247) 
where the relevant respects are those qualities listed in section 4.2.1: being alive 
and being conscious, but also having beliefs and desires; perceptions; memory 
and a sense of the future, including one’s own future; an emotional life together 
with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare interests; the ability to 
initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals; psychophysical identity over time; 
and individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for 
them logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently 
of their being the object of anyone else’s interests. 
 Regan argues that factory farming and many research practices (viz., those 
that involve subjects of a life) violate at least one of these five principles.102  This 
is because most factory farm and research animals are subjects of a life and so are 
covered by the five principles.  In cases where the status of these animals is in 
question, he says that the animals ought to be given the benefit of the doubt and 
be treated as subjects of a life.  Again, this is because being a subject of a life is 
merely a sufficient, not necessary, condition for having inherent value and thus 
being covered by the principles.  Also, as was noted above, Regan thinks that we 
are better safe than sorry when it comes to the recognition of moral rights and that 
                                                 
102
 Regan also thinks that hunting and trapping are morally wrong, but given that the 
primary concern of this dissertation is with factory farming and using animals for research I will 
not address hunting and trapping. 
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treating borderline cases with respect is necessary to ensure that we treat those 
who are clearly subjects of a life and possess inherent value with the respect they 
deserve.  So, the benefit of the doubt ought to go to chickens, turkeys, veal calves, 
mice, etc.   
 Given this, because the harms done to factory farm and research animals 
are prima facie greater than the harms that would occur to humans if we gave up 
these activities, we ought to stop factory farming and using animals for research.  
That is, Regan argues that although it might be the case that humans who 
currently enjoy factory farmed animal products would suffer the loss of 
gastronomical and culinary pleasures, convenience and economic stability (at 
least in the short term), the harms the animals experience, the pain and suffering 
and death, outweigh the harms the humans would suffer and so factory farming is 
morally wrong.  In other words, factory farming practices violate both the respect 
principle and the harm principle and they cannot be defended by the miniride 
principle, the worse-off principle or the liberty principle.  Factory farming 
practices therefore violate the rights of animals and are morally wrong.  However, 
the obligation to be vegetarian can be overridden in dire circumstances.  
According to the liberty principle, if an individual finds herself in a situation in 
which she must kill and consume an animal to survive, then she is so permitted 
(because if she does not, she will end up worse off than the animal).   
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 Similar conclusions are reached in the case of using animals for research: 
research practices violate the respect and harm principles and cannot be defended 
by the miniride principle, the worse-off principle or the liberty principle.  To use 
animals as research subjects is to fail to respect their inherent value.  It is to treat 
them as receptacles of value or as replaceable.  So, even if using animals as 
research subjects actually does result in significant benefits for humans, e.g., it 
results in medications or cures for human diseases which in turn improve the 
quality and length of human lives, it is morally wrong.  That humans might have 
to forgo new products or find other methods of testing products or that 
corporations might suffer economic losses or that humans may miss on out the 
benefits of research are not good enough reasons to violate the rights of animals.  
Therefore, Regan calls for the total abolition of animal research. 
 
4.2.3 Objections to Regan’s Animal Rights Argument 
As I did with the objections to Singer’s theory, I will briefly present some 
objections to Regan’s theory for which he does have satisfactory responses and 




 Two objections will be presented in this section.  The first I call the 
“supererogatory acts objection”.  According to this objection, the worse-off 
 190 
principle seems to imply that we have strict duties to do things that most think are 
supererogatory.  The second, which I call the “lifeboat objection”, states that 
Regan’s theory is not only speciesist, but that his claim that when faced with a 
situation in which one must choose whether to save a human or a dog one ought 
to save the human is in direct conflict with his own theory as killing the dog 
violates the rights of the dog.   
 
i. Supererogatory Acts Objection 
According to the supererogatory acts objection, the worse-off principle 
implies that we have strict duties to do things that most people think are 
supererogatory.  Regan interprets the objection as such: 
Suppose a race-car driver has been involved in a terrible accident 
and is certain to die if the available medical personnel are not used 
to save him.  Suppose that four other patients need the services of 
the personnel, that all could be adequately treated only if none of 
the staff is diverted to the driver, and that all four will be 
significantly harmed (e.g., one will lose an arm, a second will be 
partially paralyzed, etc.) though none will die, if efforts are made 
to save the driver.  Since the rights view will not allow aggregating 
harms of different individuals as a way of deciding what to do, one 
who accepts this view cannot claim that the four should be treated 
because of the sum of their harms would exceed the harm borne by 
the lone driver.  Indeed, since the worse-off principle directs us to 
prevent making the individual worse-off, special considerations 
aside, that principle, it might be claimed, requires that we override 
the rights of the four and administer to the needs of the driver, and 
that the four, recognizing the valid application of this principle in 
this case, ought to concur, agreeing to endure their respective 
harms so that the driver might be spared his. (Regan 2004, 321) 
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The problem is that because the driver will end up worse-off than any of the other 
patients, the other patients ought to agree that the driver will be given the 
attention of the medical personnel.  However, because the driver chose to engage 
in a dangerous and potentially harmful activity, it is not at all clear why the other 
patients, who it appears were innocent bystanders, ought to endure the harms 
facing them.  Although it might be courageous for the four patients to sacrifice 
their needs and endure harms so that the driver might be spared his, it is, most of 
us would agree, above and beyond the call of duty for them to do so; that is, it 
would be supererogatory for them to do so.  Yet, the worse-off principle seems to 
demand just this. 
 Regan’s response is that the objection fails to take into account the 
“special considerations aside” proviso incorporated into the worse-off principle 
(as it is in the miniride and liberty principles).  He argues that: 
[T]hose who voluntarily engage in high-risk behavior, including 
auto racing, obviously choose to expose themselves to certain risks 
that those who abstain from such activities choose to forgo, and it 
is part of the unspoken rules that apply to those embarked on such 
behavior that those who abstain cannot be reasonably required to 
suffer appreciable harm, in the name of justice, so that those who 
take additional risks might be rescued from their plight when the 
risk materializes. (Regan 2004, 321; original emphasis) 
 
The point is that those who engage in high-risk activities and find themselves in 
need of assistance waive their right not to be made worse off if the means used to 
save them would appreciably harm others who are not engaged in high-risk 
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behavior.  So, the high risk-taker does not have a valid claim, or a right, against 
the non-high-risk-takers.   
It is not just those who engage in physically dangerous activities who 
waive their right not to be made worse off than those who do not engage in such 
activities.  The special considerations proviso applies also to those who engage in 
other kinds of risky activities voluntarily.  For example, that someone chooses to 
take a financial risk by opening a business does not entail that the rest of us are 
obligated to support the business in order to ensure that it succeeds, even if our 
failing to do so leaves the entrepreneur worse off than we would be were we to 
support the business.  Likewise, that economic disaster would befall those who 
own or are financially involved in factory farming and other types of business that 
involve the use of animals does not entail that we are required to support these 
businesses, even if it were true that the economic disaster the entrepreneur would 
suffer would be worse than the pain and suffering any one animal suffers as a 
result of being a CAFO animal.  Such people voluntarily choose to participate in a 
high risk activity and so their rights not to be made worse-off are secondary to the 
rights of the animals, even by the standards of the worse-off principle.  We do not 
have a duty to support risk-takers in their activities.103   
                                                 
103
 I think the “special consideration” proviso is problematic, viz., it is not clear who gets 
to decide what and exactly when special considerations ought to be taken into account.  In 
addition, Regan admits that his account of special considerations is not complete (Regan 2004, 
323).  However, I do not think this is an overwhelming objection and have chosen to set it aside 
and not include it in the section which addresses unanswered objections. 
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 This is not to say that we cannot forgo our own rights in order to keep the 
risk-takers from being made worse-off.  The patients in the race-car driver 
example above can agree to forgo treatment in order to help the race-car driver, 
but they do not have a duty to do so.  Similarly, we can support the businesses of 
entrepreneurs if we so desire, but we are not obligated to do so.  Furthermore, 
given that the rights of the animals were violated in the first place, the CAFO 
owners have no claim on us to support them.  That is:  
If some of those involved are in their present predicament because 
other involved individuals have violated their basic rights in the 
past, then these past violations make a moral difference in the 
application of the miniride and worse-off principles … No one has 
a right to profit from violating the basic rights of others.  Those 
who are parties to such injustice lose the protection the miniride 
and worse-off principles provide and have no grounds to complain 
if we override their right not to be harmed and spare the victims of 
their past injustice. (Regan 2004, 322-323)   
 
 
ii. Life Boat Objection 
  Regan argues that in a lifeboat situation in which there are, for example, 
four normal adult humans and one dog and there is only room for four so 
someone must be thrown overboard, it is morally permissible to throw the dog 
overboard.  According to the life boat objection, throwing the dog overboard and 
saving the humans is not only speciesist, but it violates the basic rights of the 
animal and therefore is an action that seems to be in direct conflict with Regan’s 
own theory.  However, Regan claims that saving the dog and throwing any of the 
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human survivors over gives the dog more than his due.  It would be, he says, “to 
count the lesser harm done to the dog as equal to or greater than the greater harm 
that would be done to any of the humans if one of them was cast overboard” 
(Regan 2004, 324).  This is because, as was noted above in section 4.2.1, “the 
harm that death is, is a function of the opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses, 
and no reasonable person would deny that the death of any of the four humans 
would be a greater prima facie loss, and thus a greater prima facie harm, than 
would be true in the case of the dog” (Regan 2004, 324).  Choosing to throw the 
dog overboard does not conflict with recognizing the dog’s (equal) inherent value 
or its prima facie right not to be harmed.  It only has to do with the fact that in 
situations in which we must choose between harming one individual and harming 
another, we ought, according to the worse-off principle, to choose to harm the one 
who will suffer the lesser harm.  Given that any normal adult human thrown 
overboard would be made worse-off than the dog, we ought to throw the dog 
overboard.     
 In addition, he argues that even if there were a million dogs on board 
along with the four humans and the boat will only support four humans or a 
million dogs, it is morally acceptable to throw the million dogs overboard to save 
the four humans (Regan 2004, 325).  To reach a contrary judgment would be to 
involve one in an aggregative consideration which is not permissible according to 
rights theory.  Again, what matters is the harm that comes to each individual 
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involved.  Given that the death of each of the humans is a greater harm than the 
death of each of the dogs, the million dogs ought to be thrown overboard.  Such a 
decision is neither speciesist nor does it conflict with Regan’s rights view as the 
decision is based on “assessing the losses each individual faces and assessing 
these losses equitably, an approach that is at once consistent with and required by 
the recognition of the equal inherent value and the equal prima facie right not to 
be harmed possessed by all those involved” (Regan 2004, 325; original 
emphasis).  
 There is one point that I want to make clear.  The harm that death is for the 
normal human is greater than the harm that it is for the dog because, as was noted 
above, the opportunities for satisfaction were greater for the human while she was 
alive than they were for the dog.  Therefore, the human suffers greater losses by 
losing out on those opportunities than the dog does (as we would be hard pressed 
to say that the dog loses out on many of those opportunities).  In addition, it does 
not matter whether it is the lives of one normal human and one normal dog that 
are at stake, or whether it is the lives of one normal human and one thousand 
normal dogs that are at stake, or whether it is the lives of one thousand normal 
humans and one normal dog that are at stake.  However, were the human, or 
humans, to be severely mentally enfeebled or senile or something of the like, then 
it might be the case that it is in fact the human, or humans, that should be thrown 
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overboard and not the dog, or dogs, (as the dog’s losses might be greater and so 
the harm might be greater). 
 
Unanswered Objections 
 In this section I present two objections to Regan’s rights theory for which 
he does not have satisfactory responses.  The first I call the “unknown inherent 
value objection” according to which the failure of Regan’s theory to thoroughly 
classify those animals with inherent value and those without results in untoward 
consequences.  The second, which I call the “prohibition against aggregating 
harms objection”, states that it is a major problem with Regan’s theory that unless 
the harms individuals are subjected to are prima facie comparable, i.e., equal, we 
ought not take into account the number of individuals harmed when making moral 
decisions. 
 
i. Unknown Inherent Value Objection 
 Regan admits that his theory leaves uncertain the moral status of a 
significant number of beings.  Not only does the class of borderline cases include 
the likes of fetuses, newborn infants, insects, snakes, and spiders, but it also 
includes some animals about which Regan is very concerned, e.g., chickens, 
turkeys, veal calves, and mice.  As noted above, Regan thinks we ought to give 
the benefit of the doubt to such beings because we ought to err on the side of 
caution where moral rights are concerned and because doing so will help ensure 
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the proper attitudes and actions toward those who are clearly in the class of those 
with inherent value.  He says: 
When our ignorance is so great, and the possible moral price so 
large, it is not unreasonable to give these animals the benefit of the 
doubt, treating them as if they are subjects, due our respectful 
treatment, especially when doing so causes us no harm. (Regan 
2004, 367; original emphasis) 
 
Those who at the very least do not reject the fact that animals have a 
certain moral standing that needs to be respected will not object to this claim of 
Regan’s, even if they do not agree with his rights theory in particular.  The 
problem, however, is that treating those animals whose status is unclear as if they 
did have inherent value could in fact cause harm.  That is, it could interfere with 
scientists’ abilities to do research which could help save, prolong or improve the 
quality of life of any number of humans.  So, treating borderline case animals as 
individuals with inherent value may not directly cause harm (that is, doing so will 
not cause harm to the animals), but it could indirectly result in harm (that is, it 
could result in harm to those who would benefit from such research).  In other 
words, the opportunity cost is the loss of any benefits that those who certainly 
have inherent value are not receiving because Regan thinks it is better to be safe 
than sorry with respect to those whose status as possessors of inherent value is 
undetermined. 
In addition, erring on the side of caution could result in a violation of the 
worse-off principle.  First of all, not only do beings without inherent value not 
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have rights, but it is reasonable to think that the harms they suffer are generally 
not as great as the harms those with inherent value suffer, if in fact those without 
inherent value can be harmed at all.  Also, although I have taken the stance 
throughout this dissertation that most uses of animals for research are useless, this 
is not to say that all animal experimentation is futile.  If both of these statements 
are true, the harms suffered by those without inherent value who are used as 
research subjects would not be prima facie comparable to those suffered by those 
with inherent value who would be beneficiaries of the research.  In other words, 
those with inherent value would be worse-off if the research is not performed on 
those without inherent value, thus violating the worse-off principle.  Therefore, 
Regan’s command that we err on the side of caution and not use any animals for 
research not only forces us to respect the rights of those who might not even 
possess them, but could also result in our violating the worse-off principle and as 
a result doing something morally wrong.  
 
ii. Prohibition Against Aggregating Harms Objection 
A second significant problem with Regan’s theory is that the number of 
individuals harmed does not matter unless the harms are prima facie comparable, 
i.e., equal.  For example, if we must choose between harming A -125 and harming 
a thousand -125 each, then according to the miniride principle we are to harm A.  
On the other hand, in an example above we imagined a situation in which we had 
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to choose between harming A -125 and harming a thousand -124 each.  According 
to Regan, the worse-off principle demands that we harm the thousand -124 each 
because the harm A will suffer is greater than the harm any of the thousand will 
suffer; the harms each individual suffers are not prima facie comparable because 
they are not equal. 
It might be argued that the harms are in fact prima facie comparable as a 
harm that is -125 is not significantly different than a harm that is -124, even 
though they are not in fact equal, and that Regan needs to reconsider his position 
regarding what is and what is not prima facie comparable.  Although I do think 
that Regan ought to address this concern, I do not think it is an overwhelming 
problem.  The more troublesome problem for Regan is that when we aggregate 
the harms to be suffered in this example, the overall harm suffered is greater if we 
harm the thousand than if we harm the one, but Regan is adamant that we are not 
to aggregate the harms.  So, regardless of whether the harm A is to suffer is -125 
and the harm the thousand is to suffer is -1 each or -124 each, the overall harm 
done is greater if the thousand are harmed than if the one is harmed.  It seems that 
we ought to at the very least have the option of saving the thousand given that the 
overall harm done is greater if we save the one.  Yet, again, according to the 
worse-off principle we are forbidden from aggregating: it is morally wrong to 
override the rights of the one in favor of the rights of the many in situations in 
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which the harms are not prima facie comparable, i.e., equal, and the harms the 
one or few will suffer are greater than the harms each of the many will suffer. 
Two things come to mind here.  Firstly, I want to make clear that we need 
not think that aggregating harms ought to be required to think that there is 
something unsettling about the fact that aggregating them is not even permitted 
when the harms are not prima facie comparable according to Regan’s rights 
theory.  That Regan forbids aggregating the harms of the many in circumstances 
in which the harm each individual of the many suffers is less than the harm a 
single individual suffers even though the overall harm suffered is greater if the 
many are harmed is enough to motivate my objection.  Secondly, Regan could 
save himself from this problematic implication, that greater overall harm be 
permitted, if he was not so committed to idea that prima facie comparable harms 
are harms that are equal.  If Regan allowed for harms that are similar, but not 
equal, to be prima facie comparable, then he would not suffer the problem his 
prohibition against aggregating brings when, for example, the harm to the one is -
125 and the harm to each of the many is -124.  Although this will not save him 
from concerns that the prohibition against aggregating harms will bring when the 
harms are significantly different, say -125 for the individual and -1 for each of the 
many, Regan’s demand that prima facie comparable harms be harms that are 
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equal causes him to not only fall victim to the objection, but it prevents him from 
being able to respond to it in any way.104 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 Singer’s preference utilitarianism and Regan’s rights theory both demand 
that we stop all factory farming.  In addition, while according to Regan’s rights 
theory we must give up all research using animals, according to Singer’s 
preference utilitarianism we must stop using animals for most, but not all, 
research.  These conclusions are those with which most anyone concerned about 
the current treatment of animals, and in particular the treatment of CAFO and 
research animals, would be pleased, at the very least.   
The problem is that both theories fail to give satisfactory responses to 
important objections which leaves us unconvinced that either one is the best 
animal ethic available.  The objection for which Singer does not have a 
satisfactory response is the “moral standing objection”.  According to this 
objection, Singer’s preference utilitarianism has a number of problems concerning 
the moral standing of sentient beings.  In particular, even though Singer claims 
that the moral standing of sentient beings is superior to that of non-sentient 
                                                 
104
 One need not embrace aggregation to the extent that utilitarians do to think that there 
is something disconcerting and counterintuitive about this aspect of Regan’s theory.  That we are 
forbidden from aggregating the harms and then acting accordingly is something that not only will 
a utilitarian object to, but we can imagine that social contract theorists as well as some Kantians 
will allow for the saving of the many rather than the one or the few.  Most notably, as I discuss in 
chapter 5, normative sentimentalism allows for the harming of the one or the few instead of the 
many in situations like that presented above.  
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beings, his preference utilitarianism does not go far enough in protecting sentient 
beings against certain types of actions, viz., it does not offer them enough 
protection against killing.  
Regan leaves two significant objections unanswered.  The first is the 
“unknown inherent value objection” according to which it is not a virtue of the 
rights theory, but rather a problem for it (because of the opportunity cost) that we 
do not know how far down the line is drawn with respect to which animals 
possess inherent value and which do not.  The second is the “prohibition against 
aggregating harms objection” according to which a failure of the rights theory is 
its permitting the harming of a group of individuals (the many) rather than to a 
single individual (or to the few) if the harms each individual in the group will face 
are less than that which the single individual will face even though the overall 
amount of harm will be greater. 
While I have already shown that normative sentimentalism reaches 
conclusions that are in accord with our considered judgments regarding the 
treatment of CAFO and research animals, in the next chapter I show how 
normative sentimentalism is able to respond to the objections, both those that are 
answered satisfactorily as well as those that are not answered satisfactorily, to 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism and Regan’s rights theory thereby showing that 
it is the superior animal ethic.  In addition, in order to allay possible concerns 
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about normative sentimentalism, I show how it satisfactorily responds to some 
criticisms that are specific to it. 
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Chapter 5: Criticisms and Responses 
 
 
 In this chapter, I first show how normative sentimentalism responds to the 
objections, both those that are answered satisfactorily and those that are not, to 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism and Regan’s rights theory.  I then address 
possible objections to the normative sentimentalist ethic itself.  I do all of this to 
demonstrate not only that normative sentimentalism is superior to both preference 
utilitarianism and rights theory, especially when it comes to animal ethics, but 
also to help demonstrate that normative sentimentalism ought to be our moral 
theory of choice. 
 
5.1 Normative Sentimentalist Responses to Objections to Preference 
Utilitarianism 
 
 In this section, I show how normative sentimentalism is able to answer the 
objections that preference utilitarianism answers satisfactorily (the speciesism 
objection, the natural predator objection, the animal interests objection and the 
preference satisfaction objection) and the one that it cannot answer satisfactorily 
(the moral standing objection). 
 
5.1.1 Normative Sentimentalist Responses to Answered Objections 
i. Speciesism Objection 
 Recall that according to the speciesism objection, we can treat animals any 
way we please because they are a different species.  Recall also that Singer’s 
 205 
response to this is that to distinguish between humans and animals in this way is 
speciesist and thus wrong.  The morally relevant quality, he says, is the capacity 
for pain and suffering and because animals can feel pain and suffer it is not 
morally acceptable to treat them in any way we like even though they are a 
different species. 
Normative sentimentalism agrees with preference utilitarianism that 
speciesism is wrong.  However, it holds this for a similar, but slightly different 
reason.  That is, according to normative sentimentalism a moral agent’s causing, 
contributing to or allowing the harm of a being is at the very least disliked and if 
causing, contributing to or allowing the harm is a result of a motive that is 
disapproved of then such an action will be morally wrong.  The morality of an 
action does not depend on a being’s species.  What matters is whether and in what 
ways the being can be harmed.  Given that most animals can be harmed (see 
chapter 3), normative sentimentalism, like preference utilitarianism, rejects the 
idea that because animals are a different species it is morally acceptable to treat 
them in any way we like (thus it rejects speciesism).105  
 
                                                 
105
 This is not to say, of course, that according to normative sentimentalism animals can 
never be used for human purposes.  As was discussed in chapter 3, if we have to choose between 
giving greater consideration to the more significant interests of the human or to the less significant 
interests of the animal, or if we are in a life and death situation and have to choose between our 
own life or the life of an animal, then it is morally acceptable to harm or kill the animal.  
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ii. Natural Predator Objection 
 
 According to the natural predator objection, animals kill other animals for 
food so it is acceptable for us to kill animals for food.  Singer’s response was that 
not only is it odd for humans to look to animals for moral guidance when we often 
think of ourselves as superior to them, but we cannot evade our responsibility by 
imitating the actions of those who are incapable of making certain kinds of 
choices, viz., moral choices.   
Although normative sentimentalism allows for the killing of an animal for 
survival (as would preference utilitarianism if greater overall preference 
satisfaction would occur by doing so), the circumstances must be dire, viz., when 
the moral agent’s life is in danger and the only way to save it is for her to kill and 
eat the animal (as we saw in chapter 3).  Normative sentimentalism does not 
permit the killing of animals to satisfy trivial interests such as gastronomical 
pleasure.  By taking the lives of animals for the gastronomical pleasure of moral 
agents, the moral agent does not give due consideration to the relevant interests of 
the animals.  To kill animals for these reasons is to give greater consideration to 
the less significant interests of the humans than to the more significant interests of 
the animals.  Such motives are disapproved of and the consequences disliked by 
the impartial spectator (and so the actions are morally wrong).  So, that there are 
situations in which it is morally acceptable to kill an animal for food is a 
conclusion that is not reached by looking to other animals for moral guidance.  It 
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is reached by looking at the motive behind the action and the consequences of the 
action.  So, although humans might consume animals to survive, as do other 
animals, it is not because humans are following the lead of animals. 
However, even if we want to look to other animals for moral guidance, we 
could not use this to defend our current treatment of many animals.  That is, 
animals do not harm or kill other animals for gastronomical pleasure or for 
entertainment or for useless research.  If we really were to follow the lead of 
animals, we would harm or kill other animals only if they were threatening our 
survival or if we needed to consume them to survive.106  
 
iii. Animal Interests Objection 
 According to the animal interests objection, not only does the lower 
intelligence of animals entail that their interests be given less consideration than 
the interests of humans, but humans in general have greater interests than animals 
and thus their interests deserve greater consideration.  Singer’s response to this is 
that there are many humans who have lower intelligence than many other humans 
and so if we are going to make moral decisions based on intelligence, then we 
ought to be using lower intelligence humans much the same way we are using 
animals.  Further, he does not deny that (most) humans have greater interests than 
                                                 
106
 Admittedly, some animals kill other animals for other reasons, e.g., in order to become 
the leader of the group.  However, the main point I am trying to make is that if we based our 
actions on those of other animals, we would not be killing animals for trivial or useless research or 
for gastronomical pleasure as no other species of animal does so. 
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(most) animals.  Rather, he argues, for example, that those interests do not entail 
that factory farming and using animals for research are morally acceptable.  That 
is, although it is morally acceptable in most cases to choose the life of a normal 
adult human over that of an animal, this does not mean that we can fail to give 
consideration to the interests of animals in our daily activities.   
 The normative sentimentalist agrees with this conclusion of the preference 
utilitarian, but for different reasons.  If a moral agent harms a moral agent or 
moral patient as a result of a selfish motive then she has done something morally 
wrong.  This is because, in part, the moral agent did not give due consideration to 
the relevant interests of the moral agent or moral patient upon whom she acted.  
What matters is not what type of being the moral agent or moral patient is or what 
her level of intelligence is; what matters is whether the victim is harmed and 
whether her relevant interests were given due consideration.  For example, given 
that the interests of factory farm animals and research animals are (for the most 
part) not given due consideration and the animals are subsequently harmed, 
causing, contributing to or allowing such harm is morally wrong.   
Like the preference utilitarian, the normative sentimentalist is not saying 
that some human interests are not greater than some animal interests.  The 
normative sentimentalist is merely saying that not all human interests outweigh all 
animal interests.  Again, if a moral agent is in a situation in which she must kill an 
animal or die herself, then she is morally permitted to kill the animal.  However, if 
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she is in a situation in which she must choose between a vegan meal and a meal 
that contains factory farmed products and we assume that the meals are 
nutritionally equivalent but the factory farmed meal is better tasting, it is morally 
wrong for her to choose to eat the factory farmed dinner.  In this case, the interest 
of the moral agent, viz., her interest in experiencing gastronomical pleasure, is not 
as significant as the relevant interests of the animals, viz., their interest in not 
being tortured and being able to continue to live.  So, although there are times 
when it is not morally wrong to give greater consideration to human interests than 
to animal interests, there are times when it is in fact wrong to do so. 
  
iv. Preference Satisfaction Objection 
 According to the preference satisfaction objection, the net amount of 
preference satisfaction brought about by factory farming (e.g., satisfying the 
preference for gastronomical pleasure) and using animals for research (e.g., 
satisfying the preference for the improved quality and lengthening of human life) 
outweighs the lack of preference satisfaction (e.g., the preference for avoiding 
pain and suffering) which the animals experience.  Singer rejects this claim 
stating that the pain and suffering of the CAFO animals far outweighs the 
gastronomical pleasure of those who consume them.  In addition, he argues that 
most research done on animals is useless and as a result the pain and suffering of 
the animals is not outweighed by the benefits of the research.  Therefore, because 
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preference satisfaction is not maximized when animals are factory farmed or 
when they are used for research, these actions are morally wrong.  
 As was shown in chapter 3, the normative sentimentalist agrees with this, 
although she is not concerned with maximizing preference satisfaction.  
Regardless of whether an act maximizes preference satisfaction, it is morally 
wrong if the motive is disapproved of and any consequence of the action is 
disliked.  Because most moral agents do not need to consume animals to survive 
(especially CAFO animals), because the human interest in gastronomical pleasure 
is less significant than the animals’ interest in avoiding pain and suffering, and 
because most research using animals is of little to no benefit to humans or actually 
harms them, moral agents are (usually) acting from selfishness when they use 
animals in these ways.107  And, because using animals in these ways causes harm 
to the animals, it is morally wrong to cause, contribute to or allow these actions.  
So, although the normative sentimentalist is not concerned with maximizing 
preference satisfaction, she does agree with the preference utilitarian that these 
practices are morally wrong.   
 
5.1.2 Normative Sentimentalist Response to the Unanswered Objection:  
The Moral Standing Objection 
 
 In this section, I present the normative sentimentalist response to the moral 
standing objection to preference utilitarianism.  According to this objection, 
                                                 
107
 Recall that there might be times when scientists are not acting from selfishness (see 
section 3.2.2). 
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although preference utilitarianism grants sentient beings considerable moral 
standing, it does not go far enough in protecting them against certain types of 
actions, viz., it does not offer them enough protection against being killed. 
 
a. Moral Standing of Persons 
 
 According to this aspect of the objection, it is problematic that according 
to Singer’s view it is only prima facie wrong to kill persons because a person’s 
preferences can be outweighed by the preferences of other persons and of merely 
conscious beings.  This means that it is not only morally acceptable, but it is 
morally required that persons be killed in certain situations.  For example, we are 
required to kill a single healthy person for her organs if doing so will save the 
lives of several others.  Similarly, if we are in a situation in which we have to 
choose between killing one hundred chickens or a 95-year-old adult, we are 
required to kill the 95-year-old adult as the aggregated preferences of the chickens 
outweigh those of the adult.  In both examples, preference satisfaction is 
maximized by killing the single person.  However, requiring these actions in order 
to maximize preference satisfaction is unacceptable to many. 
 According to normative sentimentalism, actions that are morally wrong 
are those committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent who is 
acting from a motive that is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and results 
in any consequence that is disliked by the impartial spectator.  In the cases 
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presented, a moral agent does nothing morally wrong regardless of which choice 
she makes. Whereas preference utilitarianism requires us to choose to save the 
many rather than the one, normative sentimentalism permits the agent to save 
either the one or the many in situations in which the relevant interests of those 
involved are equivalent.108  When a moral agent is faced with a situation in which 
the interests of those affected are equally relevant, she does nothing morally 
wrong by choosing to save the one or the many even though the consequences of 
her action will be disliked either way.  This is because her motive will not be 
disapproved of as long as she is not acting from selfishness.  Again, if she is 
giving due consideration to the relevant interests of the members of both parties, 
then she can give greater consideration to whichever party she wishes for some 
other reason.  So, according to both normative sentimentalism and preference 
utilitarianism, killing the one to save the five in the transplant case is not, on the 
face of it, morally wrong.  However, normative sentimentalism will not require it, 
as preference utilitarianism does.  In this way, it avoids one of the major 
objections to preference utilitarianism.   
 To be clear, it is only in cases in which the interests of those involved are 
equivalent that choosing either one or the many is morally acceptable.  In cases in 
which the interests of the many are less significant than those of the one, then 
                                                 
108
 Recall that to say the interests of those affected are equivalent is to say that they are in 
fact identical, or that they are similar enough to be identified as equivalent, or that the less 
significant interests of the many are, when aggregated, equivalent to the more significant interests 
of the one (see section 1.2.1). 
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choosing the interests of the many over the interests of the few is not morally 
acceptable.  In other words, according to normative sentimentalism, the less 
significant or trivial interests of the many do not outweigh the more significant 
interests of the one even when the interests of the many are aggregated.  Thus, in 
addition to the fact that normative sentimentalism does not require us to aggregate 
in situations in which the interests of those affected are equivalent, it actually 
forbids us from doing so when the interests of the one are more significant than 
those each of the many.   
 With respect to the example involving the chickens and the 95-year-old, 
on the face of it the normative sentimentalist conclusion will be similar to its 
conclusion regarding the transplant case: that killing either chickens or the 95-
year-old is morally acceptable.  This is because I am imagining a state of affairs in 
which the mental capacities of the 95-year-old are so compromised that her 
interests are equivalent to those of the chickens.  In situations in which this is not 
the case and the interests of the 95-year-old are more significant than those of the 
chickens, then certainly the chickens should be sacrificed.  In situations in which 
the interests of the chickens are more significant than those of the 95-year-old, 
then the 95-year-old ought to be sacrificed. 
Now, it may be argued that morally permitting the one to be killed for the 
sake of the five and killing the chickens rather than the 95-year-old are 
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counterintuitive and unsettling conclusions.  I will further defend this aspect of 
normative sentimentalism in section 5.3. 
 
b. Moral Standing of Merely Conscious Beings 
 As was the case with persons, Singer thinks that it is prima facie morally 
wrong to take the lives of merely conscious beings.  However, as was noted in 
section 4.2.3, it is required of us, according to preference utilitarianism, to take 
the lives of some humans, those that are not persons, to save the lives of other 
humans, those that are persons.  The class of humans that consists of merely 
conscious beings, those that are not persons, includes the mentally enfeebled and 
newborns.  In addition, we are required to take the lives of non-person humans to 
save the lives of animals that are persons.  Also, Singer thinks that merely 
conscious beings are replaceable and so we can take as many of their lives as we 
choose as long as we replace them with beings that will have equally pleasant 
lives.  As was noted in section 4.1.3, these conclusions are unsatisfactory. 
 Normative sentimentalism steers clear of these concerns.  According to 
normative sentimentalism, not only are we not required to kill moral agents or 
patients (humans and most animals), but doing so is morally wrong if the motive 
is disapproved of.  As explained above, it may be morally permissible to kill 
moral agents or moral patients for the sake of others, but it is not required.  This 
position of normative sentimentalism avoids the very objectionable position of 
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preference utilitarianism that we are required to kill the mentally enfeebled and 
infants for the sake of normal adult humans and some animals.   
Furthermore, normative sentimentalism does not think of any being that 
can be harmed as merely replaceable.  Because one of the primary concerns of the 
normative sentimentalist is the harming of a being, any action that that does so 
will be disliked, even if the individual that is harmed (killed) is replaced by 
another who will live an equally pleasant life.  Additionally, if harming the 
individual is done for selfish reasons it will be morally wrong.  Therefore, unlike 
the preference utilitarian, the normative sentimentalist does not think merely 
conscious beings are replaceable which means that unlike the preference 
utilitarian she does not think that some humans, e.g., the mentally enfeebled and 
infants, are replaceable. 
 
5.2 Normative Sentimentalist Responses to Objections to Rights Theory 
In this section, I show how normative sentimentalism is able to answer the 
objection that rights theory answers satisfactorily (the lifeboat objection) and 
those that it cannot answer satisfactorily (the unknown inherent value objection 
and the failure to aggregate objection).  I will not address the supererogatory acts 
objection because the aspect of Regan’s theory to which the objection is posed is 
specific to Regan’s theory (i.e., that the worse-off principle seems to demand that 
people commit supererogatory acts).  Because this is not a component of 
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normative sentimentalism, it is superfluous to try to create something comparable 
in it only to show how normative sentimentalism is able to counter it.   
 
5.2.1 Normative Sentimentalist Responses to Answered Objection: Lifeboat 
Objection 
 
 According to the lifeboat objection, when faced with a situation in which 
one must choose whether to throw a dog or a human overboard, Regan’s rights 
theory commands that we throw the dog overboard and this is speciesist.  Regan’s 
response is that it is not speciesist to throw the dog overboard because the harms 
the dog suffers as a result of its death are less than those a human suffers as a 
result of her death.  Therefore, according to the worse-off principle, we ought to 
throw the dog overboard.  However, it is not wrong for a human to offer to be 
thrown overboard if she wishes to do so; it is supererogatory for her to do so. 
 The normative sentimentalist position with respect to the lifeboat case is 
that it is not necessarily morally wrong to throw over either the dog or the human.  
As long as the interests of the dog and human are equally relevant and as long as 
due consideration is given to the interests of both, then those making the decision 
do nothing wrong by harming one or the other (although the action will be 
disliked).  So, we can imagine a situation in which the moral agents choose to 
throw the dog over and this would not be morally wrong, viz., all the humans and 
the dog are healthy and the relevant interests of the humans are at the very least 
equivalent to those of the dog.   
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However, we can also imagine a situation in which the human is thrown 
over, e.g., the dog is a healthy guide dog but one of the humans is a 100-year-old 
severely mentally enfeebled invalid with no friends or family, and this is not 
morally wrong because the interests of the dog are at the very least equivalent to 
those of the 100-year-old.  Thus, although the consequences are disliked, the 
motive is not disapproved of.  Even in a case in which the relevant interests of the 
dog and the human are equivalent, it is not necessarily wrong to throw the human 
overboard.  Again, when the relevant interests are equivalent and are given due 
consideration, one is not acting from selfishness by choosing one over the other, 
regardless of the reason.109   
 
5.2.2 Normative Sentimentalist Responses to Unanswered Objections 
i. Unknown Inherent Value Objection 
 According to this objection, Regan’s theory results in untoward 
consequences because it fails to thoroughly classify those animals with inherent 
value (and those without).  This failure could result in an opportunity cost of the 
loss of any potential benefits that those who certainly have inherent value are not 
receiving because Regan thinks it is better safe than sorry with respect to those 
who are borderline cases, viz., research animals.  
                                                 
109
 This is because one acts from selfishness only when one fails to give due 
consideration to the relevant interests of the moral agents or patients who might be affected by the 
consequences that are a result of the motive (see section 1.2.1). 
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 Normative sentimentalism is immune to this objection.  It allows for 
research as long as the researchers are very certain that their research will have 
useful results, e.g., it results in new drugs to save human lives.110  So, because the 
interests of the humans the research can help are at the very least equivalent to the 
interests of the animals that would be used in the research and the researchers are 
giving both due consideration, the motives will not be disapproved of (although 
some of the consequences will be disliked) and so the actions of those performing 
the research will not be morally wrong. 
 At this point it might be argued that normative sentimentalism still results 
in an unacceptable opportunity cost when it comes to using animals for research.  
In other words, a critic might argue that if the certainty of a scientist with respect 
to the usefulness of the research is just shy of what is acceptable, but the 
experiment will in fact help humans in significant ways, then by forbidding the 
research we miss out on the benefits that would have been gained by permitting it.  
There are two things to be said here.  The first is that although this is entirely 
possible, it is not probable.  That is, with recent scientific advancements it is 
unlikely that imposing such a standard will cause a significant loss in benefits to 
humans because there are other research methods that can be employed and 
because there are good reasons to believe that most research using animals as 
subjects is not as beneficial to humans as previously believed (see section 
                                                 
110
 This was defended in section 3.2.2. 
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3.2.2).111  Secondly, if there is a loss suffered because of the standard, it will be 
less than what would be suffered if scientists were to abide by Regan’s rights 
theory mandate against all uses of animals as research subjects.  Thus, normative 
sentimentalism is still on better ground than Regan’s theory in this regard. 
 Additionally, normative sentimentalism does not suffer from the 
difficulties in classifying beings in the way that Regan’s rights theory does.  Of 
course, the normative sentimentalist still must classify beings into two categories 
– those that can be harmed and those that cannot be harmed.  However, making 
determinations of this kind are much easier than determining whether or not a 
being possesses inherent value if it is not in fact a subject of a life.  This is in part 
because Regan does not give us any criteria for being a possessor of inherent 
value if one is not a subject of a life.  This is also due to the fact that it is much 
easier to determine whether or not a being can be harmed than it is to determine 
whether a being has inherent value (even if it is a subject of a life).  As Singer 
noted, we can be sure at this time that mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and crustacea 
all feel pain and thus suffer regardless of their age; and if a being can feel pain 
and suffer, then it can be harmed.  Contrary to what is the case for Regan’s rights 
theory, the only animals whose status is up for debate in the normative 
sentimentalist taxonomy are animals like insects, worms, clams, sponges, and 
echinoderms (e.g., starfish). 
                                                 
111
 Of course, Regan could also use this as a defense. 
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ii. Prohibition Against Aggregating Harms Objection 
 According to Regan, unless the harms to be suffered by the individuals 
involved are prima facie comparable, in other words equal, we are not to take into 
consideration the number of individuals that will be affected.  So, if the harm that 
a single individual will suffer is greater than the harm any member of a large 
group will suffer, we ought to harm the group, even if the total amount of harm 
will be greater than if we choose to harm the individual.  The problem is that even 
if the harms each member of the group will suffer are only slightly less than the 
harm the individual will suffer, we are still to harm the members of the group.   
 Normative sentimentalism avoids this problem insofar as it does not 
demand that we subject the group to harm, although it does not demand that we 
subject the individual to harm either.  That is, if the moral agent who must make 
the decision is acting from a motive that is not disapproved of (she is not acting 
from selfishness), then regardless of whether she chooses to save the one or the 
group, she will not be doing anything morally wrong (although the consequence 
of her action will be disliked).  In an example above we imagined a situation in 
which we had to choose between harming a single individual -125 or harming 
each member of a group of a thousand -124 each.  According to Regan’s worse-
off principle, we are obligated to harm the thousand. (Singer’s preference 
utilitarianism would probably demand we harm the individual.)  According to 
normative sentimentalism, we do nothing wrong if we choose to harm the one (or 
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the few) or if we choose to harm the thousand (or the many) as the harms those 
involved will suffer are for all intents and purposes equivalent.  Therefore, 
whereas Regan’s conclusion that we are obligated to harm the thousand is 
disconcerting and counterintuitive to many, the normative sentimentalist’s 
conclusion that we do nothing morally wrong by saving either the individual or 
the group accommodates those who want to aggregate the amount of harm 
suffered while also accommodating those who think we ought not aggregate.   
 
5.3 Normative Sentimentalist Responses to Possible Objections 
 In this section, I address three objections a critic might have to the 
normative sentimentalist ethic itself.  I first consider the fact that some might 
think that taking the life of another in order to preserve one’s own life is actually 
selfish, contrary to what I have stated above.  I then discuss any worries that 
might arise regarding the fact that normative sentimentalism does not require 
individuals to aggregate the consequences of actions in order to determine which 
action is the morally correct choice.  Finally, I further defend the idea that there 
are times animals can be used for food and research. 
 
5.3.1 Self Preservation  
One aspect of the theory that some might call into question is the fact that 
acting to preserve oneself is not selfish in any situation.  That is, there might be 
those who think that when individuals find themselves in a situation in which 
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their lives are at stake, they are morally obligated to refrain from taking the life of 
another even if it means their own death.  Although I have not distinguished 
between those actions that are morally acceptable and that we have positive 
reasons to perform and those that are morally acceptable but that we do not have 
positive reasons to perform and those that are supererogatory according to 
normative sentimentalism, I cannot think of a single good reason to hold that an 
individual ought to be required to sacrifice her own life in any situation.  For 
example, normative sentimentalism sees no morally relevant difference between 
the lifeboat case and the transplant case.  That is, imagine a situation in which two 
people are in a lifeboat but the lifeboat will only hold one and the individuals and 
their lives are similar.  Most, including the normative sentimentalist, would agree 
that all things being equal it is not morally wrong for one individual to throw the 
other overboard to save her own life.112  For the normative sentimentalist, this is 
because although a consequence of her action will be disliked as her action results 
in the death (harm) of the other, her motive will not be disapproved of because 
she was not motivated by selfishness (again, because she is acting from self-
preservation).  Now, imagine a situation in which one person needs a heart 
transplant or she will die.  Imagine that she knows of an otherwise innocent 
bystander who is a perfect match and whose life is very similar to her own.  
According to normative sentimentalism, it is not morally wrong for the sick 
                                                 
112
 The exception would be the Kantian who, given the constraints of her theory, would 
struggle to give us a useful directive in this situation. 
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person to take the life of the healthy person.  In contrast to the lifeboat case, many 
reject this conclusion.  This might be because in the lifeboat case, if one of the 
two people is not killed, both will die, whereas in the transplant case only one 
individual stands to lose her life (at least in the immediate future as far as we 
know).  Or, it might be because in the lifeboat case one is not using the other as a 
means to an end whereas in the transplant case the sick person is using the healthy 
person as a means to her end.113   
Although the cases are different in these ways, I do not think the 
differences are morally relevant differences.  With respect to the first difference, I 
fail to share the utilitarian intuition that the reason it is morally acceptable for one 
of the members of the lifeboat to kill the other is so fewer people will lose their 
lives.  As I have made clear throughout this dissertation, it is not just the 
consequences that need to be taken into account when making moral decisions 
and judgments.  In particular, it is not just the maximization of good 
consequences that ought to be the sole determining factor in moral decision-
making and judging.   
With respect to the second difference, I do not share the rights theorist’s 
intuition that individuals with inherent value deserve a certain kind of respect.  
Similarly, I do not share the Kantian’s intuition that the autonomy of certain 
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 That is, in the lifeboat case neither individual needs the other.  Each would be 
contented if the other had never existed or disappeared.  This is not the case with the sick person in 
the transplant case.  She would not be contented if the healthy person had never existed or 
disappeared because she needs her for her own survival. 
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individuals, namely persons, ought never be disregarded.  I have shown 
throughout this dissertation that a moral agent’s motive is morally relevant.  
However, an individual can treat another as a means to an end, according to 
normative sentimentalism, as long as due consideration has been given to the 
relevant interests of all those involved.  If one individual’s interests are more 
significant than another’s and satisfying those interests involves treating the other 
as a means, then this is morally acceptable.  If the interests of each are equally 
significant, then one can base her decision on some other factor even if it results 
in one of the individuals being treated as a means.   
That it is morally acceptable to treat others as means is especially true in 
the case of self-preservation.  As I have noted throughout this dissertation, to act 
from self-preservation is to never act from a selfish motive, even if doing so 
causes an individual to treat another as a means to her own end.  Furthermore, 
there is nothing morally wrong with treating another as a means if none of the 
consequences is disliked.  This is not to say that we want to encourage individuals 
to treat others as merely means in these types of situations.  There may be other 
good reasons that we want to discourage this, e.g., it does not foster the type of 
attitudes that are good for society.  The point is just that an action is not morally 
wrong merely in virtue of the fact that an individual has been treated as a means 
to another’s end.  
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This is also not to say that we want to encourage the killing of innocent 
healthy people to save sick people.  In fact, it might be the case that we actually 
want to discourage it as we do with other types of actions that are not inherently 
morally wrong, e.g., speeding, recreational drug use, etc.114  Failure to discourage 
the killing of the healthy to save the sick could cause healthy people to live in a 
state of fear and this is something that would take away from the quality of 
people’s lives.  Or, allowing such actions could result in a very unstable society.  
However, I reiterate that committing such an action is not morally wrong.  Again, 
according to normative sentimentalism, acting from self-preservation is never 
selfish, although it might result in a consequence that is disliked.  Likewise, 
helping to save a person’s life is not morally wrong even if in doing so one has to 
cause, contribute to, or allow the death of another.  Again, if the interests of all 
involved are equally relevant, then choosing one over the other for some other 
reason is not selfish. 
It might now be argued that self-preservation ought to be moderated, as 
the passions ought to be when they are too strong.  Although I did say in chapter 
1, and have reiterated above, that the purpose of the impartial spectator is to make 
sure that moral judgments are not based on passions that are too high (or too low), 
I do not think that self-preservation can be or ought to be moderated.  Every living 
                                                 
114
 I say they are not inherently morally wrong because it might be argued that these 
actions are wrong insofar as one is breaking the law when engaging in them and this might be 
morally wrong.  However, independently of breaking the law, there is nothing morally wrong with 
these actions. 
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thing strives toward life.  It is contrary to nature at its most basic level to think 
that living things ought to be required to sacrifice their lives for the sake of other 
living things.  Again, this is not to say that an individual does anything morally 
wrong by sacrificing her own life for the sake of another, but failing to do so is 
not morally wrong. 
 
5.3.2 Aggregating Consequences 
Another concern with normative sentimentalism might be with the fact 
that it does not require the aggregating of consequences.  However, what is 
attractive about normative sentimentalism is that not only does it not require an 
individual to aggregate the consequences before making a moral decision, it does 
not forbid her from doing so either.  Recall that when it comes to consequences, 
what matters to the normative sentimentalist is whether an action results in any 
harmful consequences.  So, in an example discussed in chapter 3, if one must 
choose between a single individual losing her life and a hundred cows losing 
theirs, it is not wrong for the agent to save her own life by killing the cows.  The 
individual is harmed in one scenario and all the cows are harmed in the other, but 
the individual is not acting from selfishness when she kills the cows to save her 
own life; she is acting from self-preservation. 
According to normative sentimentalism, even in a situation in which an 
individual must choose between saving herself by killing and eating a hundred 
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other humans or allowing herself to perish to save the other hundred human lives 
neither choice the individual makes is morally wrong.  Again, although the 
consequences of such actions will be disliked by the impartial spectator, the moral 
agent’s action is not morally wrong because her motive will not be disapproved of 
by the impartial spectator (because she is acting from self-preservation and not 
selfishness).  (The motive of a moral agent who contributes to or allows such a 
thing is not disapproved of by the impartial spectator either.) 
I anticipate a critic saying something like the following: does the 
normative sentimentalist really want to say that in a situation in which the options 
are for you to be killed or a nuclear bomb will be dropped on a highly populated 
area neither choice is morally wrong, assuming all interests are equally relevant 
and that the decision-maker is not acting from selfishness?  Clearly, a preference 
utilitarian and Regan rights theorist will say it is morally wrong to choose to save 
yourself and allow so many others to die.  As in the other examples noted above, 
the normative sentimentalist response denies that it is morally wrong to choose to 
save yourself rather than the others, although you are not required to do so.  
Again, this is because the motive is not disapproved of by the impartial spectator, 
although the consequences are disliked.  However, as I have stated several times, 
this is not to say that we would want to encourage such actions.115   
                                                 
115
 That is, although I have made clear which actions are morally wrong in a number of 
examples, I have not explained which actions are morally right and are also those that we have 
positive reasons to perform and those that are morally right but that we do not have positive 
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It is understood that some will have a problem with this conclusion, viz., 
utilitarians, but it is not at all clear to me that we should be forced to aggregate 
when it comes to something as significant as our own lives.  It is not at all clear to 
me why I am or ought to be morally required to give up my life in a situation in 
which my choices are to die or to kill a hundred people to live.  This is not to say 
that I cannot choose to die and allow the hundred to live, but I do nothing morally 
wrong by failing to do so.  Given the strength of the instinct of or desire for self-
preservation, acting from it is not selfish. 
Even in situations in which individuals are not acting from self-
preservation, they are not morally required to aggregate.  For example, imagine a 
situation in which an individual has to choose between feeding herself or feeding 
a hundred hungry children.  There is nothing selfish about her choosing to feed 
herself and not the children.  Again, the interests of the individuals involved are 
equally relevant and significant to those of the children.  Thus, the individual does 
not act from selfishness when she chooses to satisfy her own interests; neither 
does someone who in some way contributes to or allows her to do so. 
                                                                                                                                     
reasons to perform.  As I stated above (1.2), my intuition is that those actions that are morally 
acceptable and that we have positive reasons to perform are those that are committed by moral 
agents whose motives are approved of by an impartial spectator and the consequences of which 
are liked by an impartial spectator.  Those actions that are morally permissible but we do not have 
positive reasons to perform are those committed by a moral agent and either her motives are not 
disapproved of by an impartial spectator or the consequences of the action are not disliked by an 
impartial spectator.  
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 I want to make it clear that it is only in the cases in which the interests of 
those affected are equivalent that normative sentimentalism permits aggregating 
or not.  So, as noted above, if the choice is between saving one life and that of a 
hundred others or feeding one hungry person and feeding a hundred others, one is 
permitted to choose either the one or the many in either case.  If the choice must 
be made between saving a single life and feeding a hundred hungry people, the 
interest of the one to live is more significant than the interests of the many in not 
being hungry and so it is morally impermissible to feed the many rather than save 
the life of the one.  Normative sentimentalism does not accept that the less 
significant interests or the trivial interests of the many can outweigh the 
significant interest of the one when the less significant or trivial interests are 
aggregated.  Again, in order for there to be no moral difference between saving 
the one or the many, the interests of each of those involved must be equally 
relevant.  For example, if the choice must be made between killing one and 
subjecting an infinite number of others to having a tooth pulled without 
anesthetic, one must choose to subject the infinite number to having the tooth 
pulled.  Although there will be a lot of pain and suffering because of this choice, 
not having one’s tooth pulled in this manner is a less significant interest than the 
interest one has in living, even if we aggregate the amount of pain and suffering 
ad infinitum.  
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A critic might argue that normative sentimentalism is too permissive with 
respect to the fact that it does not dictate or give specific directives for what to do 
in many cases.  For example, in a case mentioned above, we imagined a situation 
in which an individual must die in order for five others to be saved by using her 
organs.  Generally speaking, utilitarians will say that it is morally required that the 
one be killed to save the many.  Generally speaking, the rights theorist will say 
that it is morally wrong to kill the one to save the many (because treating the 
individual in this way is to fail to respect her inherent value).116  Because 
normative sentimentalism will judge as morally acceptable either killing the one 
or allowing the five to die (assuming their relevant interests are equal), it may be 
thought that normative sentimentalism is weak.  In other words, it might be 
argued that the class of morally acceptable actions in a given situation is too large 
according to normative sentimentalism. 
Not only do I disagree with the critic, but I think the fact that normative 
sentimentalism allows for more than one morally acceptable action in many 
situations is an advantage of the theory.  I think that to say that only one action is 
morally permissible in most situations is to look at things from a very limited 
perspective – the perspective that in most situations there is one moral feature that 
overrides all others, e.g., a utilitarian consideration, rights, duty, autonomy, 
contractualist considerations, etc.  Theories that force individuals to make 
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 Similarly, Kantians, on the face of it, will also judge such an action as morally wrong.   
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decisions based solely on consequences, and in particular on the aggregation of 
consequences, or on rights, duties, considerations of autonomy or contractualist 
considerations fail to give due respect and consideration to all aspects of human 
psychology.   
This is not to say that individuals who hold that in most situations there is 
only one morally right choice are utilitarians, rights theories, deontologists, or 
contractualists.  They may also, for example, be particularists.  My point is just 
that according to normative sentimentalism, it is not necessarily the case that in 
most situations there is one sole overriding moral consideration that ought to be 
the basis for our moral decisions or moral judgments.  Again, I think it is an 
advantage of normative sentimentalism that it allows for more than one action to 
be morally acceptable because in doing so it recognizes the complexity of human 
psychology and, as stated above, we ought to “make sure when constructing a 
moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, 
and behavior prescribed are possible … for creatures like us” (Flanagan, 32 and 
section 2.1.1).  Permitting individuals to decide, within some constraints, which 
feature of the situation is the most morally considerable does just this.  To hold 
that individuals will or ought to agree on which consideration is the morally 
relevant one in every situation is to hold us to an impossible standard.  This is 
obvious from the fact that there are utilitarians, deontologists, contractualists, 
virtue ethicists, and particularists. 
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Of course, as has been stated throughout this dissertation and as I noted 
just above, not all human psychological responses should be approved of, viz., 
extreme emotional responses, but moral theories that fail to recognize the 
complexity of the human intellect and sentiments, and their interaction with each 
other, are inadequate.  Normative sentimentalism takes human psychology into 
account in a way no other moral theory does, without sanctioning any and all 
reactions (and thus behaviors).   
 
5.3.3 Using Animals for Food and Research 
It might also be argued that the normative sentimentalist stance on using 
animals for food and research is too weak.  That is, as noted in chapter 3, 
consuming animals or using them for research is not morally wrong as long as it 
is either necessary or it is truly believed that doing so will save the lives of others.  
This is not a speciesist claim as the normative sentimentalist will allow for 
humans to be used in these ways as well.  Again, if the animals or human subjects 
are being used to save the lives of others, than those committing, contributing to, 
or allowing these actions are not acting from selfishness and thus their actions are 
not morally wrong (even though the actions have harmful consequences).  The 
same thing can be said in cases in which the animals (or humans) being used as 
research subjects are subjected to pain and suffering in order to relieve the pain 
and suffering of others.  Again, if the scientists are sure that the research will 
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serve the intended purpose, using the animals (or humans) in this way is merely 
giving the interests of the human beneficiaries greater consideration than the 
equally relevant interests of the animals (or other humans).  When a choice has to 
be made, if all the interests are equally relevant, it is not selfish to choose based 
on some other criterion, whether it be a theoretical commitment or a commitment 
to a loved one. 
Now, as has been explained above, that there might not be anything 
morally wrong with some actions is not to say that we want to encourage or 
permit them.  It might be the case that treating animals and humans as tools or 
means to ends will cause problems in society that we would rather avoid, e.g., that 
it will impact our treatment of others in every day life.  If this is the case, then we 
can and perhaps should by all means discourage it.  But, I reiterate, this is not to 
say that it is morally wrong. 
Furthermore, I think that it is an advantage of this theory that although it 
condemns most uses of animals for food and research, it will allow them in 
situations in which the interests of all those affected are equally relevant and in 
life and death situations.  In this way, it is better than preference utilitarianism 
because preference utilitarianism is too permissive in the use of animals in these 
ways and it is better than Regan’s rights theory which is too strict with its 




The purpose of this dissertation was to introduce a normative 
sentimentalist ethic.  The moral principle that was defended is: An act, or a failure 
to act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or 
allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial 
spectator and the act results in any consequences that are disliked by the impartial 
spectator.  It was explained that the class of motives that will be disapproved of 
includes, but is not necessarily limited to, selfishness.  One is selfish when one 
fails to give due consideration to the relevant interests of the others who will be 
affected by the action.  I also explained that consequences that are disliked are 
those that cause harm to a moral agent or moral patient.  In addition, it was 
established that the impartial spectator, although fictional, is the final judge of 
motives, consequences and thus actions.  She represents the viewpoint of the 
ordinary person when she is in the position of a non-involved spectator.  So, 
although she does not possess those traits specific to the person (people) 
principally involved, she does possess all the normal feelings characteristic of 
human nature - she possesses enough human characteristics to make her a good 
heuristic device, yet she is also an impartial bystander and so is able to properly 
evaluate actions. 
Part of the defense of this principle was to show how it handles two 
important moral issues, the treatment of CAFO and research animals.  According 
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to normative sentimentalism, factory farming animals and using them for research 
are on the whole morally wrong because the motives of the moral agents involved 
in the practice are generally disapproved of by the impartial spectator and the 
consequences of their actions are disliked by the impartial spectator.  This is 
because those involved are giving greater consideration to their own less 
significant interests than they are to the more significant interests of the animals 
all the while harming them.  Additionally, many of those causing, contributing to 
or allowing such practices are negligently ignorant and so are acting from a 
selfish motive.  However, if it is the case that the interests of both the potential 
human beneficiaries and the potential sacrificial animals are equally significant, 
then it is not selfish to give greater consideration to the humans and their interests.  
Yet, it was also established that it is not necessary for most humans to consume 
animals to survive and live a healthy life and that most uses of animals for 
research are far less valuable than is often claimed. 
After explaining Peter Singer’s preference utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s 
rights theory, it was shown that, although they were able to satisfactorily respond 
to several objections, they did not have satisfactory responses to some key 
objections.  The objection for which Singer does not have a satisfactory response 
is the “moral standing objection”.  According to this objection, Singer’s 
preference utilitarianism has a number of problems concerning the moral standing 
of sentient beings.  In particular, even though Singer claims sentient beings have 
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moral standing superior to that of non-sentient beings, his preference 
utilitarianism does not go far enough in protecting them against certain types of 
actions, viz., it does not offer them enough protection against killing.  
Regan leaves two significant objections unanswered.  The first is the 
“unknown inherent value objection” according to which a problem with Regan’s 
rights theory, because of the opportunity cost, is that we do not know how far 
down the line is drawn with respect to which animals possess inherent value and 
which do not.  The second is the “prohibition against aggregating harms 
objection” according to which a failure of the rights theory is its requiring the 
harming of a group of individuals (the many) rather than a single individual (or 
the few) if the harms each individual in the group will face are less than that 
which the individual will face even though the overall amount of harm will be 
greater. 
I showed in section 5.1 that normative sentimentalism can respond 
satisfactorily to all three of these objections.  With respect to the “moral standing 
objection”, normative sentimentalism does not suffer from the problem of 
preference utilitarianism in requiring an agent to take the lives of the few in order 
to save the lives of the many.  That is, normative sentimentalism allows for the 
killing of the few to save the many if and only if all relevant interest are given due 
consideration.  In a situation in which the relevant interests of those involved are 
equivalent, the moral agent does nothing wrong by causing, contributing to, or 
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allowing the death of the few or the many to save the lives of the many or the few.  
In addition, unlike preference utilitarianism, normative sentimentalism does not, 
at the very least, view beings that can be harmed as merely replaceable beings. 
I also explained that normative sentimentalism has a satisfactory response 
to the “unknown inherent value objection”.  Firstly, it does not classify beings in 
the way Regan’s rights theory does thus avoiding the problems associated with his 
taxonomy (or lack thereof).  Secondly, because the normative sentimentalist 
position regarding the use of animals for research is not an absolutist position like 
that of Regan’s rights theory, the risk of a high opportunity cost is much lower 
than that associated with Regan’s theory.  Again, normative sentimentalism will 
allow for the use of animals to save lives if we are convinced or as scientifically 
certain as we can be about their usefulness (because the relevant interests of the 
affected individuals are equivalent and therefore it is morally acceptable to choose 
one over the other, regardless of the species of the individuals that are involved).  
In addition, it was shown that normative sentimentalism does not have to worry 
about the “prohibition against aggregating harms objection” because in many 
cases there is no prohibition against aggregating harms in normative 
sentimentalism.  As noted above, if the relevant interests of those affected are 
equivalent, then the agent does nothing morally wrong by choosing the one or the 
many if she is forced to make such a decision. 
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Finally, I have shown that some possible objections to normative 
sentimentalism are easily answered.  I gave further support to the idea that acting 
from self-preservation is never a selfish motive thereby establishing that taking 
the lives of others to save ourselves is not morally wrong according to normative 
sentimentalism.  In addition, I showed that one of the advantages of normative 
sentimentalism is that, unlike Singer’s preference utilitarianism, it does not 
require an agent to aggregate the consequences of her action when making a 
moral decisions, but nor does it forbid it, as Regan’s rights theory does.   
Arguably, there are questions that still need to be answered with respect to 
this theory: which actions belong in the class of those that are morally acceptable 
but that we do not have positive reasons to perform and which actions belong in 
the class of those which are morally acceptable but that we also have positive 
reasons to perform; which acts are supererogatory; and what does normative 
sentimentalism have to say about other important contemporary moral issues such 
as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment and environmental ethics.  To answer 
these questions, other questions need to be answered, e.g., what constitutes a harm 
and, thus, what kinds of beings can be harmed.  In particular, I think it is 
important to establish whether exploitation is a harm.  Furthermore, a clear 
ranking of interests needs to be determined as does a more detailed understanding 
of selfishness.  My intuition is that “selfishness” will in fact turn out to be a 
broader concept than I have recognized here.  In addition, I think it is important to 
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get clear on the metaethical aspect of this theory and to determine what is actually 
occurring when the impartial spectator disapproves of a motive and when she 
dislikes a consequence.  That is, I want to ascertain whether it is a cognitivist or a 
non-cognitivist story to be told here and subsequently what kind of cognitivist or 
non-cognitivist story it is.   
 Ultimately, however, I believe this dissertation not only demonstrates that 
normative sentimentalism is a viable normative moral theory, but that it gives 
some compelling reasons, e.g., moral wrongness depends on both motives and 
consequences as well as the moral agency of the agent and normative 
sentimentalist conclusions regarding the morality of factory farming and using 
animals for research are in accord with our considered judgments, that normative 
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